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ABSTRACT 
 
 Although a number of approaches to the issue of religious violence are already 
available for academic consumption, this study attempts to approach the problem of the 
violent tension between religious principles and secular socio-political realities from a 
new perspective.  We argue that religious violence is best conceptualized as a moment of 
crisis in the relationship between law and justice, considered as both intimately related (in 
Kant’s analysis of the rightful condition) and peculiarly disjointed (in Derrida’s 
reflections on the possibility of “justice beyond law”).  We provide a preliminary account 
of the necessary conditions for a future theory of religious violence based on our effort to 
recontextualize the discussion of the corresponding issues by paying close theoretical 
attention to the interaction between the concepts of law, justice, violence, and religion.  
We conclude that any theoretical reevaluation of religious violence must inevitably widen 
its scope to include not only such customary problems as the relationship between “faith” 
and “knowledge” or the relationship between “private beliefs” and “public duties,” but 
also an account of the peculiarly religious motivational framework that often implicitly 
guides our conversations about any future human condition of peace and justice.  
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Fiat iustitia, pereat mundus. 
I 
Introduction: Situating the Problem of Religious Violence. 
 
The role of religion in modern life is an issue that has been continuously drawing 
attention from a variety of angles, but lately, especially after the events of 9/11, from a 
peculiar perspective of investigating the role of religion in sanctioning, condoning and 
even requiring acts of violence.  This essay hopes to be an addition to a larger field of the 
study of the relationship between religion and violence.  Our overall goal is to craft a 
conceptual framework for dealing with the contemporary resurgence of religiously 
motivated violence, or, as we will refer to this relationship between religion and violence 
throughout this essay, religious violence.  This term has suffered the rather unfortunate 
fate of being used to describe such a wide variety of examples of behaviors that its 
continued use in this essay seems like a rather foolish endeavor.  However, as we hope to 
argue, it is partially this overuse and this lack of conceptual sophistication that will 
allows us to initiate the necessary task of rethinking the very issues involved in any 
serious discussion of religious violence.  Our general intention in this essay is to 
decontextualize the problem of religious violence, that is, to take a closer look at the 
usual framing of the problem by shifting certain ideas, assumptions, prejudices and 
foregone conclusions around in order to see if a better, more nuanced and more effective 
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framework might be constructed.  This new framework can only be given in a 
preliminary promissory form, yet this essay intends to present an argument that would 
allow us to recontextualize the problem of religious violence in such a manner as to allow 
a future researcher to proceed in a number of fruitful directions.  The issue of religious 
violence, we insist, is certainly an important one both in terms of its own peculiar 
problematic and in terms of its ability to shed light on a number of important 
contemporary problems.       
Raising the issue of religion today and proposing to reassess its lasting influence 
is no longer an odd theoretical move.  This is the case, for the most part, because we have 
learned, despite general hopes of modern secularism, that religion is not disappearing 
from the public sphere and is not likely to diminish its influence in the near future.  
Although we have talked about the religious influences during the past couple of 
centuries in terms of secularization, it is clear from even a superficial look at the most 
recent events in the world that religion is asserting itself as never having left the public 
debate.  The typical narrative of secularization (and the resulting secular condition) 
recounts the story of a gradual liberation of human reason and human spirit from the 
superstitious bounds of religious prejudice in the wake of the horrible sectarian wars of 
sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe.1  This narrative describes the eventual advance 
of science and undoing of religious belief as humans became more self-sufficient, 
                                                
1 Cf. Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce, “Secularization: The Orthodox Model,” in Religion and Modernization: 
Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 8-
30;  Steve Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003);  Pippa 
Norris and Ronald Ingleheart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), esp. chapter 1-3;  Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, 
Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).  See also Charles Taylor’s latest book – A 
Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007) – that deals with a larger context of secularization and 
related matters.  
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rational, progressive and modern.  In this common narrative, secularism and religion 
function as opposites.   
The starting point of much of the contemporary discourse on secularism is often 
traced back to the ideas of the Enlightenment: religious superstition is a sign of human 
immaturity and dependence on the authority of tradition; any sensible liberation of human 
spirit from the bonds of superstition, unquestioned obedience and slavery of ignorance 
must involve the weakening of religion and its institutions.  The imagery of liberation is 
essential for any secularist discourse on religion.  The Enlightenment, of course, as a 
rather complex historical movement, if such ever existed in any unified and easily 
identifiable way, produced a great variety of responses to religion, ranging from 
Voltaire’s hostility to religion to Kant’s attempts to justify “rational faith.”2  However, it 
is clear that this very distinction between private (religious) and public (secular) spheres, 
as José Casanova argues, is essential to any modern social secular order.3  Religion as a 
private affair of the citizens is constitutive of Western modernity in the dual sense: on 
one hand, it points to a freedom of conscience (internal freedom) as a precondition of all 
modern freedoms; on the other hand, it points to a process of institutional differentiation 
where religion is “progressively forced to evacuate the modern secular state and the 
modern capitalist economy.”4   
The resurgence of the interest in religion today is undoubtedly caused by the 
events of 9/11 and the revelation that all of the perpetrators were, in fact, religious 
                                                
2 For an overview of Enlightenment’s ideas on religion, among many other valuable sources, see Dorinda 
Outram, The Enlightenment, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 8: “The Rise 
of Modern Paganism? Religion and Enlightenment,” 109-25. Cf. Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: The Rise 
of Modern Paganism (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1995). 
3 José Casanova, “Private and Public Religions,” Social Research 59:1 (Spring 1992): 17-57. 
4 Casanova, “Private and Public Religions,” 18. 
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persons who conceived of their actions as following a religious prescription.  After the 
attacks of 9/11, a great number of reactions shook the public sphere in the US.  The 
general mood was that of puzzlement, shock and, eventually, anger and frustration.  In 
February 2002, for example, a group of 60 or so American intellectuals signed a “Letter 
from America: What We Are Fighting for,” drafted by Jean Bethke Elshtain.5  The letter 
was a curious combination of appeals to universal human rights, calls for justice, and a 
sophistical argument in the favor of war against those who hate “American values” and 
“American way of life.”   
If the letter’s only evidence was a delusional reference to “international Islamicist 
network, active in as many as 40 countries, now known to the world as Al Qaeda,” 
evidence that has been thoroughly discredited and exposed as being based on nothing but 
a propagandistic effort to justify a war, this letter could be easily dismissed as another 
hysterical conservative overreaction.6  However, the signatories presented their 
justification of “war on terror” in terms of the need to reestablish that “the best of what 
we too casually call ‘American values’ do not belong only to America, but are in fact the 
shared inheritance of humankind, and therefore a possible basis of hope for a world 
community based on peace and justice.”7  Duncan Forrester insightfully points out the 
following essential contradiction at the heart of this document and many similar reactions 
to the events of 9/11:  
                                                
5 The letter originally appeared on the website of Institute for American Values 
(http://www.americanvalues.org/html/wwff.html), a conservative think tank. It was later republished as an 
appendix to Elshtain’s book Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World 
(New York: Basic Books, 2003), 182-98.  
6 Cf. Jason Burke, Al Queda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2004), 7-8.  
7 Elshtain, Just War, 185. Emphasis added.  
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After declaring that ‘We are united in our belief that invoking God’s authority to 
kill or maim human beings is immoral and is contrary to faith in God’, the 
signatories appeal to the tradition of the just war and say that, ‘there are times 
when waging war is not only morally permitted, but morally necessary, as 
response to calamitous acts of violence, hatred and injustice. This is one of these 
times’.  Apparently waging a ‘just war’ in the course of which many innocent 
non-combatants will be killed is acceptable provided the name of God is not 
invoked.8 
 
It is indeed not the appeal to “American values” and the universal rights and ideas of 
peace and justice in the world that is so peculiar about much of the post 9/11 reaction, but 
a peculiar blindness vis-à-vis the issues of serious engagement with the issue of religious 
violence.  On one hand, the above mentioned letter clearly promotes “deepening and 
renewing our appreciation of religion by recognizing religious freedom as a fundamental 
right of all people in every nation,” yet, on the other hand, this appreciation of religion 
ends as soon religion turns violent as “killing in the name of God is contrary to faith in 
God and is the greatest betrayal of the universality of religious faith.”9  There is no doubt, 
we are told, that in such cases we are witnessing “a world-threatening evil that clearly 
requires the use of force to remove it.  Organized killers with global reach now threaten 
all of us.  In the name of universal human morality, and fully conscious of the restrictions 
and requirements of a just war, we support our government’s, and our society’s, decision 
to use force of arms against them.”10  
 In this essay we would like to explore a possibility of another conceptual 
approach toward the issue of religious violence that not only attempts to decode the 
various conceptual clichés, including the most powerful one, it seems, of religious 
                                                
8 Duncan Forrester, Apocalypse Now? Reflections on Faith in a Time of Terror (Burlington: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2005), 3. 
9 Elshtain, Just War, 188, 183. Emphasis added.  
10 Elshtain, Just War, 192. Emphasis added.  
 6 
 
violence as evil, used to describe the present struggles against the evils of religion, but 
allows us to rethink and to reconfigure the number of essential concepts necessary for any 
adequate theory of religion and violence.  Before we proceed, we will provide a short 
overview of the recent literature dedicated explicitly to the problem of religious violence.  
Although this overview is far from being inclusive of all the work done in the field, it is 
representative of the main more or less influential approaches to the problem of religious 
violence.  These are the approaches that we will argue are in need of major rethinking 
and decontextualization.  In what follows we identify the defining characteristics of a 
number of takes on the issue of religious violence and discuss what we judge to be the 
particular problems of this or that conceptualization of religious violence.  
 
1. Religious Violence: The State of Research. 
 The matter of religious violence has received a rather disproportionate amount of 
attention after the attacks of 9/11.  Where previously only a few interested specialists, 
either academics or security experts and consultants, claimed expertise and attempted to 
provide a theoretical analysis of the subject matter, now there is a multitude of 
disciplinary perspectives.  Although the distinction between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 
research might appear somewhat unjustified, there were plenty of instances of religiously 
motivated acts of violence, including religious terrorism, before 9/11, we agree with 
Hector Avalos who, among others, introduces such distinction and argues that it indicates 
a different attitude to the issue of religious violence, an approach that no longer considers 
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it a marginal and insignificant subject matter.11  Indeed, the attacks of 9/11 have revived 
an interest not only in religious violence, but also in the role of religion in general.  We 
think that a great variety of approaches to the problem of religious violence can be 
classified into four major groups according to the main emphasis of each approach: 
religious violence as a result of particular scriptural interpretation, religious violence as 
an indication of a psychological conflict, religious violence as a result of civilizational 
clash, and, finally, religious violence as a form of apocalyptic violence.  
 The relationship between religious violence and its scriptural justifications is 
often presented in a more or less traditional “history of religion” approach first 
formulated and exemplified by Mircea Eliade.  In his classic book The Sacred and the 
Profane: The Nature of Religion, Eliade proposes to call “history of religion” a special 
“branch of knowledge”: “The science of religion, as an autonomous discipline devoted to 
analyzing the common elements of the different religions and seeking to deduce the laws 
of their evolution, and especially to discover and define the origin and first form of 
religion, is a very recent addition to the sciences.”12  This new science of religion 
attempts to formulate the essence and the history of religion.   
 The example of the recent study of the relationship between religion and violence 
based on the assumption that religious people commit acts of violence in the name of 
their beliefs derived from their sacred texts is a study of monotheism – The Curse of 
                                                
11 Hector Avalos, Fighting Words: The Origin of Religious Violence (New York: Prometheus Books, 
2005), esp. 39-90. 
12 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1959), 216. 
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Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism – by Regina M. Schwartz.13  Although a great 
number of studies exist on the issue of how particular religious texts allegedly encourage 
violent behavior, Schwartz’s book can be taken as an excellent representative of this 
approach in that it deals with texts of monotheism as producing a distinctive collective 
identity that in turn spawns violence.  In other words, Schwartz’s essential assumption is 
that acts of religious violence originate in the interpretation of foundational sacred texts 
and the ultimate influence this interpretation plays in a formation of collective identity of 
believers.  Violence of identity formation is thus original violence that expresses itself in 
some secondary acts of violence that are aimed at protecting collective identity when it is 
perceived to be under threat.  
Schwartz “locates the origins of violence in identity formation, arguing that 
imaginary identity as an act of distinguishing and separating from others, of boundary 
making and line drawing, is the most frequent and fundamental act of violence we 
commit.”14  Referring to Judaism, Schwartz writes: “Identities have of late come to be 
thought of as provisional, constructed, arbitrary, and one way to understand the biblical 
stories is to see them engaged in efforts to strengthen the precariousness of collective 
identity formations.”15  This emphasis on identity formation as an essential violent act 
can be further confirmed by recent work of Amartya Sen who in Identity and Violence 
also argues that violence arises from an imposition of a singular and a non-negotiable 
                                                
13 Regina M. Schwartz, The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997). 
14 Schwartz, The Curse of Cain, 5. 
15 Schwartz, The Curse of Cain, 17-8. 
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religious or cultural identity.16  If such collective identity is formed as a result of 
communal reading and interpretation of the sacred texts, we are told, then our attempts to 
deal with religious violence must involve knowledge of these texts and history of their 
interpretation.   
Although much of Schwartz’s study deals with monotheistic religions and much 
of her discussion can be labeled a kind of “cultural criticism,” we are calling her 
description of violence scriptural because much of it is based on the assumption of a very 
close (yet not fully explored) connection between religion’s texts and its general 
behavioral standards.17  This model works even for religions that do not have a strict set 
of authoritative books like three major monotheistic religions discussed by Schwartz 
because the general approach is to assume a closer relationship between the external 
signs of authority (texts, rites, tradition, geographic location, clergy, ethnicity and so on) 
and internal disposition of those who claim to be adherents of a particular religion.  This 
assumption is the weak point of this approach precisely because it tends to identify a 
privileged site of authority in its attempts to understand religion and its violent 
expressions.  It relies primarily on insider testimonies, whether it is actual religious 
                                                
16 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006). Cf. 
Sudhir Kakar, The Color of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion and Conflict (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996).  
17 For an excellent criticism of this assumption in relation to Schwatz’s book, see Peter Berkowitz, “Thou 
Shall Not Kill,” The New Republic (June 23, 1997), 41-45.  Berkowitz argues that Schwatz interprets 
biblical texts in such a way as to present their violent destructive interpretations while avoiding confronting 
an obvious possibility of reading these biblical texts productively and positively.  “The Bible does have a 
dark side, and Schwartz has confronted it with gusto.  But the Bible's dark side is not the Bible's whole 
story, and it will be misunderstood if it is wrenched from context, if it is read reductively, if the interpreters 
who have lived with and transmitted the text are ignored, if its self-presentation as a document that depicts 
the revelation of the one God, creator of the heavens and earth, is imperiously dismissed out of hand as so 
much superstitious stuff and nonsense.  Had Schwartz approached the Bible with the respect for 
multiplicity that she preaches throughout her book, she would have contributed more effectively to a 
venerable tradition of moral criticism.  For the curse of Cain is not easily or smugly dispelled.  And one of 
the blessings that the Bible bestows is an understanding of why not.” (45)  
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people who share their views on the matter or texts and other institutions of tradition that 
can be interrogated on the subject matter. 18  The essential issue with this approach is not 
so much its insistence that the origin of religious violence lies in the interpretative 
practice that makes a number of assertions about the meaning of this or that particular 
text.  We are not contesting that certain interpretations do encourage certain types of 
behavior.  Yet the interpretation itself does not take place in a vacuum.  The question that 
we must ask vis-à-vis approaches to religious violence as resulting from a violent 
interpretation is the following: how is this violent interpretation produced?  It is certainly 
not impossible to assume that some texts or doctrinal propositions can be and often are 
understood as encouraging violent behavior by those who adhere to a specific religion.  
However, our general approach in this essay is to look for an overall theoretical 
framework that makes violent interpretations possible and here we think that to delegate 
the issue of religious violence to the issue of textual interpretation, whether the causal 
links are presented as simple and direct or as complex and indirect, is to ignore a larger 
issue of the conditions of possibility of particular interpretations of texts that encourage 
violent behavior.  
The next large group of sources that deals with religious violence is the group of 
studies of psychology of religious violence.  Here again we need to point out that studies 
of religion and its psychological structures come before the actual application of these 
                                                
18 For more studies of religious violence from a scriptural perspective see, among other studies, Peter 
Partner, God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam (London: HarperCollins, 1997); John Kelsay 
and James Turner Johnson, eds., Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in 
Western and Islamic Tradition (New York: Greenwood, 1991);  Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000);  Nancy Tatom Ammerman, Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the 
Modern World (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987).  For a counter-argument, see James G. 
Williams, The Bible, Violence, and the Sacred: Liberation from the Myth of Sanctioned Violence (San 
Francisco: Harper, 1991). 
 11 
 
psychological theories to the study of violence.  The major difference in interpreting 
religious violence as a psychological violence is that it does not really concern itself with 
the explicit religious message and does not rely solely on the insider accounts.  
According to the psychological interpretations, it is not specific texts or theological 
positions that cause religious violence but a certain psychological dysfunction such as 
accumulated aggression, envy, sexual repression and so on.  Of course, any discussion of 
psychology of religious violence would be incomplete without a mention of Freud who 
articulated many of the basic notions in Totem and Taboo and The Future of an Illusion.19  
Freud’s general approach to the analysis of religion is premised on his view that 
human society is only possible in a situation where individual humans must repress their 
instinctual sexual and aggressive desires.20  Freud’s position on religion and violence is 
additionally premised on his generally pessimistic view of human nature where actual 
conflicts, wars and other examples of aggression are only secondary expressions of some 
primary violent identity formed by demands of coexisting with others.  For Freud, 
religion is essentially and inherently a violent affair of fighting, killing, and sacrificing 
both animals and humans in the name of religious beliefs, even if this explicitly 
murderous agenda is often unconsciously covered up with an elaborate network of texts, 
rituals, and beliefs.  The scholar who has paid much attention to this Freudian tradition 
and who gained much prominence attempting to articulate a view of religious violence 
from this psychological perspective is René Girard whose work on the issues of religious 
                                                
19 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950) and 
Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961). 
For a general introduction to the relationship between Freud’s psychoanalysis and religion, see Erich 
Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) and Gregory Zilboorg, 
Freud and Religion: A Restatement of an Old Controversy (Westminster: Newman Press, 1958). 
20 Cf. Michael F. Palmer, Freud and Jung of Religion (London: Routledge, 1997) and Donald Capps, Freud 
and Freudians on Religion: A Reader (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).  
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violence have remained highly influential, even if still controversial.  For the purposes of 
this introduction we can mention his early book Violence and the Sacred.  Girard, 
however, continued to engage the themes of religion and violence throughout his career.21  
Girard views religion, not unlike Freud, as an outlet for our repressed aggression 
and sexual desires.  Yet for Girard, religion’s role in defusing and redirecting this 
aggression into a more socially acceptable and ultimately manageable way is essential for 
any attempt to deal with the issues of religion and violence.  Girard contests Freud’s view 
of aggression as coming from our instincts and suggests that the true source of violence is 
found in human culture that creates and encourages “mimetic desire” that is based on 
envy and jealousy: “the subject desires the object because the rival desires it.”22  Girard 
argues that this mimetic desire is at the very basis of human culture and creates 
aggression that can only be released in a ritualized way of religious sacrifice.  
Religion invariably strives to subdue violence, to keep it from running wild.  
Paradoxically the religious and moral authorities in a community attempt to instill 
nonviolence, as an active force into daily life and as a mediating force into ritual 
life, through the application of violence…  Primitive religion tames, trains, arms 
and directs violent impulses as a defensive force against those forms of violence 
that society regards as inadmissible.  It postulates a strange mix of violence and 
nonviolence.  The same can perhaps be said of our own judicial system of 
control.23 
 
This last reference to the similarity between religion’s attempts to regulate violence and 
law’s overall task of managing violence is important as it indicates a connection between 
religious institutions, rituals, and secular institutions of law and order that, of course, 
                                                
21 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (London: Continuum Press, 2005). See also 
his Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, trans. Stephen Bann (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1987), The Scapegoat, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1989), and I 
See Satan Fall Like Lightning, (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2001). 
22 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 154-55. 
23 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 21. Emphasis added. Cf. “Religion shelters us from violence just as 
violence seeks shelter in religion.” (25) 
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historically have interacted throughout the history of humanity.  Ultimately Girard’s 
thought-provoking analysis is an important example of a speculatively rich cultural 
analysis, even if it seems to lack a genuine anthropological and pragmatic research angle.  
Girard’s theory and its implications are build on a psychology of culture and its rituals, 
and are suggestive in many productive ways, especially in terms of building a broad 
theoretical base in any attempts to think about such large topics as “religion” and 
“violence.”   
Girard’s work remains controversial precisely because of its seeming lack of 
experimental data and its very broad theoretical sweep.  The important point of 
contention is whether there is a demonstrable relation between Girard’s symbolic 
violence of religious rituals and real violence of religiously motivated acts of murder and 
terrorism?  Mark Juergensmeyer, whose work we will discuss shortly, suggests that this 
is precisely the problem with Girard and others who propose a theory of symbolic 
violence without necessarily tying it to specific instances of “real” violence.24  However, 
if we return for a moment to “history of religion” approach exemplified by the likes of 
Mircea Eliade and Rudolf Otto, we will see that their theoretical discussions of the 
essence of religion are also only tangentially based on experimental data and 
ethnographic observations.  For example, Rudolf Otto’s influential work on the idea of 
the holy – The Idea of the Holy – is very much a theological rather than social scientific 
study.25  Yet the very impulse to theorize religion (and violence) in terms of essential 
                                                
24 See Juergensmeyer’s introduction to the collection of essays on the matter, “Editor’s Introduction: Is 
Symbolic Violence Related to Real Violence?” in Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World, ed. Mark 
Juergensmeyer (London: Frank Cass, 1991). 
25 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry Into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and 
Its Relation to the Rational, trans. John Wilfred Harvey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931).  For an 
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characteristics, although unfashionable after the various critiques of essentialism and 
foundationalism, is still very much the bread and butter of any serious attempt at thinking 
about religion and violence.  Girard’s theorization of religious violence is therefore 
firmly situated in the great tradition of Feuerbach, Marx and Freud’s sweeping 
generalizations that paradoxically produce a necessary effect of thinking about religion’s 
role in human society with enough theoretical power to change our very perception of 
religious violence, the way we must approach it, and, ultimately, the way we must 
confront it.  
Although this essay’s main motivation is to situate religious violence in a 
different conceptual framework, we are sympathetic to Girard’s overall intention of 
providing us with a broad cultural presentation of religion.  While it seems to pursue the 
study of religious violence in a very universalizing and even totalizing manner, 
suggesting that all religions and their rituals come from some universal characteristic of 
human nature and human culture, we believe that the real value of Girard’s contribution 
is its prescriptive presentation of the subject matter.  When Girard suggests that all 
religious violence is based on mimetic desire that attempts to manage and regulate the 
resultant aggression, it is possible to read him as prescriptively arguing that this is how 
we must understand religious violence and that all other instances of violence that do not 
fit the theoretical model should thus be excluded.  This emphasis on the normative 
                                                                                                                                            
short and excellent discussion of Otto’s approach see chapter 5 of Seth Daniel Kunin, Religion: The 
Modern Theories (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 62-68. 
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impulse of any theorization of religious violence is something that we will borrow from 
Girard and other psychological interpretations.26  
The next group of theoretical engagements with religious violence takes religious 
conflicts to be resulting from larger geopolitical encounters between various civilizational 
units.  This encounter between religious and cultural identities can be understood as both 
a real and a perceived conflict of civilizational identities.  We will first consider what is 
now widely regarded as an influential theoretical model of the “clash of civilizations,” a 
model that has been criticized for an unfair imposition of the Western view of religion 
and culture on the complex realities of international conflicts.  This idea of civilizational 
conflict comes from Samuel Huntington’s often-referenced book The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.27  The reason we are drawing attention 
to this work is found in Huntington’s choice to define his civilizational associations along 
the lines of religious affiliation.  Civilization here is a unit that transcends particular 
nation-states and cultures, and forms a larger collective entity that Huntington chooses to 
designate using the language of religion rather than ethnicity, nationality, race, or 
geographical location (all of these ultimately contribute to the final collective 
civilizational identity but none is preferred to any other).  A civilization is, according to 
                                                
26 For more on Girard and his psychological interpretation of religious violence see Gil Baillie, Violence 
Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads (New York: Crossroad, 1995); Paisley Livingston, Models of 
Desire: Rene Girard and the Psychology of Mimesis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); 
Andrew J. McKenna, Violence and Differenc: Girard, Derrida, and Deconstruction (Urbana-Champagne: 
University of Illinois Press, 1992); Violence Renounced: Rene Girard, Biblical Studies and Peacemaking, 
ed. Willard Swartly (Telford: Pandora Press, 200); Baruch Levine, "Rene Girard on Job: the Question of 
the Scapegoat,”  Semeia 33 (1985): 125-133.  For a critical discussion of Girard’s mimesis, see Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe, “Typography,” in Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, trans. Christopher Fynsk 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 102ff. [43-138]  
27 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1996). 
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Huntington, the “highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural 
identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species.”28   
 The source of conflict between various civilizational groupings is the perceived 
threat to one’s civilization and its religious culture.  Violence is then a legitimate attempt 
to maintain the integrity of one’s civilizational identity.  Violent defense of one’s religion 
and culture is then perceived as necessary and justifiable, regardless of the means.  This 
thesis that most of the contemporary conflicts must be understood in terms of the larger 
clashes between various collective identities is an attractive (and very convenient) way of 
making sense of the increasing amount of violence, allowing us to interpret most of the 
violence as implicitly religious due to civilizational identity’s inherent religiosity.  
Yet there are plenty of voices that contest not so much the theoretical power of 
Huntington’s thesis or its practical potency but its ultimately hegemonic nature of 
prescribing perhaps too much.29  In other words, if we accept Huntington’s notion that we 
must interpret contemporary conflicts as conflicts of civilizations rather than nation-states 
or international entities, we are allowing the simplicity of our theory to undermine the 
inherent complexity of any conflict.30  This, of course, is the inherent danger of any 
attempt at theorization of such a complex relationship as that between religion and 
violence.  It is here that we need to mention a number of approaches to the issue of 
                                                
28 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 43. 
29 For an excellent critique of Huntington’s awkward labeling of civilizations along the lines of religion and 
culture see Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity (London: Verso, 
2003), 273ff.  
30 For a number of engagements with “Huntington’s thesis” see the essays that originally appeared in 
Foreign Affairs magazine and later republished as The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate (New York: The 
Council of Foreign Relations, 1996).  For a different take on the matter, see The Clash of Civilizations? 
Asian Responses, ed. Salim Rashid (Dhaka: The University Press, 2003).  See also Dieter Senghaas, Clash 
Within Civilizations: Coming to Terms with Cultural Conflicts (London: Routledge, 2002), chapter 7 and 
Lee Harris, Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2004), 44ff.   
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religious violence that are less grandiose and hegemonic, yet that still rely on the 
language of religious and cultural identity.  Attempts by such authors as Jessica Stern and 
Mark Juergensmeyer to understand why specific religious organizations encourage and 
perpetrate violence can be categorized as social scientific, descriptive, and even 
journalistic approaches, yet we argue that both Stern and Juergensmeyer are still caught 
up in a sort of analysis that, if pushed further along its argumentative lines, can lead us to 
ideas of civilizational conflict approach represented by Huntington.  
Jessica Stern’s book – Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill – 
aims to explain the main motivations behind much of religious violence and relies 
primarily on insider accounts.31  Religious terrorism, argues Stern, “arises from pain and 
loss and from impatience with a God who is slow to respond to our plight, who doesn’t 
answer.  Its converts often long for a simpler time, when right and wrong were clear, 
when there were heroes and martyrs, when the story was simple, when the neighborhood 
was small, when we knew one another.”32  Stern’s methodological approach is very 
simple – talk to terrorists and see what they have to say about their own motivations and 
their own justifications.  Stern is driven by her desire to find out “how people who claim 
to be motivated by religious principles come to kill innocent people in the service of 
ideas,” as if the notion of violence in the name of ideas and ideological positions is a 
complete novelty.33  This methodological naiveté – all we need to do is ask them why 
they want to kill innocent people and they will tell us – is found in the very assumption 
                                                
31 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: HarperCollins, 
2003). 
32 Stern, Terror in the Name of God, xi. 
33 Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 281. 
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that we need to “completely empathize with the pain and frustration”34 of religious 
activists, yet it makes Stern’s analysis strangely thought-provoking because it allows her 
to present her own views on the matter as an occasional commentary and as a seemingly 
secondary framing of the issues.  Like other civilizational accounts of the reasons for 
religious violence, Stern presents the issues of civilizational conflict in terms of perceived 
dangers of globalization.  As Thomas Mockaitis puts it, referring to Stern’s work, “the 
homogenizing effect of globalization threatens to make every place just like every other 
place, creating social and psychological dissonances that produce violence.”35  Stern’s 
combination of psychological and civilizational explanation of religious violence, 
although somewhat theoretically superficial, reminds us once again of the need to 
theorize religion and violence in broader terms than one is usually advised to do. 
Stern’s reliance on testimonial accounts of the perpetrators of religious violence, 
despite her warnings that such accounts cannot always be trusted, allows us to see the 
main weaknesses of her descriptive approach: the majority of concepts that need to be 
explained and questioned remain in the background.  We are to assume that everyone 
already knows what religion, violence, terrorism, identity, injustice and so on are.  All we 
have to do at this point, Stern suggests, is to shape our domestic and foreign policies 
based on our research so that most of the violence-triggering issues are successfully 
avoided.   
Unlike Stern, Mark Juergensmeyer’s study of religious violence – Terror in the 
Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence – dedicates only a half of the book 
                                                
34 Stern, Terror in the Name of God, xvi. 
35 Thomas R. Mockaitis, The “New” Terrorism: Myths and Reality (Westport: Praeger Security 
International, 2007), 45. 
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to the accounts of witnesses and perpetrators of religious violence, while the second half 
of the book is dedicated to attempts to provide a theoretical framework.36  Juergensmeyer 
is guided by a similar set of concerns as that of Stern and others who approach the 
problem of religious violence from a more or less commonsensical point of view of 
essentially peaceful nature of religion:  
Most people feel that religion should provide tranquility and peace, not terror.  
Yet in many of these cases religion has supplied not only the ideology but also the 
motivation and the organizational structure for the perpetrators…  What puzzles 
me is not why bad things are done by bad people, but rather why bad things are 
done by people who otherwise appear to be good – in cases of religious terrorism, 
by pious people dedicated to a moral vision of the world.”37  
  
This concern with morality was already a point of interest in Stern’s study that suggested 
that religious terrorists act out of certain sense that gross injustices have been committed 
and all legitimate ways of confronting such injustices have been exhausted.  This 
“enormous amount of moral presumption”38 that allows religious terrorists to justify their 
acts of violence is fully illustrated in the first six chapters of the book in which 
Juergensmeyer presents the results of the multiple interviews he has conducted with a 
number of prominent supporters of religious violence from several religions.  It is the 
second part of the book, however, that provides us with an attempt to theorize religious 
violence: “The very adjectives used to describe acts of religious terrorism – symbolic, 
dramatic, and theatrical – suggest we look at them not as tactics but as performance 
violence.”39 
                                                
36 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, third revised ed. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). 
37 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 5, 7. Emphasis added.  
38 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 11.  
39 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 126. 
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Whether all of the acts of violence described in the book can neatly fit 
Juergensmeyer’s definition of “performance violence” can be debated, but what is 
essential to his argument still stands, i.e., religious violence is concerned not only (and 
maybe even not so much) with the protection of some cultural-civilizational identity, but 
with the appeal to some universal symbols of higher law and justice.  In one of the more 
powerful chapters of the book – “Cosmic War” – Juergensmeyer gathers various threads 
of his discussion into a picture of a “culture of violence”: “[The] images of divine 
warfare are persistent features of religious activism.  They provide the content and the 
themes that are played out in the grand scenarios that lie behind contemporary acts of 
performance violence.”40  The essential connection between rituals of symbolic violence, 
often found in many religious creeds and practices, and “real acts of violence,” writes 
Juergensmeyer, is the connection we ought to examine more carefully: 
The question of why images of cosmic struggle are translated into real acts of 
violence is complicated, since the line between symbolic and actual violence is 
thin.  Symbols are sometimes more than just fictional representations of the real 
thing.  Rites of sacrifice, for instance, often involve killing, and feats of 
martyrdom lead to death.  The symbiosis between symbolic and real violence is 
profound and goes to the very heart of the religious imagination.41 
 
Although Juergensmeyer seems to imply throughout that “real violence” consists in 
actual physical murder or physical harm done to others, while symbolic violence only 
represents such acts, it is clear that he is not sure about this very distinction himself and 
attempts to articulate a more sophisticated position that escapes the usual definition of 
violence as physical violation and presents religious violence as primarily a violence of 
ideology and its performance or its acting out of the cosmic battle.  In the final chapter of 
                                                
40 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 149. 
41 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 164. 
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the book – “The Mind of God” – Juergensmeyer presents but does not fully develop the 
prescriptive theory of how we must understand and deal with religious violence.  One of 
the most important aspects of Juergensmeyer’s analysis is an effort to escape the 
limitations of seeing religious violence as a defense of performative cultural-civilizational 
identity and an attempt to think religious violence in terms of a juxtaposition between 
juridico-political authority of the earthly powers and divine authority that brings ultimate 
justice to those who actively seek it.  
 
2. Religious Violence and Apocalyptic Faith.  
The value of a civilizational approach is found in its insistence that contemporary 
conflicts be evaluated not on a level of nation-states fighting each other for resources or 
influence, but on a level that transcends the geographical and political limitations of 
nation-states and looks for a larger international perspective.  However, thinking of 
religious violence as civilizational or identity-oriented violence puts the main emphasis 
on cultural, social or religious identity that is perceived to be under threat and needs to be 
defended.  Charles Selengut in his study of various theories of religious violence – 
Sacred Fury: Understanding Religious Violence – identifies a group of theoretical 
approaches that insist that only violence in the name of some future ideal society is to be 
labeled “religious violence.”42   
In a way continuing Juergensmeyer’s discussion of “cosmic war,” Selengut writes 
that, according to some religious believers, the “establishment of God’s order will not 
come easily.  The forces of good will have to confront the forces of evil and a terrifying, 
                                                
42 Charles Selengut, Sacred Fury: Understanding Religious Violence (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2003), chapter 3. 
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cataclysmic event causing great suffering and destruction – the apocalypse – will 
transform the universe and usher in the new age of peace and harmony.”43  Although the 
coming of the new age is usually placed above any human agency in most established 
religions, writes Selengut, there’s always a number of marginal groups that promote the 
need to hasten the coming apocalypse, “break through the boundaries of everyday life 
and achieve a sacred reality.”44  This notion of transcending the ordinary world and 
reaching a radical and alternative reality combined with a search for ultimate justice often 
creates an antinomian sentiment of opposing all “rules, norms, and legalities of the 
established order.”45 
 Religious violence as apocalyptic violence then is based not only on the 
opposition to the present socio-political situation, often characterized as that of injustice 
and chaos, but also on the very clear insistence that this old world must be destroyed in 
order to make room for the new age of peace and justice.  However, unlike revolutionary 
movements with their reliance primarily on human agency and active political change, 
apocalyptic violence attempts to trigger the catastrophe by acts of violence that are aimed 
to provoke, to threaten the status quo, to terrorize those who are either aware of the 
problems but are complacent or in need of conversion to this vision of the new age.  This 
vision of religious violence as violence in the name of the future age of peace and justice, 
despite its clear religious imagery, however, introduces an essential element into any 
                                                
43 Selengut, Sacred Fury, 95-6. 
44 Selengut, Sacred Fury, 98.  
45 Selengut, Sacred Fury, 100. Cf. Charles Selengut, “Eschatology and the Construction of Alternative 
Realities: Towards a Social Conflict Perspective on Millennialism,” in The Return of the Millenium, ed. J. 
Bettis and S. K. Johannesen (Barrytown: New Era Books, 1984).  
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discussion of religious violence an element of social and political struggle against 
injustice.46   
 It is essential to add, however, that Selengut often confuses so-called “apocalyptic 
groups” and their actions with what he initially purported to describe as theorizing 
religious violence as apocalyptic violence, which suggests that only those acts that are 
committed in the name of the soon to be revealed new age are to be considered examples 
of religious violence and everything else needs a different theoretical framework.  In 
other words, the confusion is between the claim that apocalyptic violence is a type of 
religious violence and the claim that apocalyptic violence is the only type of violence that 
can genuinely be described as religious.  It is essential to repeat this point vis-à-vis all of 
the views of theorizing religious violence discussed so far: religious violence as 
scriptural, psychological, civilizational, or apocalyptic violence.  When attempting to 
understand the essential characteristic of a violent act that makes it an act of religious 
violence, as opposed to other types of violence, we cannot simply state that it is an act 
committed by religious persons in the name of some religious principles.  All of the 
discussed approaches attempt to go further than that and propose to have identified, more 
or less successfully, a certain defining characteristic that allows us to explain what 
separates acts of religious violence from other violent acts.   
                                                
46 For more discussions of apocalyptic religious groups and ideologies, see Norman Cohn, Cosmos, Chaos, 
and the World to Come: The Ancient Roots of Apocalyptic Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1993); Paul Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1994); Daniel Wojcik, The End of the World As We Know It: Faith, Fatalism 
and Apocalypse in America (New York: New York University Press, 1999), esp. chapter 7; Richard K. 
Fenn, Dreams of Glory: The Sources of Apocalyptic Terror (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 
2006).  For an interesting theological treatment of apocalyptic sensibilities of the twentieth century, see 
Ulrich H. J. Körtner, The End of the World: A Theological Interpretation, trans. Douglas W. Scott 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995) and Duncan B. Forrester, Apocalypse Now? Reflections 
on Faith in a Time of Terror (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), esp. chapter 5. 
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Although a more sophisticated theory of religious violence might include several 
of the discussed perspectives, we are keeping them separate in order to better articulate 
the issues at hand.  We argue that the last theoretical framework of presenting religious 
violence as apocalyptic violence, with some necessary changes discussed in this essay, 
will serve best the purposes of articulating the rising number of acts of violence 
committed in the name of religious beliefs.  In order to support this claim and to move 
our discussion along, we would like to end this review of literature on religious violence 
with a look at two authors whose perspectives on the matter have been influential in our 
attempt to initiate a different take on the matter of religious violence.  
The first author, James F. Rinehart, is a political scientist who lately has been 
drawing attention to the issue of apocalyptic or millennial violence in his books on 
religious terrorism and millenarianism.47  The second author, Hent de Vries, is a 
philosopher who wrote two seminal works that connected recent philosophical trends to 
what he labeled “the turn to religion” and paid close attention to the issue of 
“apocalyptics” in Derrida and Kant.48  Both authors both posit the problem in an original 
way so as to displace the issue of religious violence from its traditionally marginal status 
of extremist activity of the few crazed fanatics and reintroduce the issue of religion and 
violence and place it into the very heart of the debates about law, justice, violence, force, 
freedom and other essential topics of contemporary public conversation.  
                                                
47 James F. Rinehart, Revolutions and the Millennium: China, Mexico, and Iran (Westport: Praeger, 1997) 
and idem, Apocalyptic Faith and Political Violence: Prophets of Terror (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006) 
48 Hent de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) 
and idem, Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspective from Kant to Derrida (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
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Rinehart’s recent study of millenarianism builds on already significant research 
done in this area, research that conclusively shows the error of associating “end of times” 
(or millenarian) movements only with the three monotheistic religions.49  Rinehart 
presents us with a carefully argued picture of a terrorist who, as it happens, is never really 
quite secular, despite the fact that most of Rinehart’s examples do not come from what is 
traditionally understood as religious violence: “…to become a terrorist one must possess 
two congruent cognitions: (1) a worldview that clarifies one’s conceptualization of what 
is just and unjust in some highly satisfactory way, and (2) the establishment and 
sustainment of an identity consistent with that worldview.”50  Rinehart’s “millenarian 
terrorists” use violence in order to achieve a perceived sacred cause, and “although they 
possess a firm loyalty to the conventions of stable and orderly daily life within their 
society and are obliged to ensure their longevity, under certain conditions of 
disorientation, disharmony, and/or foreign impingement that threaten the institutions and 
norms of their way of life, they are driven to invoke traditional images of cultural 
salience.”51  
Apocalyptic violence then, according to Rinehart, is not an anarchic violence that 
is aimed at total destruction of lawful society as such, but an effort to correct the present 
situation of depravity and degradation in order to reestablish the proper order to things.  
Such a potentially violent position then involves a sophisticated ideological litmus test 
that allows one to recognize the condition of injustice and disorder and to experience this 
                                                
49 Among a number of studies one might list here, see Vittorio Lanternari, The Religions of the Oppressed: 
A Study of Modern Messianic Cults (New York: Mentor Books, 1965); Michael Barkun, Disaster and the 
Millennium (New Have: Yale University Press, 1974); Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China: The 
Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror: 
Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, 1996).   
50 Rinehart, Apocalyptic Faith, 27. Emphasis added. 
51 Rinehart, Apocalyptic Faith, 28. Emphasis added.  
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condition as a violation of sacred norms.  This peculiar connection between an always in 
some way defective “how things are” and an always ideal and coming “how things 
should be,” notices Rinehart, is not just a feature of this particular way of thinking about 
the relationship between socio-political demands and sacred duty to correct the situation, 
but is, in fact, “the intellectual mother of all political ideologies.  It is the ultimate belief 
system.  No other set of ideas offers such a compelling message and provides such a 
powerful tool for influencing the popular mind.  It is the definite articulation of 
discontent and a powerful unifying force that provides the most effective meaning to 
popular grievances.”52  
This destructive power of “apocalyptic faith” is nothing new.  However, we think 
about it in terms of a simple pronouncement: any and all human institutions, including 
basic ideas of morality and legality, are finite because they are constructed for the sake of 
peaceful human coexistence.  When such coexistence is perceived as being impossible, 
when the present moral and legal standards are no longer corresponding with those of 
higher justice, one is justified in overthrowing the corrupt order in order to usher in the 
new order.  This justification, however, always comes from the outside of any present 
moral and legal order, and this outside is always identified as transcending any human 
institution and therefore sacred.  This transcendent nature of the outside justice that 
judges the present state of affairs, argues Rinehart, is nothing but a religious idea of 
justice, or justice presented as a sacred duty in an implicitly or explicitly religious 
                                                
52 Rinehart, Apocalyptic Faith, 30.  Cf. the concluding paragraph of the study: “Violence comes to be seen 
as a tool for abolishing the old and accelerating the new.  Nonetheless, in each of these cases [Peru, Iraq 
and Japan, discussed in detail in the book] the resources to actually affect substantive change were scarce.  
Out of desperation, yet imbued with a sacred sense of destiny, they resorted to the use of an instrument that 
could render the anticipated denouement: terrorism.” (167) 
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language.  What makes this appeal to higher justice an example of “apocalyptic faith” is 
the insistence on both the possibility of the continual moral and socio-political 
improvement in view of the standards of this higher justice and the ultimate faith in the 
future, even if always to come in some cases, ideal state of peace, justice and harmony 
(either literally in the form of perfect religious community, or ideally as an orienteer for 
present decisions).  
Hent de Vries’ insightful analysis of how contemporary philosophical discussion 
is experiencing a “turn to religion” is then a way of addressing some of the issues of what 
he labels “apocalyptics” raised by Rinehart’s analysis of specific millenarian movements.  
De Vries’ two works on religion and philosophy can be read as two volumes of the same 
project dealing with the role of religion and its violent expressions in the contemporary 
philosophical discourse. 53  The first book’s project is self-professedly humble as de Vries 
proposed to analyze “the theoretical significance of religious and theological citations in 
writings whose roots lie in the phenomenological tradition, although by historical 
accident they came in the United States to be associated first with ‘structuralist 
controversy’ and then with poststructularism and its purported godfathers, Nietzsche, 
Marx, and Freud.”54  The second book continues to discuss the same phenomenological 
tradition and now adds that we have to state that there is “no violence without (some) 
religion; no religion without (some) violence.”55 
                                                
53 In fact, in the Preface to Philosophy and the Turn to Religion de Vries announces the forthcoming 
“sequel” that was provisionally titled Horror Religiosus and subsequently became Religion and Violence. 
See de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, xi.  
54 De Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, xi. 
55 De Vries, Religion and Violence, 1. 
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Although de Vries surveys a great number of contemporary thinkers, the primary 
figure in both works is Jacques Derrida.  In fact, as several reviewers pointed out, the 
titles of the works are somewhat misleading because they promise but do not deliver 
either in terms of explicitly showing the philosophy’s recent “turn to religion” or in terms 
of providing “philosophical perspectives from Kant to Derrida,” as the subtitle of the 
second book clearly indicated.56  Both books however are magisterial studies of the 
works of such a great number of scholars, even if ultimately only in connection with the 
thought of Derrida, that any attempt at a summary would not do them justice.  Derrida’s 
deconstructive attempts at reassessing the philosophemes of the Enlightenment, writes de 
Vries, present us with a unique effort to identify a certain “apocalyptic genre” at the very 
heart of the most of the Enlightenment philosophy, Kant being one of the main 
representatives of such philosophical position.57  Derrida, notes de Vries, directly 
encounters Kant’s discussion of the law and finds all sorts of uncomfortable gaps and 
suppressed movements in it.  The main point of Derrida’s critique of Kant is the 
repressed narrativity of the moral law that is reduced to a set of formal criteria and 
therefore lacks material substance and practicality.  This criticism, of course, is a peculiar 
version of Hegel’s famous critique of Kant’s formalism, yet, writes de Vries, Derrida’s 
attitude is not to reject Kant but to rethink his approach, now explicitly with a discussion 
of religion in mind.  The “apocalyptics” of Enlightenment, according to de Vries, consists 
in a vision of humanity that, while aware of its own finitude, establishes a kind of secular 
                                                
56 See, for example, Martin Kavka, “Review of Hent de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion,” MLN 
116:5 (December 2001):1119-23 and Charles K. Bellinger, “Review of Hent de Vries, Religion and 
Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
72:1 (2004): 247-49. 
57 De Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, 361. 
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religion of law and order, enthusiastically affirming rationality and moral progress as all 
but necessary elements of any human development.  The theme of religion thus, or rather 
of “rational theology,” comes prominently to the forefront of any discussion of Kant and 
other Enlightenment thinkers who affirm the secular neutrality of reason: 
[Any] attempt to immunize reason against all seduction by preventing it from 
making a surreptitious slip from the noumenal into the phenomenal… also 
confronts thought with the danger of yet another eclipse or apocalypse.  For, the 
defense of neutrality of tone in philosopher, the pretense that philosophy could 
leave tonal differences behind, ultimately comes down to condemning it to a 
certain death.58  
 
De Vries analyzes Derrida’s engagement with Kant, yet he does not have time or space 
for the notion of “religious violence,” despite the very title of the book – Religion and 
Violence.  De Vries’ analysis of Derrida’s engagement with religious and theological 
themes is thorough and comprehensive, and yet it leaves enough conceptual space for us 
to fill the large gaps, especially since de Vries’ explicit perspective on the matter is an 
exegetical study of the late phenomenological tradition.  Our task on the other hand is to 
approach the issue of religious violence from a perspective of its conceptual involvement 
with the notion of justice, the notion that is not completely absent from de Vries’ 
analysis, but that also does not receives as much attention as we think it should.59  To put 
it differently, de Vries does not emphasize the connection between philosophy’s turn to 
religion, violence and the call for justice in a way that would reveal the possible ways of 
rethinking the problem of “religious violence,” as his most important concern, after a 
need to carefully summarize and articulate the discussed positions, is to present a more 
                                                
58 De Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, 380. 
59 De Vries writes about justice in Philosophy and the Turn to Religion almost exclusively in terms of 
Derrida’s analysis of it in “Force of Law” as “emphatic, excessive, paradoxical, or even aporetic notion of 
‘justice’.” (91)   
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nuanced and sophisticated version of the a history of contemporary phenomenological 
tradition’s recent conceptual developments.60  However, de Vries’ studies give us a 
conceptual framework of thinking about religious violence in terms of a larger set of 
philosophical concepts, rather than approaching it scripturally, psychologically or 
sociologically.   
 
3.Why Kant and Derrida? 
Although not the first one to point out the relationship between religion, violence 
and apocalyptic violence, de Vries is certainly the first one to give it a more or less 
detailed attention.61  However, our primary goal in this essay is to take a much closer 
look at some aspects of Kant’s practical philosophy and Derrida’s late engagement with 
the issues of law and justice in order to clarify the relationship between religion and 
violence in terms of the difference (and the tension it creates and maintains) between law 
and justice.  This difference, we argue, is what first produces the sense of dissonance in 
any pursuit of a more just and harmonious society, the pursuit that we characterized as 
driven by “apocalyptic faith” in transcending moral depravity and stifling legal 
formalism.  Although we accepts that there exists a number of possible conceptual ways 
of approaching the issues at hand, we intend to argue that our appeal to the thought of 
                                                
60 It would be unfair to forget here another important work on Derrida’s ideas of “apocalyptics” and 
“messianic without messianism” that, however, do not directly connect these to religious violence but 
contain insightful analyses of Derrida’s concepts, namely John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of 
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Tone,” in Raising the Tone of Philosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique by 
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Kant and Derrida produces the most potent combination of insights vis-à-vis the problem 
of religious violence.  
 Although comparing the work of Kant and Derrida is not an absolutely novel 
theoretical move, the coupling is rather unusual.  In fact, what philosophical interaction 
that will take place between Kant and Derrida in this essay can very well be described in 
terms of a forced encounter.  This methodology of a forced encounter, if one were to give 
it a short explanation, is aimed at comparing the philosophical ideas rather than 
philosophical persons or the corpuses of writing.  Even though it is not difficult to show 
that Derrida indeed engaged Kant in many of his texts, the point of this study is not 
necessarily to establish any sort of philosophical lineage from Kant to Derrida.62  Our 
task instead is to establish a connection between certain conceptualizations of law, 
justice, religion and violence in Kant and Derrida.  In this sense, it is our task to force 
Kant and Derrida, or rather their peculiar ways of approaching a number of issues, to 
encounter each other’s concepts and to see what happens.  The task may be more difficult 
and treacherous than it may appear at first glance, but we are certain that it is not 
impossible to demonstrate that when it comes to the discussions of law, justice, religion 
and violence, Kant’s and Derrida’s thinking spins around the same axis.  
 If there is a sense in which Kant and Derrida are both pursuing similar 
philosophical projects, for example, both can be characterized as “critical philosophers” 
in Kantian sense, there’s also a way to see the two as almost diametrically opposite.  Kant 
                                                
62 For Derrida’s explicit discussion of Kant, see, for example, Jacques Derrida, “On a Newly Arisen 
Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy,” in Raising the Tone of Philosophy: Late Essay by Immanuel Kant, 
Transformative Critique by Jacques Derrida, ed. Peter Fenves (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993), 117-71 or Jacques Derrida, Truth in Painting, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 37ff. For a study that suggested early on that Derrida’s 
philosophy was deeply rooted in European Continental tradition see Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of the 
Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
 32 
 
was a system builder, regardless of some of the issues discussed in his final and never 
published work.63  Derrida was a system destroyer, regardless of his continuous 
protestations against misreading “deconstruction” as “destruction.”  Kant agonized in “a 
pain like that of Tantalus” over the possibility that he will die without being able to 
complete his system that is, “both as regards its means and its ends, is capable of 
completion.”64  Derrida agonized over the apparently intentional refusal to understand his 
thought by those who, without much engagement and familiarity with his texts, in 
advance declared him a fraud and a charlatan, without any interest in advancing the 
discussion of essential issues.65  Yet both were driven by a certain concern for justice: 
Kant understood justice as a system of laws and a socio-political order that would 
eventually lead us to “perpetual peace,” while Derrida insisted that justice is outside of 
the law, that it is “what gives us the impulse, the drive, or the movement to improve the 
law, that is, to deconstruct the law.”66  For Kant, justice can be achieved through a 
harmonization of human wills that, while giving up certain rights, are united in their 
respect for the law, while Derrida argued, again and again, that justice implied “non-
                                                
63 Eckart Förster, for example, have argued that Kant’s Opus Postumum gives us a set of notes on what was 
to become a work labeled “Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics” 
that, in a sense, would complete Kant’s system by showing how physics was possible.  As late as 1798, 
writes Förster, Kant agonized over an alleged “gap” in his “uncompleted philosophy.” Kant repeatedly 
asserted that what was eventually published as Opus Postumum would be his most important work, yet the 
work did not receive much attention and it is still quite unclear what we should make of it. See Eckart 
Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis: An Essay on the Opus Postumum (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2000), chapter 3;  Eckart Förster, “Fichte, Beck and Schelling in Kant’s Opus Postumum,” in Kant and His 
Influence, eds. George MacDonald Ross, Tony McWalter (London: Continuum, 2005), 146-69. 
64 Ak. 12:257. Cited in Immanuel Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, 1795-99, trans. and ed. Arnulf 
Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 251.  
65 See, for example, Derrida’s letter to Gerald Graff published as “Afterword: Toward an Ethic of 
Discussion,” in Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., trans. Samuel Weber (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1988), 111-60.  
66 Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, ed. John D. 
Caputo (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 16. 
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gathering, dissociation, heterogeneity, non-identity with itself, endless inadequation, 
infinite transcendence.”67 
 Whether justice is a perfect union of a multitude of humans in the rightful 
condition, or it is something that is always beyond this legal arrangement and pushes for 
improvement of the law, it is clear that both Kant and Derrida agree that there is a need to 
make a conceptual distinction between law and justice.  Although the phrase “between 
law and justice” in the title of this dissertation comes from Derrida’s discussion of the 
issue, we will argue that it is applicable to Kant’s presentation of the issue as well, 
because, as we will see, we take Derrida’s fundamental insight – that only with the 
concept of justice as something extraneous to the order of law is there a possibility to 
improve, not just change, the law – to be essential to any conversation about justice.  
However, the opening of the space of difference between law and justice does not come 
without a price.  We will attempt to formulate a theoretical approach to violence in the 
name of religion, interpreting this sort of violence to be a reaction to the ever-widening 
gap between the finitude of the law and the infinitude of justice. In this sense, if Kant 
comes to us as an essential thinker of the rightful condition of the law, Derrida fulfills a 
“quasi-prophetic function of simply pointing out the finitude of law [which is] justice.”68 
 Our choice of Kant and Derrida is by no means arbitrary.  Kant provides us with a 
theory of the rightful condition that stands between the early modern theory of social 
contract and natural law and the late modern formalization and unification of law that 
eventually resulted in legal positivism’s erasure of any significant difference between the 
ideas of law and justice.  Kant’s theory of right, as we will see, allows us to frame our 
                                                
67 Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell,17.  
68 James K. A. Smith, Jacques Derrida: Live Theory (London: Continuum, 2005), 66. 
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discussion of law and justice in a way that does not completely ignore or exclude the 
issues of coercion, violence and religion.  Kant’s conceptualization of right (Recht) and 
justice (Gerechtigkeit) gives us an opportunity to take a look at the development of 
certain models of the relationship between law and justice that reveal some intriguing 
difficulties and inconsistencies.  Despite Kant’s efforts to formulate his practical 
philosophy in terms of smoothing over any possible conflicts between moral ideals of 
reason and practical goals of political activity, there remains in his work a clear sense that 
there is an irreparable fracture within the law itself.  This fracture is made explicit in the 
work of late Derrida.  Although Kant is not the only target of Derrida’s critique of 
contemporary discourse of legal positivism, thought here as any discourse that aims to 
explain the notion of justice away as an embarrassing atavism of religious belief in God’s 
law as natural law, we believe that isolating certain aspects of Derrida’s critique and 
forcing them to encounter certain aspects of Kant’s discourse will allow us to gain some 
useful insights into the workings of law, justice, violence and religion.  In one sense then, 
we claim that Kant’s discussion of law, justice, violence and religion is blind to certain 
aspects of this problematic that are visible to Derrida only.  Yet, at the same time, 
Derrida’s theoretical engagement is itself blind to certain aspects that we have adopted 
from Kantian tradition and bringing Kant’s theory of right back would allow us to 
articulate them better.  In the end, however, the goal of this essay is not that of a 
comparative study in the works of Kant and Derrida, but an attempt to articulate a better 
approach to the issues of religious violence.  In the rest of this introductory chapter we 
want to summarize and succinctly present our overall argument.      
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4. The Summary of the Argument 
 In order to make the complex matter of this essay more easily accessible, and 
therefore better understood, in what follows we will provide here a short overview of the 
general structure of our argument.  The argument of this essay could be formulated as the 
following: It is impossible to properly assess the legitimacy (and therefore the 
illegitimacy) of certain acts of violence without the proper analysis of the very notion of 
legitimacy or lawfulness (the example of the so-called “religious violence” serves this 
purpose the best, as is our contention) that contain within itself a simultaneous forceful 
foreclosure of any possible challenge to itself (the concept of law that guarantees its 
stability and endurance) and an implicit opening of the possibility of its own destruction 
(the concept of justice that guarantees its continual change and transformation).  The 
example of  “religious violence” is a privileged example because it allows us both to 
analyze a number of juridico-political postulates concerning the nature of law and justice 
(and corresponding social arrangements) and to provide any future discussion of religion 
and violence with a new theoretical framework (even if not yet a fully developed theory 
of religious violence).  To put it differently, the problem of religious violence, framed 
properly and examined in its relation to the concepts of law and justice, serves as a 
privileged entry point not only into the subject matter of the present societal tensions 
related to violent expressions of religious faith (or, at least, as taken to be such 
expression), but also into the discussion of the very foundation and maintenance of the 
contemporary Western (and therefore global) conceptualization of the role of law and 
justice.  
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The issue of religion and its public role, having received some attention recently, 
needs to be further rethought in light of its apparent role in promoting violent behavior. 
However, the traditional approaches of attempting to identify the source of religious 
violence are limited due to their tendency to isolate the question of religion and violence 
it allegedly condones from the overall socio-political structure of legality and legitimacy 
(law, right, justice, coercion, and religion).  In order to achieve the task of an adequate 
rethinking of the role of religion in the public sphere, we must identify those elements of 
religion’s involvement with acts of violence committed in its name that reveal its implicit 
connection to the concepts of law and justice, or rather its connection to the very problem 
of the theoretical articulation of the relationship between law and justice.  These terms, 
law and justice, although long accepted as secular (or rather secularized) ideas, are found 
to be still not entirely divorced from their religious origins in any serious analysis of the 
possibility of violence not only as a violation of the law (criminality), but as a suspension 
or even a cancellation of the law in the name of the higher justice (revolution).  A 
peculiar case of such opposition to the order of law that, we argue, provides us with a 
better insight into the workings of law and justice (and by proxy of human society in 
general) is a case of suspension of law in the name of justice.  Such radical challenge to 
the order of law in the name of higher order of justice is impossible to understand and 
theorize without an explicit reference to the notion of religion.69  Religious violence, 
therefore, becomes a conceptualization of this challenge to the order of the law in the 
name of justice.  
                                                
69 See, for example, Harold J. Berman’s discussion of the relationship between law and religion in The 
Interaction of Law and Religion (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1974). 
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The suspension of the law in the name of justice is a peculiar conceptual knot that 
can only be untied in the context of a political theory that accounts for both the 
appearance of lawful or rightful condition and the continuous presence of the idea of 
justice that regulates, directs and, in case of need, transforms the existing law.  Kant’s 
political theory, based on the theorization of the transition from the state of nature to the 
state of law, is the theory of law/right (Recht) that reveals, even if not always willingly, 
the fundamental issue at the very heart of our formulations of legality, legitimacy, or 
lawfulness: as soon as human beings enter (voluntarily or through coercion) into a 
rightful condition and thus establish legality, they are obligated to take the next logical 
step, in the name of justice, and proceed to the next level of international and then 
cosmopolitan rightful condition, thus finding themselves compelled (and morally 
obligated) to insure that rightful condition spreads until it includes every single 
individual, thus making the initial decision to establish the rightful condition less an act 
of freedom and more an act of necessity.  Yet, for Kant, the rightful condition, potentially 
spread over the whole of earth’s surface, is the ultimate incarnation of freedom, even if 
individuals that find themselves in a less than perfect (just) state of law are not allowed to 
forcefully change it but can only hope that their enlightened leaders would eventually 
reform it, if they are inclined to do so.  Kant’s theory of rightful condition, although 
based on familiar articulations of social contract ideas, thus perceives the force and the 
logic of any lawfulness as, positively, continuously propelling itself toward a better (more 
just) societal arrangement and, negatively, continuously eliminating any possibility of 
ever returning to the state of nature, that is, any possibility of suspension or cancellation 
of the order of law.  
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The discrepancy between the promised stability of law and the continuous 
transformational requirement of justice, situated in a peculiar Enlightenment-influenced 
understanding of human institutions and their history, constitutes the space of difference 
between law and justice that Kant attempts to adequately account for, and his failure to 
do so satisfactorily, as we will insist, is as instructive as it is inevitable.  Derrida’s 
engagement with the issues of law and justice reveals the fact the above-mentioned 
discrepancy is not accidental but constitutes the very founding moment of modern 
articulations of the nature of law and legality: any attempt to ground the idea of law in a 
narrative of a voluntary transition from a lawless state of nature to a lawful state that 
guarantees rights, even if presented as a pure hypothetical decision theorized for the sake 
of an argument, reveals a hidden movement of excluding any reference to the 
transcendent (religious) idea of justice as true exteriority to the order of a newly 
established law, that is, as a truly external criterion that can be applied to any given legal 
arrangement.  Derrida’s reflections on the issues of law and justice, read in the context of 
Kant’s initial formulations of the corresponding questions, allow us to articulate and thus 
better understand a peculiar contemporary complaint of the subjects in the rightful 
condition that feel that they are no longer able to reference and insist on such seemingly 
archaic notions as justice.  Certainly, the idea of justice is far from gone in contemporary 
moral and political conversations, and yet it appears less in legal contexts and more in 
religious contexts.  The paradox of “it is legal but it is unjust” is more often articulated by 
appeals to extra-legal notions of transcendent justice and judgment rather than some 
higher institution of a specific legal system.  To act in the name of justice today is often 
to act outside of or even directly against a given legal condition.  
 39 
 
It is essential at this point to realize that religious violence is never a problem of 
particular individuals committing acts of violence against other individuals in the name of 
some religious beliefs, but always a socio-political problem of the relationship between 
individuals in a larger societal arrangement.  Still, even this seemingly clear distinction 
between religious violence as an ethical issue and religious violence as a legal or political 
issue is quickly problematized if we take a look at a comprehensive philosophical effort 
to think both ethics and politics as a part of one practical philosophy.  We therefore do 
not intend to ignore ethical and individual aspects of religious violence, but only suggest 
that if all previous efforts to understand the causes of such violence were mainly oriented 
toward problem solving, we are intending in this essay to ask a series of questions 
connected to problem setting, i.e., we are interested first and foremost in trying to 
understand what kind of problem is this problem of religious violence?  A disclaimer, 
then: while the problem of religious violence primarily exists as an ethical and political 
problem, our concern is with religious violence in a philosophical context.  
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II 
Kant’s Dilemma: On Morality and Legality. 
 
 We begin our investigation with a look at Kant’s philosophical treatment of the 
problem of law and justice.1  Kant is one of the few philosophers to make a 
comprehensive attempt at a practical philosophy that is still influential and still in need of 
much elaboration and application.2  Our primary purpose in this chapter is to show that 
the problem of the relationship between religion and violence cannot be properly 
formulated (and therefore properly addressed and dealt with) without a series of questions 
related to the very foundation of our societal arrangement based primarily on our trust in 
the force of law.  Kant’s practical philosophy provides us with not just an example of the 
possible conceptualization of the relationship between individuals in the state of law, but 
with an ultimate realization and articulation of the modern ideals of a perfect society that 
go back to the philosophical exercises of the Enlightenment.  To paraphrase early Marx’s 
                                                
1 In Kantian vocabulary, we mean the notions of Gesetz (law), Recht (right) and Gerechtigkeit (justice).  
The latter two roughly correspond to Latin ius and iustitia.  The problem of an adequate translation of these 
terms into English is well known and is discussed, among many other places, in Mary J. Gregor, 
“Translator’s Note On the Text of The Metaphysics of Morals,” in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, 
trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 357-358. See also John Ladd, 
“Translator’s Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of The 
Metaphysics of Morals, trans. John Ladd (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965).    
2 Among the most important applications of Kantian insights in contemporary practical philosophy are 
those of John Rawls whose magisterial A Theory of Justice is still an essential read for anyone interested in 
issues of justice.  See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001).  See also John Rawls, Justice As Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001) and John Rawls: Foundations and Method, ed. Chandran Kukathas (London: Routledge, 2003), Part 
8: “Rawls and Kant,” 343-84. 
 41 
 
reflection on the nature of private property – “private property has made us so stupid and 
partial that an object is only ours when we own it”3 – we can characterize Kant’s ultimate 
articulation of the social relations in terms of law and right as having made us so stupid 
that we can only think of a lasting social bond and a genuine political interaction in terms 
of guaranteed rights and enforced laws.  Any more or less serious attempt to question the 
total reign of law and legality is usually characterized as anything from petty criminality 
to evildoing and sociopathic disposition.  To think about the present societal arrangement 
outside of its reliance on legality is one of challenges that we believe we are still facing 
and we are still not taking seriously enough.  The present analysis of religious violence, 
even if initially in its vulgar representation as violence committed by religious fanatics in 
the name of some irrational ideals, allows us to attempt to get an access to a whole other 
level of socio-political inner workings of contemporary life.  Kant helps us see the 
paradoxical nature of the rightful condition.  Our analysis of Kant’s practical philosophy, 
however schematic, will show us both the problem of law in its rejection of the 
(transcendent) idea of justice and the solution that we will further articulate with help 
from Derrida.       
Describing what Kant’s philosophy is all about is never easy, regardless of one’s 
level of expertise.  It is, however, clear from Kant’s own testimony and a multitude of 
references throughout his texts, that practical philosophy is indeed his central concern.  
Although usually (and unfortunately) the complex discussion of the conditions of the 
possibility of knowledge in Critique of Pure Reason receives most attention, it is 
important to remember that all of that preparatory work is done in order that we can put 
                                                
3 Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. T.B. Bottomore (London, Watts & Co., 1964), 159. 
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our practical philosophical doctrines on a firm ground.  This view is confirmed by Kant 
himself who, in the final sections of the first Critique, states:  
Until now, however, the concept of philosophy has been only a scholastic 
concept, namely that of a system of cognition that is sought only as a science 
without having as its end anything more than the systematic unity of this 
knowledge, thus the logical perfection of cognition.  But there is also a 
cosmopolitan concept (conceptus cosmicus) that has always grounded this term, 
especially when it is, as it were, personified and represented as an archetype in the 
ideal of the philosopher.  From this point of view philosophy is the science of the 
relation of all cognition to the essential ends of human reason (teleologia rationis 
humanae), and the philosopher is not an artist of reason but a legislator of human 
reason.4   
 
This clear evaluation of the true task of philosophy as dealing with the “ends of human 
reason” and not only with a necessary but, if done for its own sake, ultimately vain, 
systematization of knowledge, is a good example of Kant’s ultimate desire to make 
philosophical science serve the overall practical goal of all humanity (cosmos).  It is 
essential that we keep in mind our overall goal of clarifying the relationship between the 
notions of law, justice, violence and religion as, we argue, these constitute the backbone 
of Kant’s articulation of the ideal of human society.  
It is fair to observe with Otfried Höffe that “from the very outset of Occidental 
legal thought, philosophers have asked whether positive law is committed to [some] 
general moral principles.”5  Such assessment of the situation can be explained in very 
general terms as a need for practical philosophy that encompasses both ethical theory of 
individual action and a political theory that regulates the actions of all the members of a 
political unit.  The question of the relationship between positive law and its (moral) 
foundation cannot be adequately addressed without a central concept of justice.  
                                                
4 Ak. A839/B867, CPR, 694-95. 
5 Otfried Höffe, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace, trans. Alexandra Newton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 79.  
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Although Kant regularly associates justice with the judiciary, he also suggests that, as 
Höffe puts it, “justice is to be equated with the moral concept of right.”6  In fact, Kant 
compares any attempt to theorize justice and law without reference to the universal moral 
principles to “the wooden head in Phaedrus’s fable, a merely empirical doctrine of right 
is a head that may be beautiful but unfortunately it has no brain.”7  Although Kant’s 
concerns with practical philosophy are found throughout his corpus, it is in the later work 
specifically dedicated to the articulation of his political theory that we find the most 
promising (and most puzzling) discussions.    
 
1. Kant’s Doctrine of Right. 
Kant’s most detailed elaboration of the issue of law and justice is found in his late 
work The Metaphysics of Morals.  This book consists of two large sections – the doctrine 
of right and the doctrine of virtue – and attempts to articulate Kant’s understanding of the 
issues of law and justice (gathered under the discussion of Recht) and virtue (fulfilling the 
early promise to supplement the discussions of formal structures and conditions of the 
possibility of ethics with the corresponding discussion of the material content).  The 
purpose of “The Doctrine of Right” is to demonstrate the general mistake of empirical 
jurisprudence.  Although Kant states that only the state of law is the state of the 
possibility of justice, it is clear that justice itself is not a simple descriptor of the sum of 
positive laws.  No matter how smoothly a legal system runs or how law-abiding the 
citizens are, the only way to have a just legal order is through a careful theoretical 
                                                
6 Höffe, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory, 79. 
7 Ak. 6:230, MM, 387. 
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analysis of the principle of justice: what makes this and not that arrangement of laws just 
or unjust?   
Kant’s discussion of justice in “The Doctrine of Right” begins with a setting of 
boundaries.  The discussion of these preliminary matters falls under the rubric of the 
“universal criterion” by which one knows what is just and what is unjust in the body of 
laws.   
In contrast to laws of nature, [the] laws of freedom are called moral [moralisch] 
laws.  As directed merely to external actions and their conformity to law they are 
called juridical [juridisch] laws; but if they also require that they (the laws) 
themselves be the determining grounds of actions, they are ethical [ethisch] laws, 
and then one says that conformity with juridical law is the legality of an action 
and conformity with ethical law is its morality.  The freedom to which the former 
laws refer can be only freedom in the external use of choice [Willkür], but the 
freedom to which the latter refer is freedom in both the external and internal use 
of choice, insofar as it is determined by laws of reason.8 
 
Kant clearly distinguishes between morality and legality here as two distinct perspectives 
of evaluation of the same action.  It is not the case that some actions are moral and some 
are legal, but that the same action, considered from two perspectives of freedom, is either 
moral or immoral and legal or illegal (four basic combinations would be “moral and 
legal,” “immoral and legal,” “moral and illegal,” and “immoral and illegal”).  The 
possibility that an action can be immoral but legal and, the most interesting case in our 
judgment, that an action can be moral but illegal is clearly implied in Kant’s definition.  
We have to emphasize this point once again by stating that for Kant all laws regulating 
human behavior are moral laws and therefore they all must pass the test of the categorical 
imperative.  To put it differently, it is not the case that morality as such can be closed off 
from any discussion of legality, and legality cannot be either grounded or evaluated 
                                                
8 Ak. 6:214, MM, 270.  
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without any reference to morality.  This distinction between morality and legality is not 
necessarily unique as the attempts to articulate a political theory with an explicit 
reference to virtue go back as far as Plato’s Republic.  What is unique about Kant’s 
approach is his refusal to disconnect morality from legality and to articulate an inner 
realm of moral disposition separately from an outer realm of external conformity.  A kind 
of reaction that often underlies an ascetic withdrawal and otherworldliness of some 
political theories with a strong emphasis on virtue is absent from Kant.  Although Kant 
often speaks of an individual moral agent, it is implied that this particular individual is 
able to share in the common humanity and therefore is always already responsible before 
other individuals.  Ultimately, if we are rational beings and if our behavior is regulated by 
reason, we must all be able to arrive at the same conclusion vis-à-vis what is and is not 
the right thing to do in specific circumstances.  Kant’s thorough rationalism does not 
allow him to think otherwise.  If our behavior and our socio-political relationships are not 
rational and therefore are not based on rational principles, there is no possibility of a 
theory of morality or legality.  In this sense, there is already a strong sense of faith in 
human rationality that allows Kant to proceed with his practical philosophy.9      
Based on his distinction between morality and legality, Kant will first discuss the 
laws of freedom that have to do with external freedom, i.e. external use of choice.  The 
concept of justice as related to right, according to Kant, has to do only with the external 
relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions can have (direct or indirect) 
                                                
9 Although only a tangential observation in the context of our essay, we might reference here Adorno’s 
intriguing analysis of Kant and Freud in his Negative Dialectics (esp. section “The metacritique of practical 
reason”) that potentially raises a question: what would Kant say about Freudian insight that our behavior is 
ultimately based on irrational impulses? Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton 
(New York: Continuum, 2007), 210ff.  
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influence on each other: “Right [das Recht] is therefore the sum of the conditions under 
which the choice [Willkür] of one can be united with the choice [Willkür] of another in 
accordance with a universal law of freedom.”10  According to this definition, Kant 
proposes the following “the universal principle of right”: “Any action is right [recht] if it 
can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its 
maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance 
with a universal law.”11   
Morality and legality are part of the same order of freedom, although one deals 
with the determining ground of action as well as its conformity with the law (morality) 
and the other only concerns itself with external conformity (legality).  This peculiar 
distinction between the “inside” (moral intention) and the “outside” (external conformity) 
will eventually create some issues for Kant in his attempts to articulate the difference 
between law and justice.  For now we will only note that if legality as regulation of the 
external use of choice appears only after humans have entered into the state of law, it is 
reasonable to assume that in the (hypothetical) state of nature there did not exist any 
distinction between internal and external moral laws, and thus no true interiority or 
exteriority vis-à-vis laws of human behavior.  In this sense, the very decision to abandon 
the state of nature in order to enter the state of law is also the decision to delimit a certain 
interiority of moral law (intention) and distinguish it from a certain exteriority of moral 
law (conformity).  
                                                
10 Ak. 6:230, MM, 386.  John Ladd translation uses “justice” for Recht: “Justice is therefore the aggregate 
of those conditions under which the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another in 
accordance with a universal law of freedom.” Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part 
I of The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. John Ladd (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1965), 32 
11 Ak. 6:230, MM, 386. 
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The section that introduces the universal principle of justice is followed by a 
short, but extremely important section on the relationship between justice and coercion 
[Zwang].  Kant’s justification of coercion is important for his overall theory of justice: 
“Resistance that counteracts the hindering of an effect promotes this effect and is 
consistent with it.”12  It is completely justifiable, for Kant, to see coercion as connected 
with justice.  In fact, as Kant argues, it is not the case that there is an obligation in 
accordance with a law and then an authorization to coerce someone to fulfill it.  “Instead, 
one can locale the concept of right directly in the possibility of connecting universal 
reciprocal coercion with the freedom of everyone.”13  Thus, the concept of right is 
conceptually dependent on the concept of coercion, and not the other way around: 
without enforcement of an obligation to obey a specific law, that law is not only 
powerless, but, strictly speaking, is not a law at all. Any imposition of the state of law 
then comes prepackaged with the certain amount of necessary violence.  
If we now draw our attention to Kant’s discussion of the public right [das 
öffentliche Recht], we see that it has three major sections: the right of a state [§§43-52], 
the right of nations [§§53-61], and cosmopolitan right [§62].  As one can see, it is not a 
very balanced part of “The Doctrine of Right” with main emphasis being on the right of 
the state [das Staatsrecht].  Kant’s overall system of public right or public justice is found 
in §43.  Here he argues that “public right is therefore a system of laws [ein System von 
Gesetzen] for a people, that is, a multitude of human beings, or for a multitude of peoples, 
which, because they affect one another, need a rightful condition under a will uniting 
                                                
12 Ak. 6:231, MM, 388. This is a Kantian version of the unfortunately confrontational and divisive slogan 
often used by politicians: “Those who are not with us are against us.”  
13 Ak. 6:232, MM, 389. 
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them, a constitution (constitutio), so that they may enjoy what is laid down as right.”14  
At the end of §43, Kant argues that as individuals in the state of nature found themselves 
wanting a civil society that would guarantee their otherwise provisional rights, and as a 
group of nations (if not all the nations) might find (or should find) itself wanting a civil 
international community, eventual result of this movement toward a universal human 
community will be a state of nations (Völkerstaat) that would unite all individuals into 
one cosmopolitan community: 
Since the earth’s surface is not unlimited but closed, the concepts of the right of a 
state [first form of rightful condition] and of a right of nations [second form of 
rightful condition] lead inevitably to the idea of a right for a state of nations (ius 
gentium) or cosmopolitan right (ius cosmopoliticum).15  
 
Kant’s vision of humanity is clearly based on his discussion of the three interconnected 
forms of rightful condition.  Kant’s famous discussion of the possibility of “perpetual 
peace” comes from his vision of the founding of civil society as a coerced transition from 
the state of nature into the state of law.  In “Toward Perpetual Peace,” Kant identifies the 
condition of peace with the founding of civil society.  
A condition of peace among men living near one another is not a state of nature 
(status naturalis), which is much rather a condition of war, that is, it involves the 
constant threat of an outbreak of hostilities even if this does not always occur.  A 
condition of peace must therefore be established; for suspension of hostilities is 
not yet assurance of peace, and unless such assurance is afforded one neighbor by 
another (as can only happen in a lawful condition), the former, who has called 
upon the latter for it, can treat him as an enemy.16   
 
In a footnote to this passage, Kant argues that we cannot even describe this conflict in the 
state of nature in terms of legitimate hostilities since we usually describe hostilities in 
                                                
14 Ak. 6:311, MM, 455. Emphasis added. 
15 Ak. 6:311, MM, 455. 
16 Ak. 8:349, PP, 111-12. 
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terms of someone’s reaction to being wronged.17  However, in the state of nature, there is 
no universal criterion that would define “right” and “wrong” and thus “a human nature 
(of a nation) in a mere state of nature… already wrongs me just be being near me in this 
[lawless] condition, even if not actively (facto) yet by the lawlessness of his condition 
(statu iniusto), by which he constantly threatens me; and I can coerce him either to enter 
with me into a condition of being under civil law or to leave my neighborhood.”18   
The state of nature is not, by the definition, a state of war or chaos.  In fact, 
certain agreements between individuals (for example, acquisition of property) in the state 
of nature can hold provisionally.19  The state of nature is not the state of injustice 
precisely because there is no universal criterion of justice.  It is a condition entirely 
devoid of justice.  This is, however, a rather ambiguous position, even if we clarify 
various aspects of Kant’s understanding of justice.  In the state of nature, there is no 
justice, no rightful arrangement, no objective external laws, and no legality.  But, of 
course, the state of nature is a state where there are provisional rights that are based on 
the idea of natural law.20  In fact, it is clear that individuals in the state of nature are still 
called to be acting on the basis of the categorical imperative, even though Kant does not 
                                                
17 Cf. Ak. 6:312-13, MM, 455-56: “It is true that the state of nature need not, just because it is natural, be a 
state of injustice (iniustus), of dealing with another only in terms of the degree of force each has.  But it 
would be still a state devoid of justice [Rechtlosigkeit] (status iustitia vacuus), in which when rights [das 
Recht] are in dispute (ius controversum), there would be no judge competent to render a verdict having 
rightful force.  Hence each may impel the other by force to leave this state and enter into a rightful 
condition; for although each can acquire something external by taking control of it by contract in 
accordance with concepts of right, this acquisition is still only provisional as long as it does not yet have 
the sanction of public law, since it is not determined by public (distributive) justice and secured by an 
authority [Gewalt] putting this right into effect.” 
18 Ak. 8:349note, MM, 111. 
19 See an interesting recent study of this issue by Elisabeth Ellis, Kant’s Politics: Provisional Theory for an 
Uncertain World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005) and her most recent book Provisional Politics: 
Kantian Arguments in Policy Context (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
20 For a detailed and insightful discussion of Kant’s relationship with the natural law tradition, see Lloyd L. 
Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 67-96.  
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often discuss this particular angle.  It is clear that some justice exists in the state of 
nature, but not justice as an enforceable external conformity, only as an internal 
disposition of moral behavior.  This common root of justice – human rationality – defines 
that relationship between morality and legality in the state of law.       
Otfried Höffe, one of the leading authorities on Kant’s political philosophy, opens 
his recent book on Kant with a following general description: “Kant did not develop his 
philosophy of right and law [Recht] and peace haphazardly.  It forms an integral 
component of his entire thought and, as an ethics of law and peace, is founded on his 
general ethics.”21  Kant’s philosophy of right does not stop with the discussion of the 
nation state, but takes us all the way to the level of cosmopolitan right.  While the idea of 
cosmopolitanism was by no means Kant’s invention, the centrality given to it in his 
ethical and political writings is worth a closer look.22  As we mentioned already, Kant 
distinguishes between three specific types of political relationships: between individuals, 
between nation-states, and between individuals or communities that belong to different 
nation-states.  All three types of relationships can be either in the state of nature 
[Naturzustand] or in the state of law [Rechtszustand].  Kant, consequently, identifies 
three forms of rightful condition, the condition that he is paying the most attention to, as 
it is the only condition that allows for peaceful and prosperous coexistence and progress: 
a rightful condition of a nation-state (individuals under a common enforceable law), a 
                                                
21 Otfried Höffe, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace, trans. Alexandra Newton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 19. Emphasis added. 
22 Centrality of cosmopolitan ideas in Kant is far from a widely accepted view of Kant’s practical 
philosophy, despite the abundance of evidence.  It is partially the secondary task of this study to draw 
attention to Kant’s cosmopolitan vision not as an additional peculiar element of his philosophy of right, but 
as a central reference point, a leitmotif of the whole Kantian project.  For a short outline of a conceptual 
history of cosmopolitanism, see Otfried Höffe, Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Munich, 
2002), chapter 8.  
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rightful condition of the relationship between nations, and a cosmopolitan rightful 
condition.  In “The Doctrine of Right,” Kant takes considerable time and effort to 
demonstrate the interdependence of these three forms of rightful condition in order to 
show that cosmopolitan rightful condition is the final realization of human project of 
peaceful coexistence.  This peaceful coexistence is, on the one hand, external lack of war 
due to the existence of proper means of resolving all conflicts, whether between persons 
or between larger societal units; and, on the other hand, it is an internal connection of 
wills into a “kingdom of ends,” an expression that we will discuss further in this chapter.   
Kant’s cosmopolitan project can be summarized in the following terms: in order 
to enjoy their rights and coexist peacefully, individual humans are compelled to form a 
lawful society in which they all rely on the authority and power of the state and its law 
[Recht] to resolve their disputes and guarantee their freedom.  However, when the 
question of the relationship between the various states arises, Kant’s logic propels the 
argument further and suggests that, in order for a security of rights and freedoms to 
continue to exist in the form of a nation-state, each state must enter into a rightful 
condition of international law and, ultimately, a cosmopolitan rightful condition.  The 
international rightful condition would guarantee that strong states do not violate the rights 
of weak states and, therefore, each state is allowed to exist as an equal partner in a larger 
coalition of states under a common law.  And yet this international rightful condition is 
further supplemented with a cosmopolitan rightful condition that guarantees that the 
citizens of particular nation-states have certain rights as citizens of the world.  The 
distinction between international level and cosmopolitan level is rather perplexing at first, 
but it is a distinction that would allow one to guarantee not only the rights of travelers 
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and tradesmen, as Kant originally intended, but also provide a rightful condition that 
would juxtapose the individual level of national citizenship and the global level of 
cosmopolitan citizenship.  Ultimately, we have only one rightful condition, one state of 
law that consists of three levels: national, international and cosmopolitan.  
It is essential to realize that were one of the stages in the development of human 
rightful condition to fail, the whole project would be doomed to disintegrate either 
immediately or under any considerable pressure in the future.23  Kant’s vision of 
“perpetual peace” is a vision of a final state of humanity.  The relationship between 
cosmopolitanism and this vision of peace is difficult to miss in Kant’s overall 
presentation of his political theory.  
The formal condition under which alone nature can attain this its final aim is that 
condition in the relations of human beings with one another in which the abuse of 
reciprocally conflicting freedoms is opposed by lawful power in a whole, which is 
called civil society; for only in this can the greatest development of the natural 
predispositions occur.  For this, however, even if humans were clever enough to 
discover it and wise enough to subject themselves willingly to its coercion, a 
cosmopolitan whole [Weltbürgerliches Ganze], i.e., a system of all states that are 
at risk of detrimentally affecting each other, is required.24  
 
This global peace, as theorized by Kant, cannot be based on an idyllic vision of harmony.  
One needs little persuasion to agree with Kant in his description of human “unsociable 
sociability.”25  However, Kant’s practical philosophy, both ethical and political theory, is 
unique in its rejection of human inclinations and its insistence on the role of a priori 
principles.  Kant’s discussion of “perpetual peace” is firmly situated within the realm of 
                                                
23 Cf. Ak. 6:311, MM, 455: “So if the principle of outer freedom limited by law [justice] is lacking in any of 
these three possible forms of rightful condition, the framework of all others is unavoidably undermined and 
must finally collapse.” Emphasis added. 
24 Ak. 5:432-3.  Cited from Immanuel Kant, The Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and 
Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 300. 
25 Ak. 8:21, PP, 32. 
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right or law.  The prohibition against war is a prohibition against war as inadequate 
means of conflict resolution.  The point of “perpetual peace” is not a utopian lack of 
conflict.  Kant nowhere suggests that individuals and states would exist without conflicts.  
However, what makes a war an illegitimate way of dealing with conflicts is the fact that 
in the state of law, all conflicts could and should be solved by the means of an 
appropriate lawful procedure.  We might describe this process of bringing about the 
condition of lasting peace as pacification through legalization: no one would need to go 
to war against anyone else if every possible conflict is preemptively resolved through an 
appeal to the legal authority of right.  
Much of this discussion of cosmopolitanism is currently being brought back as a 
viable option for the present condition of a globalized or a “flat” world, as Thomas 
Friedman likes to call this particular condition.26  The world is becoming more and more 
global, we are told, and the Kantian image of the sharing of the surface of the earth is 
becoming more and more vivid.  However, it is important to bring up a point concerning 
the Kantian vision of cosmopolitan condition that might or might not fit with the present 
day discussions of globalization.  For Kant, the cosmopolitan condition is defined first 
and foremost in terms of right, not in terms of mobility or accessibility or “flatness” of 
our geographic and economic interactions.  That is to say, if we imagine the world as 
Kant would want it to be, it would be a world of nation-states (first level of rightful 
condition) that guarantees their citizens all the necessary protections of the law united 
under a common international enforceable agreement (second level of rightful condition) 
                                                
26 See Thomas Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006).  For a critique of Friedman’s approach, see David Harvey, 
Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
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that guarantees the rights of individual nations with a special cosmopolitan agreement 
that all citizens of the world belong to both a specific nation-state and a larger 
cosmopolitan community (third level of rightful condition).  What is peculiar about this 
image is the complete absence of any space/place that is not in the rightful condition.  
That is to say, the state of nature, although originally posited as hypothetical, is 
completely eliminated with each possible violation of law being addressed on an 
appropriate level of law (national, international, and cosmopolitan).  There is no longer 
any chance of exiting the rightful condition in this ideal future situation as every possible 
conflict can be and must be resolved by appealing to a particular law.  Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism therefore, whether intentionally or not, gives us an image of the world 
in the state of law without any real need to appeal to an external authority of such 
concepts as justice.  It is a world of total law that covers every area of human relations. 
Although this might appear as a rather unusual move, both in terms of the general 
structure of our discussion and in terms of traditional order, we would like to further 
demonstrate our insight that Kantian ideal cosmopolitan order is, in fact, an order that is 
so thoroughly dominated by law to the detriment of justice by taking a look at Kant’s 
discussion of morality in terms of “respect for law” and Kant’s discussion of the 
“kingdom of ends” in its connection to the configurations of external freedom.  Our 
decision to discuss Kant’s legality before taking a look at his discussion of morality is 
motivated by several conceptual intentions of this essay.  Contextually, of course, it 
makes more sense to follow Kant’s own order and to think about the individual level of 
morality before we attempt to envision the collective level of legality as having to do 
with human interactions.  However, we are not trying to repeat Kant’s deduction here but 
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only to learn from it, assuming that we are already familiar with Kant’s main arguments 
concerning morality.  Postponing the discussion of “respect for law” and “kingdom of 
ends” until after we have presented Kant’s overall vision of the ideal state of humanity 
allows us now to draw certain contrasts between the external arrangements of legality and 
the internal conceptualization of morality.  We hope now that when talking about “moral 
law” in terms of Kant’s ethical theory we are constantly reminded of the larger context of 
his practical philosophy of total legality.  In this sense, having looked at Kant’s general 
arrangement for humankind, we can now “zoom in” and discover what grounds, or 
purports to ground, this arrangement.  
 
2. Kant on Respect for Law. 
Kant’s fascination with the issues of regularity, lawfulness and, ultimately, 
legality has been discussed by various scholars on many occasions.27  As the story goes, 
Kant began his philosophical career as a philosopher of nature, or as someone who today 
would be considered a philosopher of science.28 His early ethical ideas were rather 
pessimistic in light of what he considered to be the implications of Newton’s mechanistic 
picture of the world.29  However, as Kant himself testified with enthusiasm, after his 
discovery of Rousseau in 1760s, he abandoned his “blinding superiority” and “learned to 
                                                
27 Cf. Gottfried Martin, Kant’s Metaphysics and Theory of Science, trans. P. G. Lucas (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1955).  
28 Cf. Herman Jean De Vleeschauwer, The Development of Kantian Thought: The History of a Doctrine, 
trans. Alistair Duncan (New York: T. Nelson, 1962), 8-11; Martin Schönfeld, The Philosophy of the Young 
Kant: The Precritical Project (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17-70.  
29 Cf. Paul Arthur Schilpp, Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1938), 
15-21; Paul Menzer, “Der Entwicklungsgang der Kantischen Ethik in den Jahren 1760-1785,” Kant-Studien 
2 (1897): 290-322 and 3 (1898): 40-104. 
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honor human beings” and their rights.30  Reading Rousseau and some British moralists, 
Kant reassessed his scientific quest for knowledge and understanding in light of a very 
different set of concerns dealing with issues of justice and equality.31  Kant’s new 
intention was to develop an adequate view of practical philosophy that would ultimately 
play the most important role in his metaphysical system: while science, with all of its 
sophistication and scale, can only tell us what is, morality teaches us what must be.  If 
Kant’s discovery of Newton gave him an enthusiasm to become a philosopher of nature, 
Kant’s encounter with Rousseau brought him to awareness of the importance of practical 
philosophy:  
Newton saw for the first time order and regularity combined with great 
simplicity, where before him was found disorder and barely paired multiplicity; 
and since then comets run in geometrical courses. Rousseau discovered for the 
first time beneath the multiplicity of forms human beings have taken on their 
deeply buried nature and the hidden law by the observation of which providence 
is justified.”32  
 
One might argue that with these two elements of Kant’s early philosophical interests – 
the order of nature and the law of humankind – the later developments and breakthroughs 
were all but predetermined.  
                                                
30 Ak. 20:44. Cited in Immanuel Kant, Notes and Fragments, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Curtis Bowman at el. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 7: “One must teach youth to honor the common 
understanding on the basis of moral as well as logical grounds. I am myself by inclination an investigator. I 
feel a complete thirst for knowledge and an eager unrest to go further in it as well as satisfaction at every 
acquisition. There was a time when I believed that this alone could constitute the honor of mankind, and I 
had contempt for the rabble who knows nothing. Rousseau brought me around. This blinding superiority 
disappeared, I learned to honor human beings, and I would find myself far more useless than the common 
laborer if I did not believe that this consideration could impart to all others a value in establishing the rights 
of humanity.” 
31 For a discussion of the relationship between Kant and British moralists, see Dieter Henrich, “Hutcheson 
und Kant,” Kant-Studien 49 (1957/58): 49-69. 
32 Kant, Notes and Fragments, 9. Emphasis added.  
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Kant’s arguably best known passage that involves the ideas of order and moral 
law is found in Conclusion to his Critique of Practical Reason.  In a moment of 
seemingly uncharacteristic poetic inspiration, Kant writes:  
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence 
[Ehrfurcht], the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry 
heavens above me and the moral law within me…  The first begins from the place 
I occupy in the external world of sense and extends the connection in which I 
stand into an unbounded magnitude with worlds upon worlds and systems of 
systems, and more over into the unbounded times of their periodic motion, their 
beginning and their duration.  The second begins from my invisible self, my 
personality, and presents me in a world that has true infinity but which can be 
discovered only by the understanding…33 
 
This glorious vision of the two worlds – one of “countless multitude of worlds” that 
makes us feel so insignificant and unimportant, another of “purposive determination” of 
our very existence by the moral law – is what inspires and excites us, writes Kant, to 
pursue our philosophical work of clearing out the “path of wisdom which everyone 
should travel.”34  This “reverence” for the moral law is the synonym for Kant’s other 
phrase – respect for law – that is the basis of his theory of morality and, arguably, the 
most innovative idea in the moral theory since Aristotle.35   
It seems that the theme of religion is never too far away from the idiom of 
“respect for law.”  Kant’s description of his reaction to the presence of the moral law in 
us in terms of awe [Ehrfurht] is not accidental.  In fact, we might suggest that such 
language is completely appropriate in Kant who, for example, writes in his late (1796) 
essay “On a Recently Prominent Tone of Superiority in Philosophy”: 
Now every man finds in his reason the idea of duty, and trembles [zittert] on 
hearing its brazen voice, when inclinations arise in him, which tempt him to 
                                                
33 Ak. 5:161-62, CPrR, 268-69. 
34 Ak. 5:163, CPrR, 270.  
35 Cf. Ak. 6:488, MM, 600: Kant uses the world Achtung [respect] and Ehrfurcht [awe] as synonyms.  
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disobedience towards it.  He is persuaded that, even though the latter all 
collectively conspire against it, the majesty of the law, which his own reason 
prescribes to him, must yet unhesitatingly outweigh them all, and that his will is 
therefore also capable of this.  All this can and must be presented to man, clearly 
if not scientifically, if he is to be made aware both of the authority of his reason, 
which commands him, and also of its actual commandments; and is to that extent 
theory.  Now I put it to man, as he puts it to himself: What is it in me which 
brings it about that I can sacrifice the innermost allurements of my instincts, and 
all wishes that proceed from my nature, to a law which promises me no 
compensating advantage, and threatens no loss on its violation; a law, indeed, 
which I respect the more intimately, the more strictly it ordains, and the less it 
offers for doing so?36   
 
Even a superficial look at all the highlighted terms suggests a rather reverent attitude 
toward the majesty and the authority of the law that commands without promising any 
reward or threatening any punishment.  Yet the stricter the command, the more I respect 
it.   
The notion of “respect for law,” however, needs a closer look before we can better 
understand any of the religious overtones in Kant’s moral theory.  In Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals Kant writes:  
Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law [Achtung fürs Gesetz].  For 
an object as the effect of my proposed action I can indeed have inclination but 
never respect, just because it is merely an effect and not an activity of a will…  
Only what is connected with my will merely as ground and never as effect, what 
does not serve my inclination but outweighs it or at least excludes it altogether 
from calculations in making a choice – here the mere law for itself – can be an 
object of respect and so a command.”37 
 
Duty concerns the (determining) ground of the will and requires no incentive for action 
“other than the representation of the moral law itself.”38  This representation of the moral 
law itself, this respect for law then necessitates obedience not through external coercion 
                                                
36 Ak. 8:402. Emphasis added. Cited from Immanuel Kant, “On a Recently Prominent Tone of Superiority 
in Philosophy,” in Theoretical Philosophy After 1781, ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath, trans. Gary 
Hatfield et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
37 Ak. 4:400, Groundwork, 55. Original emphasis.   
38 Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis, 127.  
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but through, as Allen W. Wood puts it, “the inner rational self-constraint that you 
exercise over yourself from respect for correct principles.  To act from duty, in short, is to 
do something because you know that an objectively valid moral principle demands it, so 
that this gives you a good reason for deciding to do it, and then making yourself do it.”39  
The key distinction for Kant is the distinction between the external pressure to perform 
one’s duty (and the resulting action in conformity with duty out of fear or other 
pathological inclination) and the internal self-coercion motivated by the respect for law.  
In his Lectures on Pedagogy, Kant puts it succinctly as “To do something from duty 
means: to obey reason.”40  Reason here is what grounds not just this or that law, but 
lawfulness itself.  Reason legislates; it is the source of law, of order, as the first Critique 
so eloquently proclaimed on many occasions.  To obey reason is to be compelled by the 
moral law to perform one’s duty which consists in doing “whatever you know you have 
most reason to do, and what you want to constrain yourself to do because you are aware 
of this.”41  On the one hand, it simply cannot get more rationalist than this, and Kant 
therefore represents, despite his innovative way of thinking about ethics, the whole 
rationalist tradition of conceptualization of law, norm, and their role in human life (both 
individual and collective) that might be traced all the way back to the Socratic 
pronouncement that knowledge is virtue and ignorance is vice.  On the other hand, Kant’s 
particular formulation of the issues of ethics and politics pushes the rationalist discourse 
to the very limit where, as we will show with Derrida, it ultimately breaks and reveals its 
                                                
39 Allen W. Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 26. First emphasis is 
original, second emphasis added.  Further cited as Kantian Ethics. 
40 Ak. 9:483. Cited from Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History and Education, trans. and eds. Robert B. 
Louden and Günter Zöller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
41 Wood, Kantian Ethics, 159. 
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internal inconsistencies and shortcomings.  Let us pay attention particularly to the way in 
which the distinction between the internal disposition that is allegedly available only to 
the individual making a decision to act morally and the external conformity constitutes a 
kind of dualism that slowly undermines the possibility of the transition from the 
individual to the social level.  In other words, if law and justice, for Kant, only deal with 
external use of freedom and therefore must exclude any reference to the internal 
dispositions of the agents, then the danger of complete erasure of the significance of these 
internal dispositions is clear.  If all that is required is that the subjects obey the laws and 
the ideal arrangement is such that this obedience as an external use of freedom of one 
subject does not interfere with the obedience of another subject, then the discussion of the 
moral ground of any obedience to the law (“respect of law”) recedes into the background 
or disappears completely (for example, in legal positivism).  However, Kant grounds both 
ethics and politics in the rational idea of duty.  It is our obligation to act morally, both in 
terms of proper internal disposition and proper external conformity.  
Kant’s discussion of duty ultimately raises the question of the role of freedom and 
autonomy in his practical philosophy.  The autonomy expresses itself in the simple fact 
that “every rational being, as an end in itself, must be able to regard himself as also 
giving universal laws with respect to any law whatsoever to which he may be subject.”42  
According to Kant’s view of the significance of human freedom and autonomy, the very 
ability to self-legislate, to be a “lawgiving being,” is what makes one a person.  The 
categorical imperative itself is based on this peculiar ability to regard oneself as a 
universal lawgiving being, i.e. to regard every law that one makes for oneself as also a 
                                                
42 Ak. 4:438, Groundwork, 87. 
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universal law.43  Without this ability to self-legislate, for Kant, there is no autonomy of 
the will and, therefore, no morality.44  
However, from the very beginning there is a tension at the very heart of Kant’s 
discussion of duty, law, freedom and autonomy.  Allen W. Wood describes this tension of 
Kant’s concept of autonomy as “depending upon whether we emphasize the ‘autos’ or 
the ‘nomos’ – the rational being’s will as author or legislator of the moral law, or the law 
itself as objectively binding on the same will.”45  While the Romantic interpretations of 
Kant’s autonomy emphasized the ‘autos’, argues Wood, it is the ‘nomos’ part of Kantian 
doctrine that deserves additional explication.46  Kant’s view of the law, Wood points out, 
referring to Kant’s “Lectures on Moral Philosophy,” suggests that “merely statutory or 
positive legislation does not, properly speaking, give ‘laws’ at all, but only 
‘commands’.”47  In other words, any true legislation is always self-legislation.  The state 
that simply coerces its subjects to obey its regulations produces a series of external 
commands, but does not, properly speaking, legislate, because coercion as the only form 
of external compulsion aims at enforcing the command while the true obligatory force of 
any regulation comes from internal affirmation based on one’s reason:  
The sovereign does not require that a subject pay his taxes willingly, but ethics 
does demand this. Both he who pays willingly and he who pays from compulsion 
                                                
43 For a detailed discussion of Kant’s “categorical imperative,” see the classic study by Herbert James 
Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1971).  
44 Cf. Ak. 4:400, Groundwork, 55: “Autonomy of the will is the property of the will by which it is a law to 
itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy is, therefore: to 
choose only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same 
volition.” 
45 Wood, Kantian Ethics, 106. 
46 Wood, Kantian Ethics, 107. 
47 Wood, Kantian Ethics, 109. Cf. Ak. 27:273. All references to Kant’s lectures are from Immanuel Kant, 
Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath, eds. Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997).  
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are equally subjects, since they have both made payment.  The disposition cannot 
be required by the sovereign, since it is not known, in that it is internal. But now 
ethics tells us to act from a good disposition.48 
 
Let us explore this image a bit.  The sovereign that requires that we pay taxes, only 
requires that we pay taxes and not that we also like it.  Now, of course, a wise sovereign 
will attempt to explain the need for a particular level of taxation and show its immediate 
and lasting benefits to the taxpaying public, but even if the public is left unpersuaded by 
the argument, it does not affect the legal obligation to pay taxes.  The law in this sense 
disregards our internal attitude toward its rulings.  It attempts a dispassionate stand that 
only demands external obedience.  However, Kant continues, as moral persons, having 
listened to the reasonable argument in favor of taxation, we must not only pay taxes, but 
also do it willingly, i.e. with a good (moral) disposition (which, of course, still does not 
mean that we have to like it, just that we feel obligated to do it).  In other words, we are 
not obligated to have a certain disposition while paying taxes when we are called to obey 
the external law (legality), yet as subjects in the rightful condition we are under moral 
obligation to follow the law willingly, with only our reason being the judge of our 
intentions (morality).   
It is of course easy to imagine immoral but law-abiding citizens where internal 
disposition and external conformity clash, as well as moral and law-abiding citizens 
where internal disposition and external conformity coincide, but what about the situation 
in which we have a moral reason to disobey the law?  Is there ever such a situation?  
What are we to make of a situation where, for example, one’s moral position prevents 
one from paying taxes in a case when one knows that these taxes will be used to finance 
                                                
48 Ak. 27:273. Emphasis added. My translation.  
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an unjust war? 49  Kant’s position on such a matter is easy to conceive, given his strict 
distinction between external and internal freedom: despite our moral disagreement with 
legitimate taxation policies, we must pay taxes because the law prescribes that we do, 
even if we might have some moral quibbles about the use of our tax money.  However, 
Kant also suggests that moral disposition does not require that we pay our taxes in such 
scenario quietly and without raising the issue in the public discussion.  This discussion, 
however, is problematized by Kant’s very important assumption that what gives the 
sovereign body the legitimacy to tax us is our very consent, therefore, whatever laws the 
sovereign body produces are laws that we obey because we take them as laws we have 
given to ourselves: “[Hence] the will is not merely subject to the law but subject to it in 
such a way that it must be viewed as also giving the law to itself [als selbstgesetzgebend] 
and just because of this as first subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the 
author).”50 
If we obey a law of taxation not because it is imposed on us by a powerful 
sovereign body, but because we ourselves established this law (by delegating our 
legislative authority to the sovereign body) and therefore perceive the situation in terms 
of being subjects to our own laws, then any discrepancy between internal disposition and 
external conformity must eventually become an issue, because our ideal is precisely a 
situation in which moral and legal attitudes coincide thus problematizing the very 
distinction between morality and legality.  In addition to this problem, we are also 
                                                
49 Although we are using an example of a group of conscientious tax evaders in a merely hypothetical 
fashion, it is of course not without many parallels in Kant’s own use of such examples, most notably in 
“What is Enlightenment?” where three groups of citizens are explicitly discussed in terms of private and 
public freedoms: soldiers, tax payers and clergy.  See Ak. 8:37-38, PP, 42-43. 
50 Ak. 4:431, Groundwork, 81. 
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confronted with a rather paradoxical dimension of self-legislation.  As Allen Wood points 
out, this self-legislating ability is a part of our rational nature.  In fact, it is basically what 
our rationality consists of vis-à-vis practical reason.  Moreover, this very rationality is 
shared by other rational beings and allows for the possibility of an ethical commonwealth 
(ideal ethical community).  My will is only subject to the law that it gives to itself in 
accordance with the given rational nature that allows for such self-legislation.  As Wood 
puts it,  
If the will that gives the moral law is not my will but an ideal rational will present 
as much in others as it is in me, then there seems nothing left of the assertion that 
the legislative will is mine.  If the moral law is a law whose validity rests on 
objective values that are independent of what anyone wills, then it seems we 
should just stop talking about ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-legislation’ and simply say 
that when we obey the moral law we are forcing ourselves to do what is morally 
right (or ‘rational’) and not at all doing what we will to do.”51  
 
We have before us Kant’s idea of lawfulness expressed in the fact of reason (“moral law 
in us”) that commands us unconditionally, yet we also have an ability to go against our 
self-legislating will and thus disobey the law, because we are free.  In our example of 
conscientious tax evasion, we might wonder if our decision not to pay taxes for a number 
of reasons we judge to be valid is really an example of immoral behavior, because our 
objection to the perceived injustice of the law cannot be objectively valid, i.e. be in 
accordance with the moral law as required by categorical imperative since it cannot be 
universalized, as Kant would likely to argue.  In order to imagine any scenario, therefore, 
in which it is moral to disobey the law, we must be able to better articulate the distinction 
between morality and legality.  Such articulation is impossible if we stay on the level of 
                                                
51 Wood, Kantian Ethics, 109. Original emphasis. 
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individual morality motivated by the respect for law and must include a larger communal 
perspective.    
 
3. Kant’s Moral World. 
 Before Kant’s major work on religion – Religion Within the Limits of Reason 
Alone – the problem of morality was addressed primarily from the point of view of 
individual agent.  In Religion, we read for the first time about our “duty sui generis, not 
of human beings toward human beings but of the human race toward itself.  For every 
species of rational beings is objectively – in the idea of reason – destined to a common 
end, namely the promotion of the highest good as a good common to all.”52  Kant’s 
individual moral agent is, of course, never alone, even if the majority of the discussion is 
presented from the perspective of an individual moral agent.  In fact, Kant’s vision of the 
moral universe, a universe that would encompass all of the moral agents and their actions, 
appears already in the final sections of the first Critique:  
In its speculative use reason led us through the field of experience, and, since it 
could never find complete satisfaction for itself there, it led us on from there to 
speculative ideas, which in the end, however, led us back again to experience, and 
thus fulfilled its aim in a way that is quite useful but not quite in accord with our 
expectation.  Now yet another experiment [Versuch] remains open to us: namely, 
whether pure reason is also to be found in practical use, whether in that use it 
leads us to the ideas that attain the highest ends of pure reason [die höchsten 
Zwecke der reinen Vernunft] which we have just adduced, and thus whether from 
the point of view of its practical interest reason may not be able to guarantee that 
which in regard to its speculative interest it entirely refuses to us.53 
 
                                                
52 Ak. 6:97, Religion, 132.  Emphasis added. Cf. Sharon Anderson-Gold, “Ethical Community and the 
Highest Good,” in Proceedings: Sixth International Kant Congress, Vol. II/2, ed. Gerhard Funke and 
Thomas M. Seebohm (Wshington, DC: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University 
Press of America, 1989), 231-24. 
53 A804/B832, CPR, 676. Emphasis added.  
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In this enlightening summary Kant clearly proposes to address the issue of a larger 
practical interest of reason giving us the satisfaction of our initial expectation 
[Erwartung] that was frustrated by the speculative use of reason.  What is this 
expectation?  It is the expectation, one might deduce from Kant, to reach the highest end 
[Zwecke] of reason: “Reason is driven by a propensity of its nature to go beyond its use in 
experience, to venture to the outermost bound of all cognition by means of mere ideas in 
a pure use, and find peace [Ruhe zu finden] only in the completion of its circle in a self-
subsisting systematic whole.”54  This systematic whole is nothing other than the unity of 
reason.  The initial “scandal” of reason, for Kant, is the “scandal of the seeming 
contradiction of reason with itself [das Scandal des scheinbaren Wiederspruchs der 
Venunft mit ihr selbst].”55  Human reason’s “peculiar fate” and “perplexity” is what 
initially thrusts Kant into the investigation of pure reason.56  
Now at the close of his investigation, his critique of reason, Kant is able to finally 
solve the problem of reason’s seeming contradiction by demonstrating that “the ideas of 
pure reason can never be dialectical in themselves; rather it is merely their misuse which 
brings it about that a deceptive illusion arises from them; for they are given as problems 
for us by the nature of our reason, and this highest court of appeals [dieser oberste 
Gerichtshof] for all rights and claims of our speculation cannot possibly contain original 
deceptions and semblances.”57  The “court of justice” announced in the Introduction to 
the first edition has delivered its verdict regarding the rightful use of speculative ideas 
                                                
54 A797/B825, CPR, 673. 
55 Ak. 12:258. From September 21, 1798 letter to Grave. My translation.  
56 Avii, CPR, 99. Cf. A642/B670, CPR, 590.  On reason’s “peculiar fate” see Peter D. Fenves, A Peculiar 
Fate: Metaphysics and World-History in Kant (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
57 A669/B697, CPR, 605. Emphasis added. 
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that, having been misused before Kant’s critique and having led to either dogmatism or 
scepticism, are now limited to the “sphere of reason” that is our field of experience.58   
This image of the court of law goes along with Kant’s extensive use of the 
juridical metaphors including, if one were to accept Dieter Henrich’s explanation, the 
central aspect of the structuring of the first Critique around the juridical demonstration of 
reason’s legitimate and illegitimate use of its capacities in the Transcendental 
Deduction.59  In other words, the critique of pure reason demonstrates that there is only 
one legitimate arrangement of intuitions, concepts and ideas.  Kant’s presentation of 
reason as a legislator and a judge, i.e. his extensive use of juridical metaphors, despite 
frequent complaints about the inability of metaphors and examples to truly communicate 
that which is being expressed through them, is essential as it allows us to get a glimpse of 
a larger picture that Kant has in mind.  This larger picture is that of the lawful and 
peaceful human coexistence.  If only we can set before us a high enough goal of an ideal 
civil society with all of its necessary components, we can judge our present progress by 
comparing our situation to that ideal.   
Kant’s critical philosophy thus clears the metaphysical rubble and allows us to 
clearly conceive of the ideal state of human coexistence.  However, reason is still not 
quite satisfied with this situation.  To use the Kantian metaphor, reason is able to find a 
“resting-place” [Ruheplatz], but certainly not a “dwelling-place [Wohnplatz] for 
permanent residence.”60  In order to find this final dwelling-place, writes Kant, we need 
                                                
58 Axii, CPR, 101 and A762/B790, CPR, 654-55.  
59 See Dieter Henrich, “Kant’s Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First 
Critique,” in Kant’s Transcendental Deductions, ed. Eckart Foerster (Stanford, Stanford University Press 
1989), 29-46. Also see A740/B768, CPR, 644 and A751/B771, CPR, 649. 
60 A761/B789, CPR, 654. 
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to answer the following question: “If I do what I should, what may I then hope?”61  We 
certainly cannot hope for any sort of definitive knowledge of the “systematic unity of 
nature in accordance with speculative principles of reason,” as the critique of pure reason 
has demonstrated.  However, Kant argues, these speculative principles of reason “have 
objective reality in their practical use, that is, in the moral sense.”62  He continues: 
I call the world as it would be if it were in conformity with all moral laws (as it 
can be in accordance with the freedom of rational beings and should be in 
accordance with the necessary laws of morality) a moral world.  This is conceived 
thus far merely as an intelligible world, since abstraction is made therein from all 
conditions (ends) and even from all hindrances to morality in it (weakness or 
impurity of human nature).63 
 
This idea of a moral world is the answer to the question of hope.  It is therefore to the 
practical reason and the moral law what knowledge is to the theoretical reason and the 
natural law.64  To hope for a moral world in the future is to provide “a necessary context 
for meaningful action in the present.  To hope for something does not assure that it will 
come to pass.  But neither is hope reducible to fancy or idle wishing.”65  We hope for 
future happiness, for a future, permanent, dwelling-place: “the system of morality is 
therefore inseparably combined with the system of happiness, though only in the idea of 
pure reason.”66  This inseparable connection leads us to assume the existence of the 
highest reason, the morally most perfect will, that is, the ideal of the highest good.  Enter 
God:  
It is necessary that our entire course of life be subordinated to moral maxim; but it 
would at the same time be impossible for this to happen if reason did not connect 
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with the moral law, which is a mere idea, an efficient cause which determines for 
the conduct in accord with this law an outcome precisely corresponding to our 
highest ends, whether in this or in another life.  Thus without a God and a world 
that is now not visible to us but is hoped for, the majestic ideas of morality are, to 
be sure, objects of approbation and admiration but not incentives for resolve and 
realization, because they would not fulfill the whole end that is natural for every 
rational being and determined a priori and necessarily through the very same pure 
reason.67  
 
Kant is quick to add that the idea of God does not serve as a direct incentive for a moral 
action.  God is a postulate of practical reason that guarantees the consistency of our moral 
reasoning in the same way that geometrical postulates guarantee the consistency of a 
geometrical proof.  The idea of God then serves as a “frame of orientation for moral 
reasoning.”68  Whether Kant completely succeeds in keeping the idea of God from 
providing any motivational force is rather unclear, even if we take as evidence his own 
caution and continuous repetition of the same warning to keep God out of motivation for 
moral behavior.   
 In the final sections of the third Critique, Kant returns to the idea of God and 
presents “the moral proof of the existence of God.”69  Such demonstration might appear 
to be going against Kant’s very own repudiation of the traditional proofs of the existence 
of God in the first Critique.  However, it is easy to see that such “moral proof” is 
                                                
67 A812/B840, CPR, 681. Emphasis added.  
68 Raschke, Moral Action, God, and History, 99.  For a detailed analysis of the role of God in Kant’s moral 
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241) 
69 Ak. 5:447-452. Cited from Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and 
Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 313-17.  
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illustrative of Kant’s peculiar discussion of the transcendental idea of God: its validity in 
the practical aspect of reason is without doubt, even though its validity in the theoretical 
aspect of reason is forever unknown.  In a sense, Kant’s discussion of God in the third 
Critique is a culmination of a long engagement with the topic, as we mentioned before, 
raised in the first Critique.  It might be useful to recall that, according to the first Critique, 
“because regulative principles function as imperatives rather than assertions, they do not 
make cognitive claims, but merely give directions for systematizing empirical 
knowledge.”70  That is why, in Religion, Kant observes that “so far as theoretical 
cognition and profession of faith are concerned, no assertoric knowledge is required in 
religion (even the existence of God), since with our lack of insight into supersensible 
objects any such profession can be well hypocritically feigned…”71 
Religion then is not about a particular type of duties, but about our attitude toward 
our duties.  This attitude is described with a following example:  
Even when it is said: “One ought to obey God before human being,” this only 
means that whenever statutory commands [statutarische Gebote], regarding 
which human being can be both legislators and judges, conflict with duties which 
reason prescribes unconditionally – and God alone can judge whether they are 
observed or transgressed – the former must yield precedence to the latter.72 
 
This is a very important observation in light of Kant’s discussion of what in the 
Groundwork he labeled “the kingdom of ends.”  For Kant, there is “the religious 
disposition which universally accompanies all our actions done in conformity to duty.”73  
God, or rather more accurately, the idea of God – the minimum of “it is possible that 
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there is a God” – serves as a reference point, as a guide that allows us to resolve the 
potential conflicts between the statutory commands of the external authority of legislators 
and judges and the internal authority of the unconditional duties of reason.  In one sense, 
such conflicts are conflicts between law and justice.  The gap between internal 
disposition and external conformity vis-à-vis Kant’s discussion of law is thus reaffirmed 
as problematic but also as ultimately answered in the idea of God that can see both the 
internal dispositions and compare them with the external actions in conformity with the 
law.  The idea of God then serves as a guarantor that the initial distinction between law 
and justice would not result in any sort of permanent divorce between the two.  Kant 
therefore attempts to prevent the appearance of any sort of transcendent notion of justice 
but reaffirming and reemphasizing, even if to his own ultimate detriment, the need for the 
idea of God and therefore religion.  We will return to Kant’s discussion of religion later 
in this essay once we have worked our way through a number of necessary conceptual 
steps that would allow us to better appreciate Kant’s views.  
Kant discusses the “kingdom of ends” [ein Reich der Zwecke], using this very 
formulation, only in the Groundwork.  However, the notion of a final ethical 
commonwealth is found throughout Kant’s work.74  Kant’s “kingdom of ends” is a 
“systematic union [Verbindung] of various rational beings through common laws [durch 
gemeinschaftliche Gesetze].”75  These laws determine ends in terms of their universality, 
yet without completely disregarding individual private ends. Such systematic union arises 
only through “common objective laws” [gemeinschaftliche objective Gesetze], that is, a 
                                                
74 Outside of Ak. 4:433-440 (Groundwork, 82-89) Kant uses the expression “ein Reich der Zwecke” only 
twice in his notes on metaphysics R 6149 and R 6159 (Ak 18:469, 471). 
75 Ak. 4:433, Groundwork, 82. 
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kingdom or commonwealth [Reich].  As such, only the kingdom of ends is an ideal, while 
a systematic external union of rational beings is quite possible as a juridical arrangement 
of “common laws,” i.e. a rightful condition.  
What makes this Kantian vision of ethical commonwealth interesting is the 
connection between such seemingly secular juridical order and explicitly religious 
formulations.  Namely, if “Kant holds that a person can rationally act in pursuit of a given 
end only so long as he believes that this end is possible of attainment through the course 
of action he is taking,” then the ideas of God and of the kingdom of ends serve as a 
system of coordinates that allows one to assume that a “world governed by a wise 
providence would be a just world, in which our moral endeavors could be expected to 
bear fruit.”76  If an ethical community is to come into existence, all of its members must 
be under public moral laws.  The morality of actions as a matter of internal disposition, 
however, cannot be subject to public laws that can only regulate our external freedom.  
“There must therefore be someone other than the people whom we can declare the public 
lawgiver of an ethical community.”77  This someone is “the concept of God as a moral 
ruler of the world,” and the ethical community is “conceivable only as a people under 
divide commands, i.e. as a people of God.”78  This ethical community as a people of God 
is a sort of a parallel world to that of a political community: “It can exists in the midst of 
a political community and even be made up of all the members of the latter… It has 
                                                
76 Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Rational Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 21, 26. Emphasis 
added. 
77 Ak. 6:99, Religion, 133. 
78 Ak. 6:99, Religion, 134. 
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however a special unifying principle of its own (virtue) and hence a form and constitution 
essentially distinct from those of [political community].”79   
This most peculiar situation of a kind of “state within state,” as Kant suggests, has 
a well-grounded rational objectivity and the duty to join such an ethical state is consistent 
with our moral thinking.  Is it possible however to imagine a scenario in which an ethical 
community formed according to an ethical principle finds itself within a juridical state 
that either indirectly disregards its rationale for existing or directly and openly confronts 
and oppresses such an ethical community?  Is it possible to imagine an ethical community 
that is convinced that the political community it is a part of is unjust in violating the 
community’s internal freedom?  Most certainly, and Kant’s own experience of censure 
and general contemporary lack of religious freedom should lead us to believe that he 
could have easily imagined such a scenario.  However, what is most important about 
Kant’s formulation is the notion that the ethical community, both as an actually existing 
community and as an ideal “kingdoms of ends,” is essentially distinct from the political 
community, both as an actually existing political community and as an ideal 
cosmopolitan peaceful community (to come).  On the one hand, we have Kant’s notion of 
moral law that expresses itself in a proper internal disposition (“respect for law”) and in 
an external conformity to the specific laws, i.e. there is one moral law that has two sides 
and cannot be thought of as only an internal disposition or only an external conformity.  
On the other hand, we have Kant’s insistence that there are two orders of lawfulness that 
are essentially distinct, an ethical community (either secular or religious) and a political 
community (either secular or religious).  
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Kant emphasizes, again and again, the obligation that we have an internal moral 
disposition and externally conform to the requirements of the law.  This “ought” is 
grounded in Kant’s early discussion of the nature of reason and its ability to command us 
categorically.  However, Kant is also aware that it is impossible to create and maintain a 
rightful condition without coercion, even if it is strictly limited to the external conformity 
to the law. If the law and its enforcement are the necessary elements of any rightful 
condition, and this law is judged to be just and this enforcement is judged to be justified, 
then any disobedience to the law is either a breaking of the law as criminality or a 
challenge to the very idea of law and legality.  In a sense, Kant’s legal and political 
theory is an attempt to dispense with any possible reason to challenge the order of law as 
such and to concentrate on the conceptualization and eventual elimination of criminality.  
A violation of this or that law is unavoidable due to human weakness.  Coercion is 
necessary and justified in any and all cases of such violations.  Any social arrangement, 
then, must consist of both a code of law and an enforcement apparatus.  However, the 
problem of coercion runs into difficulties precisely at the point where the distinction 
between an ethical and a political community becomes visible, i.e. where the demands of 
law and legality run into the demands of justice and morality.   
 
4. Law, Justice and Coercion. 
As we pointed out above, Kant clearly demonstrates that a state of public justice 
requires two elements: the sanction of public law [die Sanction eines öffentlichen 
Gesetzes] and the authority [Gewalt] that can enforce such law.  Without the authority, or 
power, to enforce the public law, civil society cannot come into existence.  The use of 
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force [Gewalt], argues Kant, is fully justified from the very beginning in compelling 
individuals to join civil society.  As Georg Cavallar puts it, “because of the very 
lawlessness of the state of nature, one has the right to force or compel others to enter a 
civil society, or a common rightful condition.”80  Allen D. Rosen adds: “We may 
rephrase Kant’s argument: choosing to remain in the state of nature is equivalent to 
abrogating all rules of justice, in which case no one can commit as injustice against 
anyone else, and then no rights can be violated if someone is compelled to join civil 
society.”81  This coercion is directed at those who are not yet in the state of law.  
Since “The Doctrine of Right” is primarily dedicated to the discussion of a priori 
rightful condition, Kant insists that we do not need the input of our experience of human 
violence [Gewaltthätigkeit] in order to justify the necessity of “coercion [Zwang] through 
public law.”82  The idea of a “public lawful external coercion” lies a priori in the rational 
idea of civil society.  Kant uses three words for what could be construed as indicating one 
idea of external force exerted upon an individual in a civil society: coercion [Zwang], 
violence/power [Gewalt] and force [Macht].  Even though these three notions are not 
simply interchangeable, they seem to occupy the same conceptual place in Kant’s 
analysis of the founding of civil society that will later apply to both a founding of a 
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community of nations and of a cosmopolitan community of all nations.  From a close 
reading of §44 of “The Doctrine of Right,” it is clear that Kant talks about both a 
coercion to join a civil society and a external power that will be exercised on the 
individuals who will find themselves in this civil society.  One can discern what can be 
labeled, without yet any connection to Walter Benjamin’s discussion of Gewalt, “law-
establishing” and “law-enforcing” authority.  In a sense, one might agree with Otfried 
Höffe who claims that Kant here “deals precisely with the power of ought, both with the 
authorization to enforce that belongs conceptually to the law as such and with its public 
protection, which is to say, its enforcement by means of a state.”83   
What makes forcing individuals into a rightful condition of a civil society 
justifiable?  It is certain that for Kant any justification of “law-establishing” coercion 
must be a priori and thus cannot be based on such empirical grounds as security or 
happiness of individuals in a rightful condition.  A shorter account that should suffice for 
our overall line of argument might look to the concept of freedom and its rational 
components, such as freedom of choice [Willkür], for guidance.  How can a concept of 
freedom of choice, considered rationally, justify the coercion of free individuals into a 
civil society where, by definition, their freedom would be constrained?  If one thinks of 
freedom in terms of a lack of any constraints upon one’s will, then Kant’s argument will 
make little sense.  However, as Kant already pointed out in the Groundwork, freedom is 
nothing but autonomy, that is, “the will’s property of being a law to itself… to act on no 
other maxim than that which can also have as object itself as a universal law.”84  
                                                
83 Otfried Höffe, Categorical Principles of Law: A Counterpoint to Modernity, trans. Mark Migotti 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 281. Emphasis added. 
84 Ak. 4:447, Groundwork, 44.  
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However, in the state of nature, each person must be a judge in her own matters and the 
conflict of (provisional) rights can only be resolved through use of force.  Thus it is in the 
interest of preserving human freedom that one is justified in coercing others to join a civil 
society.  Kant argues that it is one’s duty to enter a rightful condition and also a duty to 
compel other to enter civil society.  “A rightful condition is that relation of human beings 
among one another that contains the conditions under which alone everyone is able to 
enjoy his rights, and the formal condition under which this is possible in accordance with 
the idea of a will giving laws for everyone is called public justice.”85   
The very condition of public right, for Kant, is an a priori law – “you ought to 
enter this [rightful] condition” – that holds for “all human beings who could (even 
involuntarily) come into relations of rights with one another ought to enter this 
condition.”86  The justification of coercion of others into a rightful civil society follows 
“analytically from the concept of right [Recht] in external relations, in contrast with 
violence (violentia).”87  In the state of nature, “no one is bound to refrain from 
encroaching on what another possesses if the other gives him no equal assurance that he 
will observe the same restraint toward him.”88  Thus it is clear from the very logic of the 
concept of right that it is beneficial for all to enter a common rightful relationship that 
would guarantee rights and would protect individuals from lawless violence 
[Gewaltthätigkeit].89  As Christine M. Korsgaard puts it, since any right is “an 
                                                
85 Ak. 6:306, MM, 450. 
86 Ak. 6:307, MM, 452. 
87 Ak. 6:307, MM, 452. 
88 Ak. 6:307, MM, 452. 
89 “Given the intention to be and to remain in this state of externally lawless freedom, men do one another 
no wrong at all when they feud among themselves… But in general they do wrong in the highest degree by 
willing to be and to remain in a condition that is not rightful, that is, in which no one is assured of what is 
his against violence.” Ak. 6:307-8, MM, 451-52. 
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authorization to use coercion, anyone may defend his right against another.  Disputes will 
inevitably arise, and there is no way to settle them, except by violence…  This licenses us 
to use coercion against one another to establish a juridical state of affairs – a state in 
which rights are guaranteed rather than provisional.  So we have a right and, indeed, a 
duty to coerce others to enter into political society with us.”90 
Kant’s vision of human society as existing under the protection of law is peculiar 
in its persistent attempts to guarantee the external conformity of everyone with the law, if 
necessary, through coercion and punishment of criminals, while at the same time crafting 
a conceptual framework that would allow for an non-invasive rule of law that leaves the 
matters of internal motivation or disposition up to the individual’s discretion.  Kant is 
very clear both in his endorsement of force directed at criminality and his endorsement of 
what is traditionally referred to as “freedom of thought”: one must obey the law and will 
be coerced if one chooses to break the law, but one must not be forced to have a 
particular disposition about the law, the external obedience and conformity is all that is 
required and can be regulated.  
However, Kant also insists on the need to ground legality in reason’s capacity for 
self-legislation, that is, in reason’s capacity for self-rule which is morality as a 
correspondence between an internal disposition and an external conformity.  Although 
Kant insists that we must preserve the idea of God as a guarantor of harmonization of our 
internal disposition, he is not yet talking about religion, but about a certain transcendental 
level that allows us to hope for a final realization of our human destiny.  The split 
between the “inside” and the “outside” of the moral law (in the internal and the external 
                                                
90 Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
32.  
 79 
 
use of freedom) ground then the split between justice as a principle of reason and law as a 
realization of that principle.  The ultimate test case of consistency of this arrangement is 
the case of revolution as an act of direct and explicit defiance of some specific rightful 
condition in the name of a better, more just, societal organization.  The case of revolution 
here does not concern the violation of this or that law, but a challenge to the rightful 
condition as a whole.  In Kantian terms, revolution is an attempt to exit the rightful 
condition, if only to reenter it as soon as a better configuration of laws is proposed and 
accepted by the people.  Although much has already been written about Kant’s discussion 
of revolution, our main task here is to suggest that revolution does not simply create a set 
of uncomfortable questions for Kantian theory of justice, but it, in fact, challenges its 
very consistency.  
 
5. Revolution: Testing Kant’s Theory of Justice. 
 After reviewing Kant’s theory of right, one might find some aspects of it to be 
similar to those of scholars from previous generations.  In fact, Kant never explicitly 
claims to be making an original contribution when it comes, for example, to the idea of 
the “original contract” or the state of nature.91  What is innovative about Kant’s approach 
is his insistence that even though leaving the state of nature would be advantageous to 
those who have only provisional rights and are under a constant threat of violence, the 
main reason that we have to form a civil society is because it is a moral obligation.  
Human beings are obligated to form a civil society, and thus, following Kant’s logic, the 
                                                
91 In one sense, Kant’s political theory is the ultimate elaboration of the long tradition of the social contract.  
Patrick Riley argues that Kant’s is the “most adequate of the social contract theories.”  Cf. Patrick Riley, 
Will and Political Legitimacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 125.  
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pursuit of global justice is a moral obligation that reason dictates us to fulfill.  Kant holds 
that human beings “will do wrong in the highest degree by willing to be and remain in a 
condition that is not rightful, that is, in which no one is assured of what is his against 
violence.”92  In a footnote to this passage Kant adds: “…they do wrong in the highest 
degree, because they take away any validity from the concept of right itself and hand 
everything over to savage violence, as if by law, and so subvert the right of human beings 
as such.”93  This last reference to the possibility of subversion of the state of law is an 
essential point, because, as we will see in a moment, it is precisely Kant’s position on the 
so-called “right to resist” that poses an important question that, when addressed, will 
significantly complicate Kant’s position.  
 Kant’s refusal to grant the subjects of an unjust sovereign any right to resist 
[Widerstandsrecht] and to revolt is famous, or rather, infamous.  This topic has been 
covered repeatedly and in great detail.94  Kant’s refusal to grant this right is peculiar from 
a number of perspectives, but the most intriguing one, considering our discussion of 
coercion and its relation to right, is the following: according to Kant, it is perfectly 
justifiable to force those in the state of nature to join the civil society because it is our 
moral obligation to do so, yet it is absolutely forbidden to force others out of the 
                                                
92 Ak. 6:308, MM, 452.  
93 Ak. 6:308n, MM. 452n  
94 For a good summary of the arguments and main sources, see Thomas Seebohm, “Kant’s Theory of 
Revolution,” Social Research 48:3 (1981), 557-87;  Thomas E. Hill, “A Kantian Perspective on Political 
Violence,” The Journal of Ethics 1:2 (1997), 105-40;  Christine Korsgaard, “Taking Law in Our Own 
Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution,” in Christine Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on 
Practical Reason and Moral Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 233-262.  See also 
Werner Hänsel, Kants Lehre vom Widerstandsrecht: Ein Beitrag zur Systematik der Kantischen 
Rechtsphilosophie (Berlin: Pan-Verlag, 1926) and Hans Reiss, “Kant and the Right of Rebellion,” Journal 
of the History of Ideas 17:1 (January 1956): 179-92.  
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established state of law, even if this state is abusive, constricting, unjust and detrimental 
to our autonomy and our very humanity.  
If we go a step further and remind ourselves that we are never in the position to 
either decide to join a rightful condition or experience being forced into joining one, 
since “original situation” or “the state of nature” is only a logical construction, not a 
historical situation of lawlessness as such, then we realize that we find ourselves always 
already in the specific state of law and if we find this state of law to be unjust, we cannot 
forcibly affect any considerable change, but must operate within the limitations of this 
particular rightful condition.  This description might suffer from some simplifications of 
Kant’s complex take on the matter.  However, we believe, it is adequate enough to raise 
an important question: how does one identify and fight specific instances of injustice in 
the rightful condition without having a right not only to overthrow the legitimate 
authority but even to question its very legitimacy?   
Regardless of how one feels about Kant’s apparently reactionary stance that 
people cannot revolt against the legitimate sovereign under any circumstances, Kant does 
spend a great deal of argumentative energy trying to show that although revolutions and 
rebellions are found throughout human history, if one takes a careful look at the concept 
of right as such, there is no right to revolt that can be rationally deduced from it.  Any 
legitimate constitution “cannot contain any article that would make it possible for there to 
be some authority in a state to resist the supreme commander in case he should violate the 
law of the constitution, and so to limit him.”95  
                                                
95 Ak. 6:319, MM, 462. 
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A provision to resist the legitimate authority in any constitution would be an 
example of self-contradiction.  Moreover, although Kant finds “estimable men who 
maintain that under certain circumstances a subject is authorized to use force against his 
superiors,” it is clear that any violent resistance or revolution “would make every rightful 
constitution [alle rechtliche Verfassung] insecure and introduce a condition of complete 
lawlessness (status naturalis), in which all rights cease, at least to have effect.”96  Since 
the state of nature is a hypothetical state completely devoid of justice, any violent action 
directed at the state of law itself, if successful, does not return us to the state of nature but 
allows us to exit the existing rightful condition in order to eventually enter the future, 
more just, rightful condition.  This intermediary space between a former law and a future 
law is not, properly speaking, a state of nature, but a state of suspension of law that might 
eventually lead to a complete cancellation of law, if revolutionaries fail to establish 
another rightful condition.   
 It is important to remember that Kant’s argument against the right to revolt is set 
against his own rather progressive, for the time, views on the actual revolutions that took 
places during his lifetime.  Kant, as is well-known, was enthusiastic about the French 
Revolution, to cite just one example: “The [French] revolution of a gifted people which 
we have seen unfolding in our day may succeed or miscarry… this revolution, I say, 
nonetheless finds in the hearts of all spectators (who are not engaged in this game 
themselves) a wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm…”97  When, 
                                                
96 Ak. 8:301, PP, 80. Emphasis added.  
97 Ak. 7:85, CF, 302. Original emphasis.  Kant was also reportedly in favor of the American Revolution as 
well, although we have only anecdotal evidence of such support in Kurt Joachim Grau, ed. Kant-Anekdoten 
(Berlin: Verlag von Georg Stilke, 1924), 18.  On Kant’s attitude toward the French Revolution, see Karl 
Vorländer, “Kants Stellung zur Französischen Revolution,” in Philosophische Abhandlungen, Hermann 
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reacting to the French Revolution, Johann Georg Heinzmann published in 1795 his 
Appell an meine Nation [Appeal to My Nation], he included Kant and Kantianism among 
the radicals who were distributing dangerous ideas that can lead to unrest.98  In addition 
to this clear allegiance to the liberal causes of the time, Kant provides us with a number 
of texts that can be read as leaving some room for an alternative interpretation. 
  The issue at hand is, again, Kant’s worry that any legitimate right to resistance 
would create a treacherous condition of a state of nature within or alongside a state of 
law.  If we accept Kant’s overall argument that such right would be logically self-
contradictory, then the question becomes not so much of the right to resistance as such, 
but of the relationship between the state of nature and the state of law in their seeming 
continuous interaction in any actual resistance to the legitimate authority.  What are we 
to make of this danger of falling back into the state of nature, a possibility of a “relapse” 
[Rückfallargument], as Peter Unruh calls it, which is supposedly present in any attempt to 
justify the overthrow of the legitimate authority?99  Kant’s argument is very clear on this 
matter: since right can only be realized in the state of law, and to enter this state is to let 
oneself be represented by the sovereign, to use violence against the legitimate sovereign 
is “to step back into the state of nature… a state without realized right, status justitia 
vacuus.”100  
                                                                                                                                            
Cohen zum 70 Geburtstag (Berlin, 1912) and George P. Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution 
(London: Longmans, 1920). 
98 Johann Georg Heinzmann, Appell an meine Nation: Über die Pest der deutschen Literatur (Bern, 1795) 
cited in John Christian Laursen, “The Subversive Kant: The Vocabulary of ‘Public’ and ‘Publicity’,” in 
What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, ed. James Schmidt 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 263.  
99 Peter Unruh, Die Herrschaft der Vernunft. Zur Staatsphilosophie Immanuel Kants, (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1995), 199-204.  
100 Thomas Seebohm, “Kant’s Theory of Revolution,” Social Research 48:3 (1981), 576. 
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We find ourselves then in a rather peculiar situation: a people are formed by an 
expressed consent of the individuals who are deciding to leave the state of nature and 
form a civil society, yet because such “true republic is and can only be a system 
representing the people,” its aim is also “to protect the rights of citizens in the name of 
the people.”101  It is precisely because “the supreme authority from which all rights of 
individuals as subjects must be derived,” that we cannot propose and defend that we also 
allow ourselves to exit the state of law that ceases to satisfy us.102  That is, although the 
initial formation of the state of law is seemingly voluntary, once the law is established 
and the right of specific legislation and enforcement is delegated to the sovereign, as 
Kant puts it, “whether it be a king, nobility, or the whole of the population, the 
democratic union,” the people who thus formed the state of law cannot leave it by 
attempting to suspend its rule.  In other words, there are no “do-overs” in the 
establishment of the rightful condition.   
Clearly, Kant does not argue his position based on the empirical historical data.  
However, this is only complicating the matter further, i.e. if Kant is not referring to the 
historical formations of the first human state of law, “an actual contractarian origin of the 
state,” then, as Christine Korsgaard eloquently argues, Kant postulates the right of 
government and claims that “we should take it for granted that the existing governments 
are legitimate representatives of the general will of the people who are ruled by them, as 
if they originated in social contracts.”103  Even in cases where the legitimate government 
                                                
101 Ak. 6:341, MM, 481. Translation slightly altered.  
102 Ak. 6:341, MM, 481.  
103 Korsgaard, “Taking the Law Into Our Own Hands,” 244. Cf. Ak. 6:319, MM, 462: “…the presently 
existing legislative authority ought to be obeyed, whatever its origin.”  
 85 
 
is abusing its authority and becomes despotic, it is better, argues Kant, to endure the 
injustice than to rebel and attempt to “abolish the entire legal constitution.”104   
In a long footnote to the discussion of the impossibility of people to judge their 
own case against the abusive government, Kant adds an interesting image of the “state 
suicide”: there is a special horror, Kant argues, in the idea of the formal execution of the 
sovereign, this horror is a moral feeling that results from the idea of the complete 
overturning of all concepts of right.105  While a “regular” criminal might violate the law 
making himself an exception to the rule, an ultimate criminal is rejecting the authority of 
the law itself and acts against his very own reason.  Or, if we may put it differently (and 
possibly provocatively), the ultimate violation of law is the belief that there is a higher 
law that can be used to question and judge the existing state of affairs, a kind of law of 
justice that revolutionaries can use to justify their overthrow of the legitimate authority.  
The ultimate crime therefore is that of the formal execution of the sovereign by his own 
people:  
…while his murder is regarded as only an exception to the rule that the people 
makes its maxim, his execution must be regarded as a complete overturning of the 
principles of the relation between a sovereign and his people (in which the people, 
which owes its existence only to the sovereign’s legislation, makes itself his 
master), so that violence [Gewalttätigkeit] is elevated above the most sacred rights 
brazenly and in accordance with principle.  Like a chasm that irretrievably 
swallows everything, the execution of a monarch seems to be a crime from which 
the people cannot be absolved, for it is as if the state commits suicide.106 
 
                                                
104 Ak 6:320, MM, 463. 
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106 Ak. 6:322, MM, 465.  Original emphasis. Interestingly enough, later in his discussion of cosmopolitan 
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The peculiarity of Kant’s language is obvious: in the struggle against the unjust 
sovereign, the people actually struggle against themselves; and in the execution of the 
sovereign, they execute themselves.  If the relationship between the people and the 
sovereign authority is disturbed, the monstrous chasm opens and consumes all.  Like a 
monster that cannot be simply killed, the sovereign is formally executed as to give the 
proceedings the “appearance of punishment,” thus the people commit an unforgivable sin 
(crimen immortale, inexpiabile) of committing a crime in the name of some future 
justice.  
 These acts of violence and injustice, according to the legitimate authority, in the 
name of future justice are indeed very peculiar acts.  As Korsgaard puts it, “a 
revolutionary undertakes to destroy the government, and so undertakes to destroy 
justice… [yet] his aim is to improve the juridical condition.  He thinks that justice will 
rise revivified from its own ashes, like the Phoenix; he hopes to bring about a new and 
better system of justice, which will come closer to doing its job, which is guaranteed 
freedom.”107  In this sense, we are not talking about examples of extremist violence 
aimed at the complete destruction of the state and its institutions.  Such violence can be 
theorized in terms of our discussion, but we choose to set it aside in order to better 
understand the instances of violence directed at undermining the existing rightful 
condition in the name of a future more just rightful condition.  The paradox of the 
Kantian distinction between law and justice as a distinction between an external 
conformity that can and must be enforced and an internal disposition that cannot be made 
                                                
107 Korsgaard, “Taking the Law Into Our Own Hands,” 253. Cf. Ak. 6:353, MM, 490:“…the pretext of 
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explicit is the following: Kant presents us with a theoretical description of human society 
that allows for constant progress and betterment of the human condition, yet he also 
provides us with a set of evaluative criteria that allows us to judge the adequacy of the 
present societal arrangement vis-à-vis its ideal form, encouraging us to strive for that 
future condition of justice “where the people can be influenced by the mere idea of the 
law’s authority, just as if it were backed up by physical force, so that they will be able to 
create for themselves a legislation ultimately founded on right.”108   
While the revolutionary overthrow of the legitimate authority that is judged to be 
unjust is out of the question for Kant personally, both theoretically as going against the 
idea of right and pragmatically as fraught with possible abuses, it is not out of the 
question for Kant’s philosophical distinction between law and justice.  The danger, on the 
one hand, is the collapsing of the issues of law and the issues of justice, and Kant 
attempts to avoid this danger by theorizing the distinction between the internal and the 
external uses of freedom.  Yet, on the other hand, the danger is that justice is to be 
understood as a transcendent, rather than transcendental, criterion that allows one to 
evaluate and, if necessary, violently change any regime that fails to live up to the 
standards of such justice.  The violence is thus inevitable and Kant chooses to align 
himself with the violence of lawfulness over against the violence of lawlessness.  
However, Kant’s personal preference here, clearly defined by his own political views, 
can be said to be irrelevant if we take Kant’s theory as a guide.  
     
 
                                                
108 Ak. 8:354, PP, 115. 
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6. Between Law and Justice.  
Let us summarize the main issues of this chapter and place them in the overall 
context of this study.  We have discovered that Kant’s political philosophy in its 
comprehensive grasp concerns itself with all aspects of a person’s life: morality as an 
internal disposition and legality as an external conformity that allows for maximum 
possible freedom.  We have asked a series of questions about the relationship between 
morality and legality, especially in view of the possibility of the conflict between the two.  
If human beings as political subjects find themselves in a state (hypothetically having 
chosen to enter such arrangement through an original contract), and if they also choose to 
form an ethical community, then it is very likely that at some point this ethical 
community might find itself in disagreement with the political authorities.  Clearly, if we 
all acted rationally, argues Kant, we would all be living in a peaceful condition in which 
our internal dispositions would coincide with our external juridical conformity.  
However, we do not live in such an ideal world and therefore we often find ourselves in 
situations where our moral persuasions contradict those of the external political order.  
The very distinction between morality and legality, then, is a distinction that is made in 
order to theorize our weakness as our inability to be thoroughly rational, thus proposing 
to establish the real possibility of a discrepancy between our ethical views and the view 
of that political community to which we belong.  Moreover, the state might not only 
propose and enforce laws that go against our ethical values, but in fact attempt to impose 
those particular values on us.  Kant advises the state against such behavior, but offers 
little in terms of actual resistance to such policies, except for his insistence on the need to 
allow for a public critique of oppressive policies in the public debate (which, of course, 
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depends on the oppressive regime’s reasonableness in allowing for such debate to take 
place to begin with).109   
In an appendix to “The Doctrine of Right,” Kant states quite unequivocally that 
we are to act according to the following categorical imperative: “Obey the authority who 
has power over you,” only to add parenthetically “in whatever does not conflict with 
inner morality.”110  Let us recall, again, our scenario in which a group of political subjects 
refuses to pay taxes out of conviction that their taxes will be used to support a war effort 
that they reject on moral grounds.  According to Kant, they are encouraged to voice their 
discontent in the public sphere and pursue their case for the change of official policy.  
However, they are also to pay their taxes as long as the legitimate government does not 
change its policy.  That is, they are to try to reform the system, not to resist it by either 
breaking the law or by attempting to undermine the legitimacy of the state.   
Regardless of the course of action in this situation, we are assuming that the 
conflict is indeed genuine, that is, that the group is genuinely convinced that its position 
cannot be compromised and in its conflict with legality it sides with morality, in its 
conflict with law it insists on confronting it in the name of justice.  Kant, as we have seen 
in his reflections on revolution, seems to be at loss when it comes to such situations, 
assuming that all humans can reach a reasonable consensus on conflictual matters and 
                                                
109 We are by no means dismissing Kant’s proposal for an open debate in the public sphere as naïve and 
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compulsion. Compulsion to unnatural sins: murder etc etc.” My translation) 
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peacefully coexist in one political community.111  We are concerned here with a situation 
that does not produce such consensus and, in fact, results in a conflict between a group 
that claims moral authority in its resistance to the juridico-political order that it perceives 
as unjust, i.e. in violations of not only its moral standards but also in violation of some 
higher law of justice.  The question for now is not so much how we deal with this 
peculiar conflict between a group of conscientious citizens resisting the legitimate 
authority in the name of justice, but what allows for such conflict to appear in the first 
place.    
We hope that this chapter demonstrates that such conflict appears as a result of 
differentiating between morality and legality, between internal and external freedom, 
between law and justice.  The idea of justice in this case is posited as something that is 
located, by definition, outside of law and therefore can be used as a criterion for 
evaluating any legal condition.  Although Kant attempts to articulate a principle of justice 
as a “sum of conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of 
another in accordance with a universal law of freedom,” he ultimately does not 
completely eliminate a sense of justice as an external criterion, not unlike that of “natural 
law” or, for that matter, the law of reason.112  This gap between legality and its immanent 
legitimacy (granted by the people) and morality that relies on ideas of reason that in this 
sense transcend the limitations of any particular juridico-political arrangement creates a 
possibility of a violent reaction against the constrictions of any particular political system 
in the name of better, more just, future of humankind.  
                                                
111 Jürgen Habermas has been a forceful proponent of such Kantian rational consensus-oriented political 
theory. See, for example, his Toward a Rational Society, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1970). 
112 Ak. 6:230, MM, 387. 
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Let us now imagine that the ethical community that we have used as an example 
so far is a religious community that perceives itself as being persecuted and marginalized 
by the secular government and attempts to fight back against this perceived 
marginalization using violent means.  The question here is, again, not whether such 
violent resistance should or should not be allowed, clearly for Kant any permission of 
violence is out of the question.  The real issue here is how we can explain the particular 
force of religious passion and its motivational drive to pursue justice.  If we pay attention 
to Kant, we learn that our religious community is not different from any other ethical 
community that attempts to organize itself around a set of “laws of virtue.”  And yet 
religious violence is not a simple matter of ethics or politics.  Indeed, our argument in this 
essay is that if there is anything distinctive about religious communities vis-à-vis ethical 
and political communities it is its more acute awareness of the very difference between 
the way things are (law/legality) and the way things must be (justice/morality).  In sum, a 
religious community is not a community of certain kinds of duties but a community of 
certain attitudes toward duties.  The issue of religious violence then is the issue of both 
ethics and politics as it forces us to ask not only a question of what motivates religious 
groups to commits acts of violence, but, most importantly, how that which motivates 
them comes about.  As we take a look at Derrida’s discussion of justice and violence in 
the next two chapters, we hope to clarify this statement about religious violence and 
eventually be able to be more specific in our attempts to articulate the economy of such 
violence.      
The task before us then is the following: if Kant’s practical philosophy represents 
(even if it does not ultimately embody) an ultimate theorization of the whole of Western 
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moral and legal tradition, then it is our task to attempt to understand why the very 
distinction between juridical and ethical laws introduced to preserve the internal freedom 
of faith of a private individual serves as a justification for violence in the name of justice.  
To put it differently, we argue that it is impossible to consistently argue that the world 
could be a better and more just place without, on the one hand, proposing an external 
(transcendent) criterion of justice and, on the other hand, insisting that, despite being 
theoretically located outside of the order of law, this criterion of justice is intimately 
connected to the such order.  Religious violence, we attempt to argue, ultimately exposes 
the paradoxical nature of the arrangement between the concepts of law, justice, and 
violence in that it raises the question of justice in such a way as to counter all the attempts 
to foreclose the open discussion of the legitimacy of the present societal constitution.  
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III 
Force of Law and the Imperative of Justice 
 
 Our discussion of Kant’s practical philosophy was aimed at giving us a wide 
enough context in which to place the issues of law, justice, force, religion and violence.    
Kant’s insistence that we abandon the state of nature and its provisional right in order to 
establish and to expand the state of law and justice grounds much of contemporary 
political theorization of the new global reality of human interaction.  Although a critique 
of a thorough legalization of human interactions is beyond the scope of this essay, it is 
essential to point out that Kant’s practical philosopher emerges as a staunch defender of 
the necessity of legality: even the worst and most abusive state of law is superior to the 
best possible state of nature because of the guarantees of justice in the state of law and 
the complete lack of such guarantees in the state of nature.   
In this chapter we will proceed with our discussion of law, justice and religious 
violence through a reading of Derrida’s thought-provoking essay “Force of Law.”  This 
essay, although not directly concerned with issues of religious violence, brings several 
problems to our attention, the most important being, as we will see, the problem of the 
paradoxical relationship between law and justice that allows us to approach the issues of 
violence and religion from a novel perspective.  In a way quite similar to Kant, Derrida 
raises the issue of the difference between law and justice as the difference between 
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morality and legality, while pursuing a vision of justice that might be located neither on 
the side of morality nor on the side of legality, but can be defined as a movement between 
the two, the movement that has its positive and negative aspects.  The movement between 
law and justice thus creates a space, an opening that provides for an understanding of the 
nature of violence as suspension/overcoming of lawfulness.  
In order to properly engage Derrida’s insights concerning the nature of the 
relationship between law and justice, we may describe Kant’s approach as an attempt to 
theorize any violence against the law as a violation of law (immanent plane), not as a 
suspension or cancellation of legality as such (transcendent plane).  Kant then is 
attempting not only to foreclose any possibility of exiting the existing rightful condition, 
as we tried to show in the previous chapter, but also to erase any reference to justice as 
true exteriority to the order of law.  Justice is theorized as a sum total of conditions that 
guarantee our freedom (immanent plane), yet when the conflict between our idea of 
justice and our experience of law arises, we are advised to refrain from asking the 
questions of legitimacy of our (or any, for that matter) rightful condition, but only to try 
to reform it without, however, leaving the existing rightful condition (transcendent 
plane).  Kant then aims to theorize the difference between law and justice as always 
already located in some rightful condition, that is to say, as always already arising in the 
immanent context of the state of law with only a hypothetical reference to the state of 
nature.  It seems, however, that Kant is unable to completely flatten the relationship 
between law and justice, and erase all references to the possibility of the notion of justice 
as constituting a truly exterior other to the order of law.  In sum, Kant attempts to prevent 
any violent clash between law and justice, while admitting that such clashes are not only 
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possible, but found throughout human history, including the contemporary examples of 
the French Revolution, by limiting our access to the true exteriority of justice in a similar 
manner that he has already limited our access to the knowledge of things outside of the 
possibility of experience in his theoretical philosophy.  By engaging with Derrida’s 
provocative reading of this very Kantian tradition of thinking about law and justice we 
hope to further explore this very potent subject matter of the relationship between law 
and justice, and the corresponding relationship between religion and violence.  
 
1. Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice. 
A suitable entry point for the continuation of our discussion of the issues of law, 
justice and religious violence is found in Derrida’s essay “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical 
Foundation of Authority’.” 1  In the first part of the address Derrida discusses the issue of 
justice and its relationship with law in the context of deconstruction.  He raises a number 
of thought-provoking questions, but the most important ones are related to the idea of a 
just action and its relationship to a moral action. “If I were content to apply a just rule, 
without a spirit of justice and without in some way inventing the rule and the example for 
each case, I might be protected by law (droit), my action corresponding to objective law, 
but I would not be just.”2  This contrast between a just action and a legal action is similar, 
                                                
1 The part of the essay was originally delivered at a conference at the Cardozo Law School and published in 
Cardozo Law Review: Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’,” Cardozo 
Law Review 11 (1989-1990): 920-1045. This essay was later reprinted  in a collection of essays that 
gathered other papers from the same conference: Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical 
Foundation of Authority’,” in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, eds. Drucilla Cornell, Michel 
Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson, (New York: Routledge, 1992), 3-67. Latest publication of the same 
essay with slightly improved English translation can be found in Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The 
‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’,” in Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anijar (New York: Routledge, 2002): 230-
298. 
2 FL, 245.  
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Derrida proposes, to Kant’s distinction between morality (internal disposition of respect 
for law) and legality (external conformity with the norm).  Derrida describes a legal 
action in the following terms: “I would act, Kant would say, in conformity with duty, but 
not through duty or out of respect for the law.  Is it possible to say: an action is not only 
legal, but also just?  A person is not only within his rights but also within justice?”3   
Derrida identifies the just action with that action that is done through duty and out 
of respect for law.  He claims, by identifying Kant as his point of reference, that what he 
labels “just action” is connected to what Kant labels “moral action.”  If Kant’s discussion 
of the distinction between morality and legality raised primarily a question of the 
relationship between internal and external freedoms, Derrida’s insistence on the idea of 
justice rather than morality or legality raises questions of the relationship between 
morality and justice and, most importantly, legality/lawfulness and justice. 
The question of justice, for Derrida, is inevitably the question of deconstruction.  
Despite the term’s popularity, “deconstruction” has been a rather elusive philosophical 
concept that, Derrida’s own protestations aside, has been firmly attached to his work, 
even though Derrida himself has apparently ceased to use it as a designation of his 
project very early on (if he ever did use it in such a simplistic manner).  A wide array of 
possible interpretations of both the word’s meaning and the philosophical procedure it 
stands for are available for public and academic consumption.4  Derrida’s discussion of 
                                                
3 FL, 245. Original emphasis. 
4 The amount of literature dedicated to introducing “deconstruction” is extensive.  One might identify 
several important early studies: Derrida and Deconstruction, ed. Hugh J. Silverman (New York: 
Routledge, 1989); John Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida 
(Fordham University Press, 1996). See also some of the more recent introductions such as Barry Stocker, 
Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Derrida on Deconstruction (Routledge, 2006); Penelope Deutscher, 
How to Read Derrida (New York: W.W.Norton, 2006) and Jason Powell, Derrida: A Biography 
(Continuum, 2006).   
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the relationship between deconstruction and the possibility of justice is structured as a 
general response to a rather common accusation that “deconstruction does not in itself 
permit any just action, any valid discourse on justice [discours juste sur la justice] but 
rather constitutes a threat to law [droit], and ruins the condition of possibility of justice.”5  
Addressing this accusation, of course, is only an entry point for Derrida’s engagement 
with the concepts of “justice” and “law,” engagement that would renew his attempts to 
(re)formulate the discourse on the status of deconstruction within his philosophy, here 
using the familiar (perhaps too familiar, one might add) ideas of justice, law (droit), and 
rule/regulation (loi).   
The question that opens the discussion of justice is following: “Does 
deconstruction insure, permit, authorize the possibility of justice? Does it make justice 
possible, or a discourse of consequence on justice and the conditions of its possibility?”6 
From the first paragraphs Derrida situates this larger issue of the possibility of justice in 
terms of the difference between justice and law (droit).  Deconstruction’s alleged lack of 
rules and definitive criteria, “what makes it suffer and what makes those it torments 
suffer,” in the context of the discussion of the possibility of justice points out “equivocal 
slippages” [des glissments équivoques] between justice and law.7  There are three 
important elements to Derrida’s presentation: law-as-rule (loi), law-as-right (droit) and 
justice (justice).  The body of positive laws forms a lawful condition of right [droit, 
                                                
5 FL, 231. Mary Quaintance, the translator of Derrida’s address, originally written in French, is very 
consistent in rendering droit as “law,” loi as “the law” and justice as “justice.”  It might be helpful to recall 
that Derrida takes droit to be equivalent to German Recht, loi to Gesetz and justice to Gerechtigkeit.  Thus, 
just like German Recht, droit may also mean “right” as in droits et responsabilités [rights and 
responsibilities] or Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme [the universal declaration of human 
rights]. 
6 FL, 231.   
7 FL, 231. 
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Kant’s Recht], i.e. a condition in which positive laws (loi) are adequately enforced.  
However, while discussing the phrase “to enforce the law,” Derrida complicates this 
situation with a peculiar distinction between justice itself (justice) and justice as 
expressed in law (droit):   
Applicability [of any positive law], “enforceability,” is not an exterior or 
secondary possibility that may or may not be added as a supplement to law 
[droit].  It is the force essentially implied in the very concept of justice as law 
[justice comme droit], of justice as it becomes law [droit], of the law [loi] as law 
[droit].  I want to insist at once to reserve the possibility of a justice, indeed of a 
law [loi] that not only exceeds or contradicts the law [droit] but also, perhaps, has 
no relation to law [droit], or maintains such a strange relation to it that it may just 
as well demand law [droit] as exclude it.8  
 
This is a fascinating passage in itself, but it becomes even more interesting if we situate it 
in the relevant discussion of this essay.  Not only is Derrida suggesting, here being in 
agreement with Kant, that force is not a supplement to law, but is its essential component, 
i.e., what makes it a law, but also that we might be looking for a different kind of justice, 
justice that would not only be divorced from juridical framework, but would also directly 
contradict it, exceed it, maybe even attempt to destroy it completely.  This new kind of 
justice is indeed both inside and outside of the juridical framework of laws.  This new 
kind of justice purports to regulate the relationships between individuals outside or 
beyond any system of enforceable laws, outside of any rightful condition, yet still be 
conceptualized as justice.   
Recalling the discussion of Kant’s position on the so-called “right to resist,” we 
might say that the peculiar space of justice as true exteriority to the order of law is 
created by a suspension of lawfulness and can only become visible under the condition of 
true “unauthorized” (illegal and illegitimate) cancellation of the law in any true resistance 
                                                
8 FL, 233. 
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to the conditions of injustice.  Derrida’s attempt to conceptualize this new type of justice 
that maintains a “strange relation” (a relation of true exteriority, we might add) to 
everything that law usually stands for is a move that urges us to seek another perspective 
on the very concepts of lawfulness, regularity, rule and order.  Recalling our earlier 
reference to a paraphrase of Marx, we might ask ourselves a question that seems to be 
guiding Derrida’s discussion of the issues: does the law, in fact, make us unable to even 
imagine the possibility of just human interactions outside of the order of law?   
Deconstruction, as some argue, lacks rules, norms and definitive criteria “to 
distinguish in an unequivocal manner between law and justice.”9  Any discussion of the 
distinction between justice and law is thus jeopardized precisely because of 
deconstruction’s alleged lack of consistent manner of articulating any distinction.  If 
deconstruction fails to contribute to our discussion of the difference between justice and 
law, it is because, one seems to imply, it is generally confused about any difference, it 
collapses all the differences due to its lack of established criteriology.  Mark Lilla 
suggests as much in his critique of Derrida’s politics when he writes that “neutralization 
of all standards of judgment” leaves legality and politics “open to the winds of force and 
caprice.”10  According to Lilla, Derrida’s deconstruction annihilates responsibility 
                                                
9 FL, 231. The amount of literature dedicated to introducing “deconstruction” is extensive.  One might 
identify several important early studies: Derrida and Deconstruction, ed. Hugh J. Silverman (New York: 
Routledge, 1989);  John Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida 
(Fordham University Press, 1996).  See also some of the more recent introductions such as Barry Stocker, 
Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Derrida on Deconstruction (Routledge, 2006);  Penelope Deutscher, 
How to Read Derrida (New York: W.W.Norton, 2006) and Jason Powell, Derrida: A Biography 
(Continuum, 2006).   
10 Mark Lilla, The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics (New York: New York Review of Books, 2001), 
174.  
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because it manages to introduce doubt and uncertainty into our fundamental discourses of 
morality and legality through its discussion of “aporetic justice.”11  
Derrida, of course, nowhere suggests that because we are confronted with the 
obvious conclusion that no legality is ever firmly founded, that somehow we undermine 
any attempts at grounding law and justice.  The goal of Derrida’s essay is to question the 
very nature of any adequate articulation of the difference between law and justice (the 
condition of its possibility, one might say) and the very necessity to establish the norm, to 
invent a criterion, to ground a judgment.  Derrida then ultimately attempts to 
problematize the distinction between the inside (“rightful condition” that aims to 
eliminate all true exteriority) and the outside of the law (“justice beyond law” as a true 
exteriority, as lawlessness).  However, even though Derrida muses about the justice-to-
come and the possibility of another kind of societal arrangement, he is rightly criticized 
for a rather obscure vision of such a society: What would the world of the future justice 
beyond law look like? What sort of practical political advice can Derrida give to the 
present generation? It is in this sense, that Derrida indeed is still unable to think the 
possibility of genuine exteriority to the juridico-political order of the law and its 
corresponding concept of justice.   
 
2. Mystical Foundation of Authority: Law, Justice and Force. 
“Force of Law” opens with a seemingly insignificant discussion of Derrida’s need 
to address the audience in English.  “C’est pour moi un devoir, je dois m’adresser à vous 
                                                
11 For additional critiques of deconstruction’s inadequate political theory, see Russell Berman, “Troping to 
Pretoria: The Rise and Fall of Deconstruction,” Telos 85 (1990), 4-16; Catherine Pickstock, “Postmodern 
Theology,” Telos 110 (1998), 167-79 and Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender 
in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).  
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en anglais.  This is for me a duty, I must address myself to you in English.”12  What kind 
of duty is this duty to address one’s audience in their native language?  Derrida proposes 
three basis formulations of this obligation.  First, one must use the language of the 
audience because “one has made this for me a sort of obligation or condition [une sorte 
d’obligation ou one condition imposée] by a sort of symbolic force or law [une sorte de 
force symbolique] in a situation I do not control.”13  In other words, one is forced into this 
address, forced by law.  Second, one must use the language of the audience because it is 
the language of the majority, thus it is more just, more appropriate or adequate [juste], to 
use the language that will be understood by the majority because it is this majority that 
sets the rules, “makes the law” [faire la loi].  Third, one must use the language of the 
audience because it is the norm of hospitality: “it is more just to speak the language of the 
majority, especially when, through hospitality, it grants speech to the stranger or 
foreigner.”14  This question of language and idiom/norm/rule is the guiding thread for 
Derrida’s discussion of the relationship between law and justice.  
To combine all of the three formulations of the above mentioned obligation, one 
might say: one is forced into an idiom of the majority by the symbolic force of the rule of 
the situation, the situation in which, through hospitality, one is granted the right to speak.  
The very granting of the right to speak, Derrida argues, already contains within itself a 
certain enforcement of the “rule of the land,” the rule of those who grant the right.  A host 
of seemingly familiar issues springs to our attention as we read these opening lines of the 
essay.  These issues have to do less with the “juridico-ethico-political” sense of justice or 
                                                
12 FL, 231. 
13 FL, 232. 
14 FL, 232. 
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law and more with “traditional” Derridian concern with language and its operations, its 
rules, its law.  What does it mean to be forced into an idiom of the majority?  What kind 
of force is at work here in the very structure of the address?  One can see then why 
Derrida poses the initial question of the discussion in a following way:  
How to distinguish between this force of the law [loi]… and the violence that one 
always judges unjust?  What difference is there between, on the one hand, the 
force that can be just, or in any case judged legitimate (not only an instrument in 
the service of law [droit] but the practice and even the fulfillment, the essence of 
law [droit]), and, on the other hand, the violence that one always judges unjust?15  
 
Thus already from the very start the relationship between law and justice is 
problematized by the issues of legitimate force and illegitimate violence.  The triad is 
thus: law, justice and force.  What kinds of relationships are established between these 
three terms?  Since the colloquium was dedicated to the question of the possibility of 
justice, one might formulate one possible combination in the following way: Does the 
possibility of justice depend on the adequate relationship between the law and the force 
that is judged legitimate in its enforcement of the law?  
In fact, we have six terms in this discussion of the possibility of justice.  Justice, 
as Derrida points out throughout the essay, can be perceived either as designating a 
crypto-theological idea of universal divine Good or as simply referring to correctness or 
adequacy (justess).  Law has a double meaning as well since it is a translation of both 
droit and loi.  We thus have law as right [droit], and law as rule or regulation [loi].  Force 
doubles into force as (legitimate) enforcement and force as (illegitimate) violence.  
However, and this seems to be the point of Derrida’s talk, as soon as the terms double – 
justice into divine justice and adequacy, law into right and rule, and force into 
                                                
15 FL, 234.   
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enforcement and violence – they simultaneously cover over this very ambiguity of their 
constitution.  In this sense, on one hand, we have a positivist discourse that refuses the 
grant the notion of justice any legitimacy outside of its immediate description of the 
positive law (“if it is legal, it is just”), refuses to grant “right” any other status than a 
configuration of legal statutes, and considers the state monopoly on force as entirely 
justified and above reproach or review.16  Yet, on the other hand, we have a long history 
of thinking about justice as an irreducible transcendent criterion that cannot ever be made 
explicit in human legal order of any sort where law comes from the “outside” and force is 
as inexplicable and overwhelming as God’s final appearance to Job.  
Commenting on the English expression “to enforce the law,” Derrida notes that 
“if justice is not necessarily law or the law [le droit ou la loi], it cannot become justice 
legitimately or de jure [de droit ou en droit] except by holding force or rather by 
appealing to force from its first moment, from its first word.  At the beginning of justice 
there will have been logos, speech or language [le langage ou la langue], but this is not 
necessarily in contradiction with another incipit, which would say, ‘In the beginning there 
will have been force.’”17  Derrida has already pointed out on multiple occasions the 
complicity between logos and force.  For example, in “Violence and Metaphysics” he 
describes this complicity in terms of “the ancient clandestine friendship between light and 
power, the ancient complicity between theoretical objectivity [logos] and technico-
                                                
16 Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, second ed., eds. P. Bulloch and J. Raz  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994).  For a critique of Hart’s position see Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1986).  For a succinct description of “legal positivism,” see Jules L. Coleman and Brian 
Leiter, “Legal Positivism,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, ed. Dennis Patterson 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 241-260.  For a critique of “legal positivism,” among many other excellent 
resources, John Finnis, “On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism,” in Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory: 
An Anthology, ed. Dennis Michael Patterson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 134-43.  
17 FL, 238.    
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political possession.”18  How is this complicity to be approached in terms of the 
relationship between law and justice?  Derrida cites Pascal’s formulation of such 
relationship in terms of force/power: 
La justice sans la force est impuissante [Justice without force is powerless – in 
other words, justice is not justice, it is not achieved if it does not have the force to 
be ‘enforced’; a powerless justice is not justice, in the sense of law – J.D.]; la 
force sans la justice est tyrannique.  La justice sans force est contredite, parce 
qu’il y a toujours des méchants; la force sans la justice est accusée.  Il faut donc 
mettre ensemble la justice et la force; et pour cela faire que ce qui est juste soit 
fort, ou que ce qui est fort soit juste [force without justice is tyrannical.  Justice 
without force is gainsaid, because there are always offenders; force without 
justice is condemned.  It is necessary then to combine justice and force; and for 
this end make what is just strong, or what is strong just].19   
 
This is, according to Derrida, a dominant context and the conventional interpretation of 
the relationship between law [droit] and justice modeled on the relationship between 
logos and force, even if, in the case of Pascal, this dominant tradition goes in a direction 
of “pessimistic, relativistic and empiricist skepticism” of equating power/force with 
justice: we are unable to make what is just strong, so we have made what is strong just.20  
Derrida’s analysis, according to his own presentation, will run counter to this tradition.  
Pascal refers back to Montaigne who suggested that “laws [lois] are not in 
themselves just but are rather just only because they are laws.”  This is what Montaigne 
calls “mystical foundation of authority” [fondement mystique de l’autorité].21  Derrida 
will address this issue at length in his discussion of Benjamin.  However, it is clear that 
Pascal, despite a certain cynicism, pointed out “the premises of a modern critical 
philosophy, even a critique of juridical ideology, a desedimentation of the superstructures 
                                                
18 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978), 91. 
19 FL, 238.  Cited from Blaise Pascal, Pensées et opuscules, ed. Léon Brunschvicg (Paris: Hachette, 1961), 
frag. 298, 470. 
20 FL, 239. 
21 FL, 239. 
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of law that both hide and reflect the economic and political interests of the dominant 
forces of society.”22  Justice is thus law enforced, law judged legitimate by an 
authoritative source.  Justice is law as the idiom of the majority, law as the rule of 
majority.  Justice, interpreted this way, is a predicate of law [droit] and the laws [lois].  
Laws, however, depend on the force of the constituting authority, on the force of 
“enforced law.”  Pascal’s position, argues Derrida, is not a simple proposition that law is 
in the service of force/authority, but that law maintains “a more internal, more complex 
relation to what one calls force, power or violence [la force, le pouvoir ou la violence].”23   
Justice as law [droit], i.e., justice considered a predicate of lawfulness, is never 
simply put “in the service of a social force or power, for example an economic, political, 
ideological power that would exist outside or before it and that it would have to 
accommodate or bend to when useful.  Its very moment of foundation or institution, 
besides, is never a moment inscribed in the homogeneous fabric of a story or history [le 
tissue homogène d’une histoire], since it rips it apart with one decision.”24  This notion of 
decision should not be misread as Derrida’s insistence on a kind of decisionism that he, 
for example, criticized in his discussion of the work of Carl Schmitt.25  William W. 
Sokoloff argues that collapsing Derrida’s discussion of decision and Schmitt’s 
decisionism is far from fair, as Derrida’s take on the notion of decision has “more in 
                                                
22 FL, 241.  
23 FL,  241.  
24 FL, 241. Emphasis added. 
25 Cf. Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997), 83-171. 
 106 
 
common with Kant including the affirmation of respect, the centrality of freedom, an 
imperative form for justice, and the distinction between right and justice.”26 
Derrida is distinguishing between justice as a predicate of law [loi and droit] that, 
according to both Pascal and Montaigne, is perceived to be in the service of power, and 
justice beyond law, justice (not yet or no longer) connected to law that is yet to be 
sufficiently described and understood.  Justice as a predicate of law is that which is 
legitimized by the power/authority/force, i.e. that which is established as legal, is judged 
to be just.  Therefore, the source of pessimism is the rule of “might makes right.”  
However, because justice as a predicate of law is never simply and directly in the service 
of power, the “might makes right” formula is philosophically naïve and simplistic.  In 
“Force of Law” justice is established through an operation that, Derrida claims, consists 
of “a coup de force, of a performative and therefore interpretative violence that in itself is 
neither just nor unjust.”27  This statement contains, one might argue, the crux of Derrida’s 
essay on the relationship between “deconstruction and the possibility of justice.”  It is 
interesting to notice that Derrida has used a similar expression to describe what he judged 
to be a paradoxical situation of the founding of the Unites States in “Declarations of 
Independence”:  
The ‘we’ of the declaration speaks ‘in the name of the people’.  But this people do 
not yet exist.  They do not exist as an entity, it does not exist, before this 
declaration, not as such. If it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, 
as possible signer [of the declaration], this can hold only in the act of the 
signature.  The signature invents the signer…  It is still ‘in the name of’ that the 
‘good people’ of America call themselves and declare themselves independent, at 
the instant in which they invent for themselves a signing authority.  They sign in 
the name of the laws of nature and in the name of God.  They pose or posit their 
                                                
26 William W. Sokoloff, “Between Justice and Legality: Derrida on Decision,” Political Research 
Quarterly, 58:2 (June 2005), 344n14 [341-352]. 
27 FL, 241.  
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institutional laws on the foundation of natural laws and by the same coup (the 
interpretive coup of force) in the name of God, creator of nature.28  
 
What is this interpretive coup de force that allows the law to be established as if ex 
nihilo?  If there is no legitimate authority that can authorize the law [droit], as in the 
American “Declaration of Independence”, that produces not only a new nation or a new 
people but a new law, then how does the state of law, championed by Kant, come into 
existence?  Clearly, according to both Kant and Derrida, it comes into existence through a 
decision to establish the state of law.  However, this very decision is clouded with a 
mysterious mist of notions that do not allow us to see clearly who decides and concerning 
what one decides in this decision to leave one state and to enter another state.  If law 
appears as a result of this decision to leave nature, as Kant argues, then how is it possible 
to enter a rightful condition, except by creating one in this very decision to enter?  Kant’s 
solution to this problem was to ground lawfulness in the very structure of reason: 
humanity in the state of nature does have an idea of law and right, but only provisionally, 
therefore its decision to enter into an agreement and thus establish a more permanent 
condition of right is based on their rational nature.  And yet, as we have already pointed 
out, if humanity’s decision is based on a preexisting notion of reason, then it is not an 
absolutely free decision as it simply follows the necessary logic of the obligation to enter 
into a rightful condition.  The problem for Derrida here is that he does not presuppose 
any existing rational structures that would allow us to somehow already have that which 
we are attempting to create in a decision.  Therefore if we are, in fact, creating the new 
                                                
28 Jacques Derrida, "Declarations of Independence," trans. T. Keenan and T. Pepper, New Political Science 
15 (Summer 1986), 10, 11.  
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law out of nothing (ex nihilo), this nothing does not disappear once the new law is in 
force; this nothing, using Derrida’s vocabulary, haunts the very order of law.  
The very difficulty of properly formulating the problem that faces us here is what 
Derrida’s analysis draws to our attention and provokes us to consider seriously.  In 
“Force of Law,” Derrida labels this “interpretive coup de force” a discourse at its limit.  
The discourse of law, of the state of law, exhibits its limit in its very performative power 
to authorize itself.  It is precisely this that Derrida proposes to call the “mystical 
foundation of authority.”29  Properly speaking, we cannot say anything about this 
mystical moment of self-authorization.  “There is here a silence walled up in the violence 
of the founding act; walled up, walled in because this silence is not exterior to 
language.”30  The question of violence reappears here yet again.  The issue of (legitimate) 
force/power that Derrida discussed in the previous sections of “Force of Law,” becomes 
the issue of (illegitimate) violence.  “Since the origin of authority, the founding or 
grounding, the positing of the law [loi] cannot by definition rest on anything but 
themselves, they are themselves a violence without ground.”31  Therefore, law is 
deconstructible because “its ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded.”32  This 
deconstructible structure of law “also ensures the possibility of deconstruction.  Justice in 
itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible.  No more than 
deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists.  Deconstruction is justice.”33   
 
                                                
29 FL, 242.  
30 FL, 242. Emphasis added. 
31 FL, 242. 
32 FL, 242.  
33 FL, 243. 
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4. Between Law and Justice: “Deconstruction Is Justice.” 
“Deconstruction is justice” – to understand this expression in the context of 
“Force of Law” and thus to avoid using it as a catchy Derridian cliché, we must, as we 
attempted so far, place it in the context of the discussion of the difference between law 
and justice.  It is also important to keep in mind that Derrida’s very purpose in this essay 
is to show that deconstruction is not some useful philosophical methodology that can be 
applied to legal studies.  It is, in fact, legal studies in general and Critical Legal Studies in 
particular that are exposed as methodologies that are always already aware of 
deconstruction, participate in deconstruction, even if without clear understanding of how 
deconstruction works.  It is so because “exercise of deconstruction… always proceeds to 
questions of law and to the subject of law.”34  If one understands “law” here as not being 
limited to legality but as a rule, regulation, norm, then Derrida’s observation on the 
interconnection between deconstruction and rule/regulation/norm is not very surprising.  
Since law, rule, norm are by definition constructible, it is nothing new or particularly 
controversial to suggest that this very constructability makes deconstruction possible.  
What is new is Derrida’s insistence on the existence of justice that is undeconstructible.   
The constructible law and undeconstructible justice both make deconstruction 
possible.  That is, deconstruction is a result of the interplay between law and justice. 
“Deconstruction takes place in the interval that separates the undeconstructibility of 
justice from the deconstructibility of law.”35  What is this interval between 
undeconstructibility (of justice) and deconstructibility (of law)?  Derrida writes: 
“Deconstruction is possible as an experience of the impossible, there where, even if it 
                                                
34 FL, 243.  
35 FL, 243.  
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does not exist, if it is not present, not yet or never, there is justice [il y a la justice].”36  
Thus Derrida interprets the subtitle of the conference (“Deconstruction and the possibility 
of justice”) as suggesting the following: “justice as the possibility of deconstruction, the 
structure of right or of the law, the founding or the self-authorizing of law as the 
possibility of the exercise of deconstruction.”37  
For Derrida the question of justice is closely connected not to the issues of some 
legal system, but to the structure, or more precisely, to the self-authorization of the law.  
Justice, as part of “deconstruction is justice,” is then not a predicate of law.  To speak of 
“just” or “unjust” law is confusing, we only need to retain such predicates as “legitimate” 
or “illegitimate.”  This could be read as Derrida’s very short answer to legal positivism.   
Justice without connection to law plays a significant role in that self-authorization of law 
that Derrida already labeled mystical and violent.  He repeats his characterization of the 
problem as mystical a couple of paragraphs later (while peculiarly avoiding discussing 
violence), and combines this predicate with the reformulated reference to experience, this 
time it is “the very experience of the aporia that is not unrelated to what we just called 
the mystical.”38 
Law is not justice.  Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be 
law, but justice is incalculable, it demands that one calculate with the 
incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as improbable as they 
are necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments in which the decision between 
just and unjust is never insured by a rule.39 
  
Justice that manifests itself as a law, as a rule, as a regulation, is calculable precisely 
because such is the structure of rule and regulated behavior.  Justice as such, however, as 
                                                
36 FL, 243. Original italics.  
37 FL, 243.  
38 FL, 244.  
39 FL, 244.  
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that which makes the experience of the rule, the experience of the passage (from rule to 
behavior and back, i.e. of regulation) possible, is beyond, or before, calculation, or 
regulation.  If justice cannot be calculated or regulated, but itself makes calculation or 
regulation possible, then how can one speak, with Kant and Derrida, of self-authorization 
of the law?  If regulation is made possible (is made calculable) by something outside of 
it, then it does not authorize itself.  Yet this is precisely the paradoxical formulation that 
Derrida repeats over and over again in a great variety of scenarios to a point of using it as 
a sort of trope even in his multiple interviews.40 
 
5. The Imperative of Justice. 
So far Derrida has used “decision” and “address” as ways of shedding light on the 
complex notion of “justice.”  If, in both cases, one is forced to address and one is forced 
to decide, then does that suggest one is also forced to be just?  And if it is possible to 
speak of being forced to be just, then who or what is forcing one to be just?  In other 
words, Derrida asks: “How to reconcile the act of justice that must always concern 
singularity… with rule, norm, value, or the imperative of justice that necessarily has a 
general form, even if this generality prescribes a singular application in each case?”41  
The act of justice is always singular and thus unique, irreplaceable, inexplicable in terms 
                                                
40 Cf. 1989 interview with Jean-Luc Nancy Derrida says: “…if I speak so often of the incalculable and the 
undecideable it’s not out of a simple predilection for play nor in order to neutralize decision: on the 
contrary, I believe there is no responsibility, no ethico-political decision, that must not pass through the 
proofs of the incalculable or the undecideable. Otherwise everything would be reducible to calculation, 
program, causality, and, at best, ‘hypothetical imperative’.”  Jacques Derrida, “’Eating Well’, or the 
Calculation of the Subject,” in Points… Interviews, 1974-1994, ed. Elizabeth Weber (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 273. 
41 FL, 245.  
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of law or rule.  For Derrida that means that one is never able to say “I know that I am 
just…  Such confidence is essentially impossible.”42 
If justice, on the one hand, is concerned with singularity and thus only appears in 
singular cases and does not have any rule, then any theory of justice is out of the 
question.  There is no rule to justice, no rigor, no possibility of predicting or even 
applying certain principles and thus producing a “just act” or “just ruling.”  On the other 
hand, however, the imperative of justice, “just call for justice,”43 necessarily concerns a 
kind of generality that, even if one would hesitate to call it “universality,” deals with 
more than one case of law.  If justice is concerned with “the other or myself as other,” 
then law, by implication, is concerned with the same, with identity, with the possibility of 
repetition (iterability).44 
Derrida returns to his example of being forced to speak in the “language of the 
other” in order to explain how any attempt to speak of “just law” is impossible precisely 
because to be just to the other in speaking her language is to “appropriate it [language] 
and assimilate it according to the law [loi, rule, norm] of an implicit third.”45  This appeal 
to the third party strips the act of justice of its singularity, or more precisely, the third 
party insists on some regularity in the application of the principles of justice and thus on 
the possibility of some positive criterion for identification of justice (criteriology of 
justice).   
What are the implications of Derrida’s constitution of the space (of difference) 
between law and justice?  In his own words, “deconstruction would not at all correspond 
                                                
42 FL, 245.  
43 FL, 244. 
44 FL, 245.  
45 FL, 245.  
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to a quasi-nihilistic abdication before the ethico-politico-juridical question of justice and 
before the opposition between just and unjust, but to a double movement.”46  The two 
moments of this movement of deconstruction are the two moments of the movement of 
justice, because, as Derrida already suggested, “deconstruction is justice” and also 
because we “know nothing more just that what [we] call today deconstruction.”47  On the 
one hand, Derrida claims, deconstruction deals with the “task of recalling the history, the 
origin and the sense [sens], thus the limits of concepts,” in our case it is concepts of 
justice, law [loi] and right [droit].48  On the other hand, deconstruction also deals with 
“apparently ahistorical” logico-formal paradoxes.49  
Derrida explicitly interprets the movement of deconstruction here in terms of the 
two poles between which the movement of deconstruction takes place: law and justice.  
More precisely, deconstruction “finds its privileged site, or rather, its privileged 
instability” in the space of difference between law and justice.50  It is this space, this site 
that interests us immensely, not only because “deconstruction always find itself and 
moves itself between these two poles,” but also because we hope to show that this 
peculiar difference (both as a gap and an interval) is essential for our understanding of the 
economy of religious violence. 51   
Everything would still be simple if this distinction between justice and law were a 
true distinction, an opposition the functioning of which was logically regulated 
and masterable.  But it turns out that law claims to exercise itself in the name of 
justice and justice demands for itself that it be established in the name of a law 
that must be put to work (constituted and applied) by force ‘enforced’.52   
                                                
46 FL, 247. Emphasis added.  
47 FL, 243, 249. 
48 FL, 247.  
49 FL, 250.  
50 FL, 249-50.  
51 FL, 251.  
52 FL, 250-51. Emphasis added.  
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If justice is of the order of incalculable, excessive, and limitless, and law is of the order of 
calculable, limited and masterable, then deconstruction is justice in a sense of being 
neither one nor the other, but a movement between the two, a movement that is made 
possible by the discrepancy between the demands of justice and actualities of law.  
Justice is infinite, incalculable, rebellious to the rule, asymmetric, heterogenic, 
heterotropic, limitless.  Law represents legitimacy, legality, a stabilizable, statutory and 
calculable apparatus, a system of regulated and coded prescription.53  The appearance of 
violence has already disturbed the fragile balance of the relationship of law and justice, 
and Derrida pushes the matter even further by suggesting that the gap between law and 
justice is impossible to bridge, unless we are ready to destroy the very institution of law 
in the name of justice.  The peculiar discrepancy between law and justice conceals a 
monstrous potency for destruction, the same potency that frightens Kant and is evident in 
his description of the ultimate “unforgivable sin” of revolution.  If Kant’s ultimate task is 
to foreclose any possibility of ever directly encountering the real difference between law 
and justice, Derrida seems eager to emphasize this difference explicitly and often, yet 
even this fearless deconstructor will shy away from some of the implications of his own 
analyses when the matter of religion and violence make their inevitable appearance.  
Derrida’s essay ends with three examples of the aporetic movement of justice.  
These are precisely examples that are meant both to summarize previous discussion and 
set a stage for any future engagement of this topic. The first example of the aporia deals 
with the paradox of any just decision: if one simply follows the legal rule, one’s action 
can only be legal or legitimate but never just, because justice implies a suspension of 
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legality and yet law operates on the assumption that it is exercised in the name of justice.  
In this example, the movement of justice is precisely the constitution of the space of 
difference between justice and law: despite the fact that law claims to operate “in the 
name” of justice and justice finds its association with lawfulness to be most “natural,” the 
destabilizing movement of justice prevents this “logically functioning and masterable” 
distinction from appearing, or rather, from stabilizing into an opposition.  Just decision, 
in fact, any decision, Derrida argues, create a unique movement that both unities and 
disrupts the calculable and the incalculable.  
The second example of the aporia of justice continues the discussion of the 
structure of decision: “no justice is exercised, no justice is rendered, no justice becomes 
effective nor does it determine itself in the form of law, without a decision that cuts and 
divides.”54  However, the decision is never final, i.e. it is never really made.  One decides 
to make a judgment, to find a suitable rule or law and apply it to the singular case under 
consideration, but, if we read Derrida carefully, such decision never proceeds by the way 
of calculation; there is always a remainder, an excess, that is, that which cannot be 
decided, the undecidable.  This undecidable haunts every decision, especially a just 
decision: “the test and ordeal of the undecidable, of which I have just said it must be gone 
through by any decision worthy of this name, is never past or passed, it is not a 
surmounted or sublated moment in the decision.  The undecidable remains caught, 
lodged, as a ghost at least, but an essential ghost, in every decision, in every event of 
decision.”55  What is most important about this ghostliness is that it eliminates all 
“assurance of presence, all certainty or all alleged criteriology assuring us of the justice 
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of a decision, in truth of the very event of a decision.”56  Thus if rule or law are of the 
order of calculable and have a certain criteriology, a certain logic and reason to their 
application, then justice is “a madness, and perhaps another kind of mysticism.”57  Justice 
is madness here represents that which is not ultimately based on reason (like law, as Kant 
argues).  It is unreason, unlaw, if we are to invent a term to designate this aspect of 
Derrida’s discussion.   
The imperative of justice is categorical and cannot be rejected or delayed.  If, 
however, a decision is never made, if it is continually being delayed, then is this 
suspension itself, as a lack of a just decision, the greatest injustice?  Indeed it is, argues 
Derrida, because the third example of the aporia of justice is precisely this problem: 
“…justice, however unrepresentable it remains, does not wait.  It is that which must not 
wait.  To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: a just decision is always required 
immediately, right away, as quickly as possible.”58  Decision, as Derrida continuously 
emphasizes throughout the essay, is not of the order of calculable and theoretical, it 
cannot come as a result of theoretical calculation, as the consequence or the effect of 
deliberation, since “decision always marks the interruption of… deliberation that 
precedes it, that must precede it.”59  
 
6. Messianic Time of Justice and Religious Violence. 
The mentioned examples of the aporia of justice lead Derrida to some general 
conclusions about his project as dealing with a larger transformation of the legal and the 
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political situation.  Justice is described as a “to-come” [à-venir], as that which has not 
lost the openness to the coming of the other:  
Justice remains to come, it remains by coming [la justice reste à venir], it has to 
come [elle a à venir] it is to-come, the to-come [elle est à-venir], it deploys the 
very dimensions of events irreducibly to come.  It will always have it, this à-venir, 
and will always have had it.  Perhaps this is why justice, insofar as it is not only a 
juridical or political concept, opens up to the avenir the transformation, the 
recasting or refounding [le refondation] of law and politics.60 
 
No matter how mysterious and alluring all this talk of “undecideable” and “incalculable” 
is, we still need to make a decision, a decision about a particular situation while, at the 
same time, grounding our decision in some universal legal framework, some “rightful 
condition.”  In other words, it is essential to ask, at this point, the following question: 
Considering all the talk of “justice to come” and its aporetic structure, how do we speak 
of justice and pursue justice today?  Derrida’s understanding of justice is self-professedly 
bound with his understanding of a peculiar temporality of decision, a temporality he often 
refers to as “messianic.”  This notion of messianic is superbly discussed in the works of 
John D. Caputo, especially his study of Derrida’s “religion without religion.”61  
Caputo argues that Derrida’s discussion of justice is “deeply resonant with the 
prophetic notion of justice, of being faithful to the coming of justice, making justice 
happen, now, for justice, which is to come, cannot wait.”62  If Derrida takes justice to be a 
sort of prophetic (transcendent) justice, than, writes Caputo, his understanding of the 
temporality of justice is clearly that it is a messianic time, because “the time to come is 
the time of the justice to come, that disturbs the present with the call for justice, which 
                                                
60 FL, 256-57. All italics are original. 
61 John Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1997). 
62 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, 81. Cf. Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986). 
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calls the present beyond (au-delà) itself.”63  The greatest injustice in this case would be to 
close off any possibility of this justice to come in positivist identification between 
legality and justice.  Derrida’s understanding of justice prophetically preaches a kind of 
openness that never allows for an ultimate closure, as it points toward the outside of all 
human mastery and control, i.e. “beyond present” which in Derrida’s terms is always 
beyond self-identical presence.  Caputo labels this peculiar idea of justice that never 
comes but only promises a final realization of itself in the infinitely approaching future, 
“an apocalypse sans apocalypse.”64     
Derrida carefully distinguishes between the determinate content of particular 
messianisms and the messianicity itself as a form of the promise.  Despite Derrida’s own 
hesitation to think of his “idea of justice” in terms of Kant’s “regulative ideas,” it is not 
difficult to see the similarities between the two, while avoiding complete assimilation.65  
In a book written immediately after “Force of Law” – Specters of Marx 66– Derrida pays 
a very close attention to the themes of messianic time in Marx and shows that  
[T]he messianic appeal belongs properly to a universal structure, to that 
irreducible movement of the historical opening to the future, therefore to 
experience itself and to its language (expectation, promise, commitment to the 
event of what is coming, imminence, urgency, demand for salvation and for 
justice beyond law, pledge given to the other inasmuch as he or she is not present, 
presently present or living and so forth).67   
 
The messianic, for Derrida, designates a “structure of experience,” a form, not a 
particular set of religious beliefs, a structure of experience that exposes any attempt at 
                                                
63 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, 81. 
64 Cf. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, 88-101. 
65 Cf. FL, 254: “I would hesitate to assimilate too quickly this ‘idea of justice’ to a regulative idea in the 
Kantian sense…” 
66 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994). 
67 Derrida, Specters of Marx,167. 
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setting down the law to the dangers of the future apocalyptic destruction and annihilation: 
“The messianic, including its revolutionary forms (and the messianic is always 
revolutionary, it has to be), would be urgency, imminence but, irreducible paradox, a 
waiting without horizon of expectation.”68  This idea of messianic time or messianic 
temporality being an essential part of our experience, of our day-to-day lives, is 
illustrated in Derrida through a metaphor of a “disjointed or dis-adjusted time.”69  This 
disjointed time is the time that is never securely and orderly closed off from cataclysmic 
changes.  It is the opposite of the time of “metaphysics of presence” that requires that 
human experience is regimented according to a strict set of rules, norms, laws.70  
Justice in this sense is always in a double danger: on the one hand, it is in danger 
of being neutralized and identified with legality, on the other hand, it is in danger of 
being a motivation for change, for going beyond the present, for violence “in the name of 
justice” that refuses to take some perceived injustice as the final state of affairs.  If our 
discussion of Kant could help us avoid the first danger, our discussion of Derrida, 
however, does not guarantee that we are able to completely pacify the dangerous violence 
“in the name of justice.”  In fact, if we take a rather forceful interpretation of Derrida’s 
discussion of this messianic temporality, and claim with Caputo that “the movement of 
justice is a movement beyond the hinges and fixed junctures of the law,” then our 
discussion of the relationship between religion and violence is provisionally located in 
this very movement beyond the law.71   
                                                
68 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 168. Emphasis added. 
69 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 170. Cf. especially Chapter 1, 3-48.  
70 Cf. Caputo, Prayers and Tears, section “Messianic Time Is Out of Joint,” 122-25. 
71 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, 123. 
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Caputo argues, summarizing a great deal of Derrida’s texts and weaving an 
intricate and complex web of arguments that we cannot reproduce here, that “religion as a 
universal messianicity despoiled of all messianism, as a faith without dogma advancing 
in the risk of absolute night, is the foundation of the law, the law of the law, the origin of 
institution and constitution, the performative event which does not belong to the whole 
that it founds or inaugurates, which Derrida elsewhere called the ‘mystical force’ of 
law.”72  Derrida argues for a messianic dimension of any pursuit of justice, a pursuit that, 
by definition, is not constrained by legal limitations of this or that system.  This pursuit of 
justice in the face of perceived injustices that are not addressed by the legal system 
(because they as such cannot be addressed) often motivates those who commit acts of 
violence in the name of religion.  
It might be useful here to approach the question of “religious violence” in the 
following still provisional way: Is religious violence a particular reaction to some 
perceived injustice?  Is it possible to isolate a specific aspect of this complex idea and 
question it vis-à-vis its reaction to the perceived injustices of the secular age?  In a sense, 
as we pointed out before, the ideas of apocalyptic finitude of human history are not 
unique to Abrahamic monotheisms that, to one degree or another, contain messianic 
elements that emphasize the possibility of divine intervention and final realization of the 
world’s potential.  If messianicity is a religious dimension of contemporary experience, if 
the call for ultimate justice is still very strong both among religious communities and 
secular political communities, then is it possible to locate religious violence among the 
various forms of violence in the name of justice, and justice to come?  Let us once again 
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return to our example of conscientious tax evaders who refuse to pay taxes that, they 
argue, support a war they believe is not necessary or justified.  This decision to evade 
taxation, although not usually considered an act of violence, is a violation of law, i.e. the 
members of the group can be arrested and tried in court for tax evasion.  However, even 
if the legality of the case is not directly affected by moral or political motivations, it is 
hardly a desirable feature of any civil society to proclaim them absolutely irrelevant.  The 
issue at hand seems to be firmly lodged between issues of morality and issues of legality.  
In this sense, it is an impossible task for any legal system to attempt to bridge this gap, to 
articulate the difference between morality and legality without a supplement of issues that 
are neither moral nor legal, or, more dangerously, are both.  
Let us imagine now another group of conscientious tax evaders that is, in fact, a 
religious group that believes in the sanctity of life and refuses to pay taxes because, it 
argues, they go to support various practices that contradict the views of this pro-life 
group.  Although formally there is little difference between pacifism of the first group 
and the pro-life motivations of the second, our examples being purely hypothetical, there 
is a sense in which we regularly group the first among the secular (even if radical) groups 
and the second among the religious (even if extremist) groups.  
Before we take a closer look at the issues of violence in the next chapter, let us 
briefly present a view of religious violence that, informed by our analysis of both Kant 
and Derrida, can be conceived not in terms of particular beliefs or positions, but in terms 
of a complex motivational matrix that produces violent acts, a matrix imbued with a 
peculiar sense of the ultimate deconstructibility of human juridico-political structures.  If 
we note, with Derrida, that any attempt to bridge the gap between law and justice cannot 
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succeed due to the incommensurability of the calculable (executable) nature of law and 
the incalculable nature of justice, then we can approach the problem of religious violence 
from a new point of view, the point of view of a particular struggle in the name of justice, 
conceived as that which is always beyond the (human) law.  
However, is such approach to the issue of religious violence not an implicit and 
rather disingenuous attempt to defend certain instances of violence when the clear 
political (and cultural) agenda of modernity is concerned precisely with complete 
elimination of all violence and conflict?  How does this proposed initial 
conceptualization of the notion of religious violence keep us from ultimately endorsing 
violence in a pursuit of justice?  This issue is quite serious, in fact, as we will see in 
Derrida’s discussion of Benjamin’s critique of violence in the next chapter, it is the issue 
that gave Derrida pause in his somewhat enthusiastic endorsements of messianic as 
disruption and un-gathering.73  The short answer to the above objections is the following: 
dismissing all violence out of hand as undesirable and therefore philosophically suspect is 
a move that prevents us from understanding not only what violence is and how it 
functions (which is a project much larger than the present study), but also how to deal 
with its more extreme and destructive expressions.  In other words, we cannot adopt a 
stance against all violence before we attempt to understand where it might be coming 
from and what motivates its continuous development.  Let us pose another question: 
What is it that often makes passionate pursuit of the cause of justice so violent, even if 
this violence is not directly physical (but only expresses itself in so-called “non-violent” 
forms)?  If we reject violence without any careful consideration of its nature, its causes, 
                                                
73 For Derrida’s analysis of justice as Un-fug (dis-jointure) in his reading of Heidegger’s analysis of justice 
as Fug (dike), see Specters of Marx, 23-28. 
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and its consequences, then we are foreclosing the possibility that even such practices as 
personal devotion to the cause, societal movements in the name of human rights, equality, 
and tolerance, and other larger reform movements aimed at radically changing the status 
quo are indeed often violent but just.  If all violence is necessarily rejected as suspect, 
then we are forever foreclosing a possibility of finding out whether it has any 
emancipatory potential.   
 Since we have reached this relevant midpoint of our study and have already 
conducted some theoretical analyses of a number of philosophical notions essential for a 
better understanding of the problem of religious violence, this could be a good point to 
restate our main hypothesis: religious violence is best conceptualized as a particular 
example of articulation of the space of difference between law and justice.  If Kant’s 
discussion of law and justice have taught us that even the most rational and secular 
versions of contemporary theories of morality and legality are not without their peculiar 
difficulties, then Derrida’s emphasis on both positive and negative aspects of any 
articulation of the space of difference between law and justice has shown us the precise 
way to approach these difficulties: we must take seriously the always present danger that 
a discrepancy between law and justice (the space of their difference) would explode in a 
violent outburst aimed as correcting the injustices perpetrated in the name of law and 
under its close supervision.  To put it differently, the present chapter presented Derrida’s 
case that the relationship between law and justice is always already problematized by 
violence (and its various incarnations such as coercion, force, power, and so on).  In fact, 
both law and justice are contaminated with the possibility of violence, as we will see in 
the next chapter of this study.  However, if Kant’s presentation of the matter of our duty 
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to enter a rightful condition and to remain in it is correct and is adequate, and if Derrida’s 
insistence that messianicity as a peculiar characteristic of our experience of justice is to 
be taken seriously, then taking the discussion of religious violence out of the usual 
contexts (discussed in the first chapter of this essay) and placing it in the midst of the 
issues of law and justice seems not only appropriate but necessary.  
 Derrida’s articulation of the imperative of justice and his presentation of the 
imperative’s inherent forcefulness also revealed to us the need to avoid two extremes in 
our analysis of the space of difference between law and justice: on the one hand, we 
cannot advocate for a simple divorcing of justice from law because, as Kant points out, 
such a split would ultimately lead to the dissolution of any rightful condition by returning 
the decision concerning justice or injustice to private individuals, stripping the sovereign 
of all the authority.  On the other hand, we cannot advocate for a complete and final 
bridging of the gap between law and justice as it will inevitably lead, as Derrida insists, to 
the same destruction of the very institution of law.  If we are take a hint from Derrida, we 
are to correct our initial proposal that religious violence is violence in the name of justice 
by reminding ourselves that, in a manner similar to Kant’s critical turn, Derrida forbids 
any objective and universal knowledge of what constitutes justice, as such.  That is to 
say, if religious violence is violence in the name of justice, then it is also violence that 
aims to correct only a perceived injustice, as it is not legitimately able to make a valid 
claim to know what is and is not just, although it constantly does make such claims.  The 
paradoxical nature of religious violence that often puzzles scholars (“why do such moral 
people commit such immoral acts?”) can be reassessed here in a following formulation: 
violence in the name of justice, motivated and driven by its pursuit of better societal 
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arrangement and tighter social bond, is often judged to have done so through what is 
perceived to be acts of utterly unjust violence.  One might note that the worse the 
perceived injustice that is being confronted in the act of religious struggle, the more 
likely we are to see more extreme outbursts of violence that seem to clash with the very 
notion of justice in the name of which they are committed.  The destructive and 
ultimately unmanageable character of this violence cannot be properly understood 
without a closer look at the inner dynamics of the relationship between ideas of justice 
and violence to which we are now turning our attention.  
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IV 
Justice and Violence. 
 
 In the second part of “Force of Law” Derrida proposes a reading of Walter 
Benjamin’s essay “Zur Kritik der Gewalt” (“Critique of Violence”).1  This paper was 
read at the opening of the colloquium “Nazism and the ‘Final Solution’: Probing the 
Limits of Representation” held at the University of California-Los Angeles in 1990. 
Derrida’s inclusion of this talk within the discussion of the Holocaust is later explained as 
a contribution to the critique of representation that he now launches from a different, yet 
familiar, perspective of the complicity between law, force, and language.  At first look, 
the theme of the difference between law and justice is somewhat less prevalent in this 
part of the essay.  However, Derrida makes some important observations that, compared 
with those in the first part of the essay, shed some light of the problem of justice, 
violence, and religion.  These observations should be considered not in terms of their 
interpretative value for our understanding of Benjamin’s essay, but in terms of furthering 
the conceptualization of the difference between law and justice pursued in this essay and 
the effect that this conceptualization produces in terms of our interest in the notion of 
religious violence.   
                                                
1 Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, 
ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken, 1986), 277-300. Further cited as “Critique of Violence.” 
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1. Derrida on Benjamin’s Critique of Violence. 
Benjamin’s essay, Derrida argues, is “haunted in advance by the theme of radical 
destruction, extermination, total annihilation, and first of all the annihilation of the law, if 
not of justice.”2  Although most of the discussion will be dedicated to Benjamin’s 
peculiar distinction between law-establishing and law-preserving violence, Derrida 
clearly proceeds with a single goal in mind: to show that Benjamin’s political philosophy 
and its critique of violence/authority/force [Gewalt] “puts to work an interpretation of 
language – of the origin and the experience of language – according to which evil, that is 
to say lethal power, comes to language by way of, precisely, representation, that is to say, 
by that dimension of language that is re-presentative, mediating, thus technological, 
utilitarian, semiotic, informational…”3  This critique of representation, although a known 
Derridean preoccupation, acquires new strength precisely due to Derrida’s more forceful 
explication of the complicity between violence and signification.  This time we are 
directly confronted with political and juridical violence and their connection to the 
various regimes of representation.   
Derrida’s essay on Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” consists of two main parts: 
one is a commentary on the essay itself; another is a preface and a postscript added later 
to the already finished essay.  The importance of this structure consists in the fact that 
Derrida’s reading of Benjamin can be shown to differ in the earlier and later layers of the 
                                                
2 FL, 258 
3 FL, 259.  
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work.4  This difference has to do with the way Derrida perceives some of the implications 
of Benjamin’s discussion of “divine violence,” especially vis-à-vis the theme of the 
Holocaust.  Namely, it reveals Derrida’s hesitation to embrace his own interpretation of 
Benjamin, considered in light of his overall project of the critique of representation. 
The main thread of Derrida’s reading of Benjamin deals with the latter’s 
insistence that any critique of violence, in order to be successful, needs to accept the 
basic theoretical distinction between “law-establishing” (die rechtsetzende Gewalt) and 
“law-preserving” (die rechtserhaltende Gewalt) violence.  Benjamin argues that the 
problem of violence is ultimately connected to the problem of law and legality, as such, 
or rather that the problem of violence is inseparable from the problem of law and its 
binding force.  The proposed distinction cannot stand, Derrida’s deconstructive reading 
reveals, because “having begun by distinguishing between two sorts of violence, 
founding violence and preserving violence, Benjamin must concede at one moment that 
the one cannot be so radically heterogeneous to the other since the violence called 
founding violence is sometimes ‘represented’, and necessarily repeated, in the strong 
sense of that word, by the preserving violence.”5  To put it differently, if there is an 
original founding violence and there is a secondary preserving violence that represents 
this original founding violence, then the relationship between the two, once framed in 
terms of representation, is immediately complicated due to representation’s economy.   
This reference to representation is not accidental.  Derrida will go on to argue in 
the main body of the essay that the opposition between foundation and preservation does 
                                                
4 See, for example, Robert Zacharias, “’And Yet’: Derrida on Benjamin’s Divine Violence,” Mosaic: A 
Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature, 40:2 (June 2007), 103-116.  
5 FL, 260. 
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not stand precisely because the two seemingly different types of violence interact in the 
contamination that is brought about in representation: despite the intention of the strict 
distinction between founding violence and preserving violence that Benjamin proposes in 
order to understand (and thus critique) violence, neither pure founding nor pure 
preservation is possible.  This point is essentially restating Derrida’s critique of what he 
often labeled the “metaphysics of presence,” meaning that sort of metaphysical yearning 
for pure presence, pure unadulterated instance in which something just is.6  It is for this 
reason that Derrida’s critique of Benjamin’s essay is chosen for our discussion of law, 
justice, violence, and religion.  Derrida, like no one else, sees the issues of law and justice 
contaminated by the problem of violence and provides us with a potent critique of this 
contamination in his general critique of representation, a critique that does not aim to 
eliminate contamination and, in fact, shows that it is impossible to do so.  
To make his point, Derrida takes Benjamin at his own word and accepts the 
proposed distinction between law-establishing and law-preserving violence as essential to 
any critique of violence/power.  This acceptance, however, is not merely hypothetical and 
is not aimed at the subsequent dismissal once the inconsistencies are exposed.  Derrida’s 
deconstructive reading then neither destroys the argument (by revealing its 
inconsistencies) nor uncritically accepts the argument (by smoothing out its 
inconsistencies).  Derrida uncovers in Benjamin’s essay an economy of violence that, 
despite Benjamin’s own hesitation, will lead us to the theme of violence as “divine 
manifestation,” and violence as religious violence.  
                                                
6 For more on Derrida’s “metaphysics of presence” see, for example, Jacques Derrida, Speech and 
Phenomena, trans. David Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) , 26ff;  Jacques Derrida, 
Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 49. 
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Derrida perceives Benjamin’s critique (Kritik) of violence as belonging to the 
Kantian tradition of critique.  This could be read as suggesting that in order to understand 
what violence is and to be able to deal with its often unpredictable and unmanageable 
expressions we need to approach it with a kind of critical scrupulousness that allowed 
Kant to describe and limit the activity of reason and understanding.  Such critique then 
would lead one to clearly state and describe the order of violence: “The concept of 
violence belongs to the symbolic order of law, politics and morals – of all forms of 
authority and of authorization, of claim to authority, at least.”7  By limiting violence to its 
proper place as part of the symbolic order of law, Benjamin is able to avoid the kind of 
theoretical confusion that sometimes accompanies the discussion of violence in general.  
Benjamin’s critique of violence is also Kantian in that he is asking a series of 
questions about the conditions of possibility of violence: although traditionally conceived 
as an issue of means (violent means to reach certain ends), the real question, according to 
Benjamin, is whether such “criteriology would then concern only the application of 
violence, [and] not violence itself.”8  The task then is to take violence out of the familiar 
space of the distinction between means and ends, that is, out of the space of 
representation.  Derrida very quickly introduces the theme of the critique of 
representation as signification, yet it is important to understand why this move is not a 
simple reduction of Benjamin’s complex issues to a number of Derrida’s “favorite” 
topics.  In fact, this very relationship between violence, law, and language (here 
designating a range of issues related to signification, representation, and logocentrism) 
will quickly reveal a kind of secret conspiracy between the workings of the law (any law, 
                                                
7 FL, 265. Emphasis added. 
8 FL, 265. 
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rule, or regulation, in fact) and injustice (oppression, exploitation, and “violence of 
metaphysics”).  This secret connection between law and injustice is exposed by Benjamin 
as a paradoxical scenario: more law does not produce more justice, because more law 
means more violence and violence cannot ground and promote justice, at least not the 
kind of justice that Benjamin would want to endorse.   
As soon as Derrida mentions the fundamental distinction between law-
establishing and law-preserving violence, he is quick to point out that this distinction is 
one of several crucial distinctions of Benjamin’s critique.  While distinguishing between 
founding and preserving violence in relation to the law, Benjamin introduces the 
distinction between this positive founding-preserving activity and “the destructive 
violence that annihilates the law.”9  It is precisely this second distinction, argues Derrida, 
that more than anything else undermines Benjamin’s critical gesture of confronting the 
violence.  The distinction between law-making and law-destroying violence leads to a 
larger distinction between “all mythical lawmaking” and “all divine end making.”10  In 
other words, Derrida points out, what begins as a focused look at the possibility of the 
critique of violence vis-à-vis the symbolic order of law ends up being an “archeo-
eschatological” theology of (divine) violence.  Before we take a closer look at this 
“theology of (divine) violence” and its implications for Derrida’s analysis of the 
relationship between law and justice, let us attempt to understand all of the connections 
between Benjamin’s critique of the instrumentality of violence and Derrida’s own project 
of articulating the concept of justice.  As we suggested above, however, these 
connections do not necessarily serve an exegetical task of attempting a comparative 
                                                
9 FL, 265.  
10 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 295. 
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analysis of the works of Derrida and Benjamin, but allow us to further conceptualize the 
problem of the relationship between law, justice, and violence.  
 
2. Justice and the Politics of Pure Means. 
While discussing the positive aspects of Benjamin’s critique of violence, Derrida 
points out the distinction between “the order of means” and “order of manifestation”:  
Once again it is very much a matter of the violence of language, but also of the 
advent of non-violence through a certain language.  Does the essence of language 
consist in signs, considered as means of communication as re-presentation, or in 
manifestation that no longer (or not yet) has anything to do with communication 
through signs, that is to say, from the means/end structure?11  
  
The critique of violence, therefore, is a critique of language perceived in terms of the 
order of means/ends, that is, as an instrument of communication.  This particular turn 
could be understood as a variation of Derrida’s critique of logocentrism (and metaphysics 
in general), a variation that picks up a theme of instrumentality of reason and the 
implications of such interpretation of rationality for the contemporary juridical systems 
and their theoretical justifications.  We are more interested, however, in how Derrida’s 
critique of representation and the related issues of instrumentality help us in the analysis 
of the phenomenon of violence in general and religious violence in particular.   
The politics of pure means (reine Mittel), argues Derrida, introduces a “whole 
other violence, a violence that would no longer allow itself to be determined in the space 
opened up by the opposition means/end.”12  This is a crucial point as it allows us to see 
that this “other violence” is primarily directed at the very configuration of the opposition 
of means and ends, not some specific societal institution.  By attempting to articulate the 
                                                
11 FL, 284.  
12 FL, 285. Emphasis added. Cf. Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 290. 
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way violence interacts with the regime of law, Benjamin thus proposes to reassess the 
very role of the space that is opened up by the distinction between human law and divine 
justice that he will discuss further in the essay.  What then distinguishes this “other 
violence” from the types discussed by both Benjamin and Derrida is its intention to 
renegotiate its own role by not allowing itself to be articulated by the imposed difference 
between law and justice.  The regime of this “other violence” imposes itself and proposes 
its own articulation of the difference between law and justice.  This imposition is both 
more and less violent than law-establishing and law-preserving violence that Benjamin’s 
critique initially targets.    
The “other violence” is further interrogated in the analysis of the strike that 
ultimately leads Benjamin to a rather unclear, even if highly provocative, introduction of 
the “law-destroying violence of God,” as Peter Fenves notes in his essay on Benjamin’s 
politics of pure means: 
[T]he politics of pure means is the enactment of a pure violence; more 
specifically, the proletarian general strike carries out the law-destroying violence 
of God.  This identification cannot be ascertained because, as Benjamin writes at 
the end of the essay, divine violence “cannot be recognized with certainty.”  But 
the force of the essay, perhaps even its own critical violence, consists in this 
outlandish suggestion: the politics of pure means enacts a destructive but 
nondivisive, hence divine, violence.  Purified of all ends, the strike for which 
Sorel serves as a prophet makes way for the sole end that purifies itself of all 
means: justice.13 
 
This justice, for Benjamin, as Fenves understands it, is an enactment of the politics of 
pure means, and the pure means here are “analogous to those which govern peaceful 
intercourse between private persons.”14  This relationship between private persons, i.e. a 
                                                
13 Peter Fenves, “’Out of the Order of Number”: Benjamin and Irigaray Toward a Politics of Pure Means,” 
Diacritics 28:1 (Spring 1998), 46 [43-58]. Emphasis added. Further cited as “Out of the Order.” 
14 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 290-91. 
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relationship that is located outside or beyond the violence of the legal system, is an 
example of a possibility of a nonviolent resolution of any conflict: “Nonviolent 
agreement is possible whenever a civilized outlook allows the use of pure means of 
agreement.”15  What are these “pure means”?  They are related to the private resolution of 
conflicts through conversation or “coming to an understanding”: just as private persons 
resolve their conflicts without any reference to the legal system, Benjamin seems to 
argue, so classes or nations can resolve their conflicts through arbitration that is not of the 
order of the law (beyond law).16  Can these non-violent, non-confrontational arbitrations 
be an example of an alternative public sphere, even if Benjamin still uses the language of 
“private resolution of conflict”?  It seems that such positing of the issue of conflict 
resolution enables us to think a possible political arrangement without any explicit 
reference to legality, yet not constituted only by an agreement of private individuals and 
their morality.17 
However, this politics of pure means will always find itself in opposition to the 
“legal order” (das Recht), because, for Benjamin, in the legal order the “final purposes 
are not only not suspended but extended in ever more invasive and homogenizing ways: 
the legal order maintains itself only apparently for the sake of justice, in truth for the sake 
of its own life.”18  Thus the goal of Benjamin’s critique of violence is to attempt to 
identify and describe this dimension of justice that is only apparently connected to the 
                                                
15 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 289. 
16 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence, 290-91. Cf. FL, 285: “Arbitration is nonviolent in this case because it is 
beyond all order of law and therefore beyond violence.”  See also Peter Fenves, “Out of the Order,” 47.  
17 One of the possible articulations of such a public arrangement without an explicit governmental system 
and the accompanying legality is the long tradition of anarchism.  For a history of anarchist ideas see Peter 
Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (London: Harper Perennial, 2008), Part IV.  
18 Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, eds M. Bullock and M. Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), 232. Cited in Peter Fenves, “Out of the Order,” 47. Emphasis added. 
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order of the law.  Derrida, in turn, attempts to follow Benjamin’s discussion in a direction 
that the latter failed to adequately address: “Of the spaces and time over which no legal 
order can preside Benjamin has little to say except that they are spaces and time of 
language.”19  And, we may add here, they are spaces and time of God as well since “law-
destroying violence” is also “divine violence.”  We can now see why Benjamin’s analysis 
of law and justice would attract Derrida’s attention.  For Derrida, the very problem of 
means/ends and instrumentality of language underlines the repression of difference and 
“play of signification” by traditional metaphysical logocentrism.  Without being able to 
go into great detail about Derrida’s overall project (if such exists), it is important to 
notice the emphasis on certain notions in Benjamin’s analysis of the legal system and its 
violence: “only by exposing the space in which and the time during which final purposes 
[ends] are suspended can one disclose the dimension of pure means,” argues Fenves.20  
For Benjamin (and Derrida) this space (and time) of the pure means is the space (and 
time) of justice beyond law.21  
According to Derrida, Benjamin “wants to conceive of a finality, a justice of ends 
that is no longer tied to the possibility of law, in any case to what is always conceived of 
as universalizable.”22  To conceive of such finality is to leave the sphere of law not only 
in its juridical sense, but also, it seems, in its general regulatory sense as any set of rules 
or prescriptions.  So what precisely is Derrida’s strategy here in his own pursuit of 
conceiving of justice outside of the order of calculability?  Derrida interprets Benjamin’s 
                                                
19 Peter Fenves, “Out of the Order,” 47. Emphasis added.  
20 Peter Fenves, “Out of the Order,” 47. Emphasis added. 
21 Cf. Eric Jacobson’s excellent study of Benjamin’s “prophetic justice” that includes first English 
translations of some recently discovered texts by Benjamin, Metaphysics of the Profane: The Politcal 
Theology of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem (New York: Columbia Unviersity Press, 2003), 
especially Part III, “A Redemptive Conception of Justice.” 
22 FL, 286.  
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references to God who is “above reason and universality” as a reference to the 
“irreducible singularity of each situation,” and “justice without law, a justice beyond law 
[that] is just as valid for the uniqueness of the individual as for the people and for the 
language, in short, for history.”23  The reconsideration of language and its mediatory 
function, its instrumentality and calculability in favor of its inherent character of 
manifestation, of having “no other aim than to show and to show itself,” is what will 
eventually lead Derrida’s analysis to a more or less legible theory of “justice beyond 
law.”24   
 
3. Theology of (Divine) Violence: Instrumentality and Manifestation. 
The distinction between law-making (founding and preserving) violence and law-
destroying violence is necessary, argues Benjamin, in order to critique the present 
discourse on violence as only dealing with the order of means and ends.  The proper 
critique of violence ought to address the “question of an evaluation and a justification of 
violence in itself,” and both natural law and positive law traditions fail to do so.25  They 
fail precisely because they deal with the role of violence in terms of its instrumentality, 
i.e. in terms of its justified or unjustified use within the sphere of law.  What undermines 
the law and the legal system that establishes and maintains it is not the critique of 
violence as improper means to certain ends, but the critique of violence as making the 
very founding-preserving of the law possible.  If law establishes itself, authorizes itself, 
either in the Kantian conceptualization of social contract or in the Derridean 
                                                
23 FL, 286.  
24 FL, 286.  
25 FL, 265.  
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conceptualization of iteration, and this self-positing is ex nihilo, then Benjamin’s insight 
seems to be that this nothing from which the law first emerges is the nothing of 
primordial violence.   
The only way to get at this (violent) condition of the possibility of “the order of 
law in general” is to consider a test case of the “right to strike,” argues Benjamin.  
Derrida calls this test case a “discriminating example”: “the right to strike is guaranteed 
to workers who are therefore, besides the state, the only legal subject to find itself 
guaranteed a right to violence and so to share the monopoly of the state [on violence] in 
this respect.”26  What is important about this “right to strike,” points out Derrida, is the 
very paradoxical nature of such sharing of power between the state and the workers who, 
by the very gesture of the strike, expose the complicity between the exercise of law and 
the exercise of violence.  Derrida’s analysis of the right to strike clearly parallels our 
earlier presentation of Kant’s analysis of the right to resist (revolution).  
The right to strike is the right to contest not this or that condition of labor, this or 
that law, but the very foundation of the legal system, the state itself.  Even though 
Benjamin’s discussion of the “general strike” relies primarily on the work of Georges 
Sorel, there are also visible elements of what Carl Schmitt described as the “right to 
resistance” in Legality and Legitimacy and other works.27  As John P. McCormick puts it, 
legitimacy, for Schmitt, “depends not on the overt compliance of those over whom 
                                                
26 FL, 267. Cf. Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 281. 
27 In his Constitutional Theory Schmitt argues that “basic rights are not legal entitlements, but rather 
spheres of freedom, from which rights, more precisely defensive rights, stem.  That character of right is 
most clearly evident in the liberty rights, which historically signify the beginning of the basic rights.  Under 
this idea, freedom of religion, personal freedom, property, right of free expression of opinion exist prior to 
the state… [that] facilitates their protection and herein generally finds the justification of its existence. The 
individual’s right to resistance is the most extreme instrument of protection of these rights.”  Carl Schmitt, 
Constitutional Theory, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 202. 
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authority is exercised but rather on their choice not to resist such authority.  This 
particular phrase – ‘right to resistance’ – raises a specter that ‘consent’ alone does not: 
the presence of violence that hovers over a legitimate system.”28  For Schmitt, as for 
Benjamin, an individual’s right to resistance has a “suprastate quality” and cannot be 
taken away and “diverted” into any legal right to simply contest the specific legal 
circumstances, because in such cases right to resist the state is transformed into right to 
petition the state to change its policies.29  Schmitt’s take on the right to resistance is in a 
certain way a direct critique of Kant’s liberal position that, Schmitt argues, rejects the 
possibility of revolution because it attempts to preserve “the idea of the unity of the 
state.”30  Maintaining such unity however, Schmitt insists, makes any legislative state 
into nothing more than a “rather complicated absolutism” and its “unconditional claim to 
obedience would be an open, coercive act of domination.”31 
The critique of violence, for Derrida, leads one to conclude fairly quickly that 
“violence [or power] does not consist essentially in exerting its power or a brutal force to 
obtain this or that result but in threatening or destroying an order of given law.”32  In 
other words, despite the appearances, the state is only able to manage the order of 
violence through reducing its sphere of influence to the instrumentality of means/ends 
structures of public life.  What shows itself in the “revolutionary situation” of the general 
                                                
28 John P. McCormick, “Identifying Or Exploiting the Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy? An 
Introduction to Carl Schmitt’s Legality and Legitimacy,” in Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, trans. 
Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), xxiv.  For Georges Sorel’s discussion of the 
general strike, see Georges Sorel, Reflections On Violence, ed. Jeremy Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999).  
29 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 203. 
30 Carl Schmitt, “Ethic of State and Pluralistic State,” in The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, ed. Chantal Mouffe 
(London: Verso, 1999), 196 [195-208] 
31 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 20. 
32 FL, 268. Emphasis added 
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strike, argues Derrida, is the fact that violence that “threatens law already belongs to it, to 
the right to law [au droit au droit], to the origin of law.”33  It is not the state and its legal 
system that use violence to found and maintain itself, but the violence itself that uses the 
state and its structures to express itself, to manifest itself, but in the end also to contain 
itself.  This particular way of considering the role of violence could be labeled “theology 
of violence” where this expression would signify primarily not the use of violence to 
promote or impose theological beliefs, but a kind of theorization of violence that both 
Derrida and Benjamin refer to as “divine violence” and associate with the concept of 
justice.  We label this insight that violence uses law and state to articulate itself in such a 
way as to ultimately preserve itself a theology of violence because such interpretation of 
violence posits a true exteriority from which this violence appears and where it remains 
by concealing aspects of itself that are not articulated in the order of law and state.  
The distinction between “divine violence” and “mythic violence” finally comes 
through as the real point of Benjamin’s critique of violence.  Derrida is clearly 
uncomfortable with such infusion of theological references as he points out in a Post-
Scriptum later added to the original essay:  
What I find, in conclusion, the most redoubtable, indeed perhaps almost 
unbearable in this text… is a temptation that it would leave open, and open 
notably to the survivors or the victims of the “final solution,” to its past, present 
and potential victims.  Which temptation?  The temptation to think the holocaust 
as an uninterpretable manifestation of divine violence insofar as this divine 
violence would be at the same time annihilating, expiatory and bloodless… When 
one thinks of the gas chambers and the cremation ovens, this allusion to an 
extermination that would be expiatory because bloodless must cause one to 
shudder.  One is terrified at the idea of an interpretation that would make of the 
holocaust an expiation and an indecipherable signature of the just and violent 
anger of God.34  
                                                
33 FL, 269.  
34 FL, 298.  
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How did we go from the discussion of the “general strike” that undermines the very 
foundation of the modern legal state to “the just and violent anger of God”?  Through his 
attempts to “de-theologize” Benjamin’s account of “divine violence,” Derrida returns the 
discussion to the topics that he is most comfortable with, that is, violence/power and 
language/signification.  It is precisely Benjamin’s (mis)understanding of the incredible 
destructive force of “divine violence,” as shown in his deconstruction of Benjamin’s 
“critique of violence,” that frightens  Derrida into a somewhat incoherent ending of the 
essay and solicits the later caution vis-à-vis the Holocaust cited above.  However, once 
Derrida recovers, he learns to appreciate this strange theological twist of Benjamin’s 
critique of violence/power precisely because he realizes that complexity of this 
complicity between calls for justice and “divine violence” that is summoned to act upon 
these calls.  If, in Kant, God acts as a guarantor of the order of law and the final reward 
for our moral behavior, in Benjamin and Derrida, God necessarily transcends the human 
institutions of law and politics.  God, in fact, stands outside of any (constructible) human 
institution as an ultimate judge of human affairs.  “Divine violence” here is violence 
without any reason, meaning both as purposeless and ultimately irrational violence.  The 
postulation of God as a source of such violence, a transcendent source we might add, 
guarantees that our discussion of the finite institutions of law and its accompanying legal 
violence will not slide toward some more updated version of the positivist fallacy. 
Derrida however does not accept Benjamin’s analysis of “divine violence” without 
question.  
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4. The Revolutionary Instant Of Iterability. 
In order to understand Derrida’s problem with Benjamin’s distinction between 
law-founding and law-preserving violence, and therefore with the whole of Benjamin’s 
argument about the nature of “divine violence” of manifestation, we need to pay close 
attention to the reintroduction of Derrida’s familiar term: iterability.  Derrida’s first move 
is to neutralize the charged political notion of the “general strike” by proposing to 
compare it with “deconstruction”: “Can what we are doing here resemble a general strike 
or a revolution, with regard to models and structures, but also modes of readability or 
political action? Is that what deconstruction is?”35  Although Derrida’s answer is “yes and 
no,” it is easy to see that the tone of the argumentation so far suggests his heavy leaning 
towards the “yes” part of the answer: deconstruction “assumes the right to contest,  and 
not only theoretically, constitutional protocols, the very charter that governs reading in 
our culture and especially in the academy.”36  This contestation, however, is mainly 
theoretical, despite Derrida’s promissory “not only,” and the main theoretical tool in this 
“strategy of rupture” is the Derrida’s notion of iterability:  
I shall propose the interpretation according to which the very violence of 
foundation of positing of law (Rechtsetzende Gewalt) must envelope the violence 
of the preservation of law (Rechtserhaltende Gewalt) and cannot break with it.  It 
belongs to the structure of fundamental violence in that it calls for the repetition 
of itself and founds what ought to be preserved, preservable, promised to heritage 
and to tradition, to partaking… Positing is already iterability, a call for self-
preserving repetition.  Preservation in its turn refounds, so that it can preserve 
what it claims to found.37  
 
This use of the notion of “iterability” is aimed at showing that Benjamin’s distinction 
collapses because “there is no more pure foundation or pure position of law, and so a 
                                                
35 FL, 271-72. 
36 FL, 272.  
37 FL, 272.  
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pure founding violence, than there is a purely preserving violence.”38  There is no 
rigorous opposition between the moment of foundation and the activity of preservation, 
but only “differential contamination” – this has been Derrida’s position regarding not just 
this particular opposition, but vis-à-vis any attempt to erect and defend a rigorous 
opposition of any kind.  Deconstruction is thus nothing but the “thought of this 
differential contamination – and the thought taken by the necessity of this 
contamination.”39  This contamination “effaces or blurs the distinction, pure and simple, 
between foundation and preservation.  It inscribes iterability in originarity, and this is 
what [we] would call deconstruction at work.”40  If there is no pure original state of 
origin, then the notion of iterability is essential, because it demonstrates how although we 
may posit a beginning, we cannot posit an origin and therefore we cannot, even if 
hypothetically, propose that there exists any pure state of nature, state of law, or justice 
that does not already contain some contamination, some impurity, some complexity that 
prevent any simple theorization.   
In an essay “Signature Event Context” (first published in 1972) Derrida tackles 
the issue of iterability in his analysis of the written sign.41  This essay provides our 
interpretation of Derrida’s reading of Benjamin’s with unexpected parallels.  “A written 
sign,” argues Derrida, “is a mark that subsists, one which does not exhaust itself in the 
                                                
38 FL, 272.  
39 FL, 272. Original emphasis.  
40 FL, 275. Emphasis added.  
41 Derrida’s “Signature Event Context” first appeared in English translation by Samuel Weber and Jeffrey 
Mehlman in the first volume of Glyph in 1977.  Another English translation of the essay by Alan Bass 
appeared in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 307-330.  In this 
discussion I will refer to the first translation because of its inclusion in a later collection Limited Inc. 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988) that also contains Derrida’s rejoinder to John S. Searle’s 
response to “Signature Event Context” both of which originally appeared in the second volume of Glyph. 
Cf. Gerald Graff, “Editor’s Foreword,” in Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., vii-viii. 
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moment of its inscription and which can give rise to an iteration in the absence and 
beyond the presence of the empirically determined subjects who, in a given context, have 
emitted or produced it.”42  There’s nothing inherently controversial or innovative about 
the above statement – a written mark, in order to be a mark, must be repeatable.  
However, Derrida insists that this repeatability is never a simple repetition that 
guarantees the transmission of marked meaning, i.e. pure communication.  “At the same 
time, a written sign carries with it a force that breaks with its context, that is with the 
collectivity of presences organizing the moment of its inscription.”43  This “at the same 
time” [de même coup] is absolutely essential for Derrida’s point because it clearly implies 
that the time of the inscription of the written sign (founding) and the time of the 
necessary positing of its repeatability (preservation) collapse here into the same instant 
(“ungraspable revolutionary instant,” perhaps). 44  
Derrida describes the situation of inscription of the written sign here in terms of 
both establishing a context (every written mark only functioning in a system of 
differences that is language) and potentially destroying a context as a “collectivity of 
presences” due to the sign’s very own force du rupture: “This force of rupture is tied to 
the spacing [espacement] that constitutes the written sign.”45  We can summarize this 
initial introduction of iterability as a condition of both possibility and impossibility of 
“pure communication” or “a hermeneutic deciphering, the decoding of a meaning or 
                                                
42 Limited, 9.  
43 Limited, 9.  Cf. translation by Alan Bass in Margins of Philosophy: “By the same token, a written sign 
carries with it a force of breaking with its context, that is, the set of presences which organize the moment 
of its inscription.” (317) 
44 FL, 274.  
45 Limited, 9.  Cf. Alan Bass: “This force is due to the spacing which constitutes the written sign…” 
Margins of Philosophy, 317.  Emphasis added. 
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truth.”46  Iterability is the quality of a sign (and an economy of signification in general) 
both to mean something within a specific context and to be detachable and repeatable 
within a completely different context, i.e. to mean one thing here and a slightly different 
thing there. 
This discussion leads us from the very specific linguistic questions of meaning 
and communication, to larger philosophical issues of particularity and universality.  If a 
context as a “collectivity of presences” is always unique, i.e. uniquely constituted by the 
particular combination of circumstances (“presences”) at the moment of inscription, then 
this particularity cannot be suppressed (despite all the efforts to do precisely that) in a 
transmission of the meaning into another situation where a mark would be used to refer to 
the same meaning.  The notion of iterability functions for Derrida as a demonstration that 
at the very heart of the law of signification there is a contaminating presence of another 
law, the law of iterability as a differentiating dissemination rather than a simple re-
presenting repetition of the meaning of any sign.  It is precisely Austin’s refusal to accept 
iterability as a law of signification that initiated Derrida’s criticism in “Signature Event 
Context”: “the value of risk or exposure to infelicity [of the sign]… is not interrogated as 
an essential predicate or as a law.  Austin does not ponder the consequences issuing from 
the fact that a possibility – a possible risk – is always possible, and is in some sense a 
necessary possibility.”47 
If we return now to Derrida’s reading of Benjamin, we can say that the figure of 
iterability enters the conversation in order to problematize the clear distinction between 
                                                
46 Limited, 21.  
47 Limited, 15. Original emphasis. For an insightful discussion of the Derrida-Austin-Searle debate, see 
Gordon C. F. Bearn, “Derrida Dry: Iterating Iterability Analytically,” Diacritics 25:3 (Fall 1995), 3-25.  
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foundation and preservation, the distinction that, according to Derrida, once questioned, 
gives way to a strange new law of contamination found in the very founding act of the 
state and its legal system.  This new law does not supersede the old law as in a 
revolutionary overthrow of the state; it takes issue “with the body of law itself, in its head 
and its members, with the laws and the particular usages that law adopts under the 
protection of its power.”48  Derrida draws a conclusion that would fit quite well with his 
discussion of signification and iterability: the threat to the law does not come from the 
outside (just like the threat to communication does not come from outside of the system 
of signs and the workings of signification), because “the law [le droit] is both threatening 
and threatened by itself.”49 
  In his discussion of violence and how it complicates the relationship between law 
and justice, Derrida can be read as revising his earlier stance that is generally well-known 
under the rubric of “there is nothing outside the text” (which in this case can be rephrased 
as “there is nothing outside the law”): if in early Derrida we find an argument against any 
exteriority or an outside criterion, then in late Derrida, especially after his turn to the 
issues of religion, we find a cautious argument in support of incalculable, undecideable, 
excessive justice.  This justice is “justice beyond law” and therefore, although existing in 
some relationship with law, ultimately separable from any and every specific rightful 
condition.  This justice is both transcendental (it makes law possible) and transcendent (it 
makes evaluating law possible), yet any attempt to articulate it is fraught with dangers of 
explosive violence.  In order to make sense of these insights, we must again return to the 
overall framework of this essay.  If we follow Kant and accept the general contractual 
                                                
48 FL, 275.  
49 FL, 275.  
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view of the establishment of law as a largely voluntary transition from the lawless state of 
nature to the lawful state of right, then any discrepancy between established law and a 
rational idea of justice is to be addressed in terms of reform, not revolution.  Any 
negotiation between the law-making sovereign authority and its subjects is to be a matter 
of a public rational discourse, not acts of violent resistance, yet if the very presence of an 
external criterion that allows one to judge the present rightful condition as unjust is 
troubling in itself.  It is necessary in order to move the human society along toward a 
better (more just) condition of peaceful coexistence; yet it is also troubling because it 
ultimately grounds justice in morality and not exclusively in legality.  If a society is 
judged to be just, then it is us, members of that society, individuals in the public sphere, 
who judge it to be just, it is not just in and of itself simply because it fulfills certain 
conditions.  
 Derrida’s articulation of the contamination of law and justice by violence 
complicates the matter further by suggesting that a transcendent criterion of justice and 
violence in the name of justice constitutes a theology and cannot be properly articulated 
and address without reference to religion.  Although we have delayed the discussion of 
religion until now, we have attempted to understand how thinking about religious 
violence in terms of the distinction between law and justice might allow us to take a look 
at the issue from a novel perspective.  In one sense, the tension between law and justice 
causes violence in the name of justice (or in the name of law, legitimate, authorized 
violence of legal system, although we have not paid much attention to this violence in our 
reflections) as violence aimed at correcting the present situation of injustice in the name 
of future justice, understood as a more perfect sum of legal conditions, not as a 
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destruction of law, as such.  However, the very possibility of this corrective violence 
reveals, according to Derrida’s reading of Benjamin, the inner workings of violence that, 
once unleashed, quickly become destructive and anarchic.  This “divine violence” no 
longer pursues any means with its violent ends, it goes beyond the present lawful 
condition and in its radical destructiveness reveals its primordial presence before the law: 
what Kant’s call a “rightful condition” thus becomes, after Derrida’s analysis, a small and 
fragile island of human society that is continuously on the verge of destroying itself in the 
name of some better version of itself.  
 If religious violence is to be situated in these discussions of the workings of law, 
justice, and violence, it is to be, first and foremost, conceptualized not so much as 
attempts to commit acts of violence (bombings, assassinations, sabotage etc.) as attempts 
to provoke violence by exploiting the very tension between law and justice that we have 
been talking about in this essay.  Religious violence as a provocation thus allows us to 
think of it in terms of the apocalyptic violence we have discussed in the opening chapter 
of this study, i.e. as violence that, unlike secular revolutionary violence, goes beyond 
reliance on human agency.  In order to understand why our hypothesis about religious 
violence required all of these conceptual twists and turns, we must take a closer look at 
religion as it is articulated in the respective projects of Kant and Derrida.  Having done 
that in the next chapter, we will conclude our study with a more straightforward account 
of how we think any future theory of religious violence should proceed.  
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V 
Kant and Derrida on Religion. 
 
Although we have already mentioned religion on several occasions throughout 
this essay, we have delayed a closer look at this notion until now for two main reasons: 
stylistically, we wanted to delay this discussion due to previous attempts to discuss 
religious violence mainly in terms of religion; conceptually, we wanted to delay this 
discussion in order to show how a reframing of the various components of the problem of 
our investigation can be achieved if we place the question of religion in a new context of 
the difference between law and justice.  As we pointed out in the opening chapter, there 
are a number of theoretical approaches to the issue of religion and violence, and most put 
their theoretical weight on some notion of defective misuse of genuinely pure, peaceful, 
religious motivations.  Our main intention in this study was to recontextualize the issues 
of religion and violence and place them in the context of notions of civil society, 
morality, legality, and coercion.  We have spent most of the rhetorical energy so far doing 
precisely that, while maintaining a fairly simple assumption: religious violence as a type 
of violence has to do not with an essentially unique “religious” core that promotes violent 
behavior, but with a motivational matrix organized primarily around the problem of 
justice.  Having discussed the issues of morality and legality in Kant, we have identified a 
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peculiar gap between them, neither moral nor legal, a gap that produces the tension we 
have identified with, after Derrida, the problem of justice.   
If Kant’s overall solution to the problem of justice as a problem of discrepancy 
between the ideals of ethical community of “kingdom of ends” and the realities of 
political community of legal order could be seen as a positing of the ideal of 
cosmopolitan justice articulated as a total legalization (and formalization) of human 
social relations in a quasi-apocalyptic closure of the space of difference between law and 
justice, then Derrida’s main contribution was his refusal to allow for such a closure, as he 
has rejected a possibility of articulating justice in either moral or legal terms.  The space 
of difference between law and justice, we noted with Derrida, describes a movement in 
the interval between the particularity of decision and the universality of any law.  Justice 
demands that the perceived injustice is addressed immediately (regardless of its 
ultimately subjective – “perceived” – status), and yet also insists that the solution be final.  
All of these issues were additionally problematized when it was revealed that a 
fundamentally law-destroying violence was at work in all the possible articulations of the 
relationships between law and justice.  Namely, Derrida’s reading of Benjamin’s critique 
of violence, aimed at clarifying the nature of the relationship between the legitimate 
violence (of law) and the illegitimate violence (of justice), revealed the impossible task of 
such an articulation.  In fact, if we are to accept Derrida’s interpretation, the space of 
difference between law and justice is not simply present and ready to be filled with either 
political ideas of messianic justice or religious ideas of divine justice, but is always 
already in the process of being determined by the very discourses that attempt to make 
sense of it.  To put it differently, a positivist discourse of law and order does not simply 
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cover over the difference between legality and morality, but determines this difference as 
conceptually irrelevant, while a theological discourse of (apocalyptic) divine justice and 
the world to come determines it as constituting the most essential difference vis-à-vis 
human society and its ultimate destiny.  The conceptual relation between certain forms of 
violence and certain conceptualizations of law and justice, discussed in Derrida’s reading 
of Benjamin, have come forward and allowed us to finally raise the question of religion 
that we intend to discuss in this chapter.  We will proceed by taking a look at Kant and 
his rational theology and Derrida who will appear as a faithful descendant of Kantian 
philosophy, and yet also as a careful reader and critic of the Enlightenment-inspired 
dismissal of religion, especially public religion.       
 
1. Kant’s Rational Theology. 
Kant’s theory of religion has been characterized as being of “profound 
ambivalence.”1  The concise version of this ambivalent attitude, a version that should 
suffice for the purposes of the present discussion, could be formulated as the following: 
the only acceptable motive for acting morally is acting out of respect for moral law, yet 
this pure motive, due to human weakness, is to be supplemented with an additional 
encouragement to think of moral obligations as divine commands.  In other words, for 
Kant, if we were purely rational, the only motivation we would need to act morally (both 
                                                
1 A. W. Moore, Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty: Themes and Variations in Kant’s Moral and Religious 
Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2003), 147.  Kant’s attitude toward religion has been a subject of a great 
number of excellent studies.  For some of the recent engagements with the issue see Philip J. Rossi and 
Michael W. Wreen, eds. Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1991);  Stephen R. Palmquist, Kant’s Critical Religion (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2000);  Chris 
L. Firestone and Stephen L. Palmquist, eds. Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2006);  Adina Davidovich, Religion as a Province of Meaning: The Kantian 
Foundations of Modern Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993);  Elizabeth Cameron Galbraith, Kant 
and Theology: Was Kant a Closet Theologian? (San Francisco: International Scholars Publications, 1996).  
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internally and externally) would be the rationality of the categorical imperative.  
However, we are not purely rational, therefore we need religion (and the idea of God) to 
provide additional perspective on the matter.  One should hesitate to call this religious 
perspective an additional motivation.  Kant explicitly suggests that only rational 
calculation of the categorical imperative can truly motivate one to act morally.  Religion, 
therefore, provides a way of accessing this rationality of moral choice through a 
supplemental presentation of the matter:  
Religion is (subjectively considered) the recognition of all duties as divine 
commands.  That religion, in which I must first know that something is a divine 
command in order that I recognize it as my duty, is revealed religion (or a religion 
which requires a revelation); by contrast, that religion in which I must first know 
that something is duty before I can acknowledge it as a divine command is 
natural religion.  Anyone who declares natural religion as alone morally 
necessary, i.e. a duty, can also be called rationalist (in matters of faith).2 
 
As Kant explains in the footnote, “this definition of a religion in general obviates the 
erroneous representation of religion as an aggregate of particular duties immediately 
relating to God…”3  If religion is a way of seeing the duty as a divine command, it is 
essential for Kant to emphasize, again and again, that ideas of “a God and a world that is 
now not visible to us but is hoped for, the majestic ideas of morality are, to be sure, 
objects of approbation and admiration [Gegenstände des Beifalls und der Bewunderung] 
but not incentives for resolve and realization…”4  Religion as a supplemental perspective 
on the matter of fulfilling one’s duty still makes sense to us when we occasionally 
describe someone’s dedication to some cause as “religious” or doing something 
“religiously.”   
                                                
2 Ak. 6:154, Religion, 177. Original italics.  
3 Ak. 6:154n, Religion, 177n. Original italics.  
4 A813/B841, CPR, 681. 
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It is only due to human weakness and inability to rely completely on the 
rationality of the moral law that religion acts in providing not an additional incentive – to 
act out of any incentive but respect for moral law is “evil” – but a supplemental angle of 
approaching the problem of moral motivation.  For Kant, “we will not hold actions to be 
obligatory because they are God’s commands, but will rather regard them as divine 
commands because we are internally obligated to them.”5  However, if this were the 
whole picture, we would not be describing Kant’s attitude toward religion as that of 
“profound ambivalence.”  It seems that this standard (deist) enlightened view of religion 
as a support system for the weak humanity is supplemented in Kant with a view that the 
idea of God is indeed necessary for humankind, and not only as a way to encourage 
moral behavior, but also, and most importantly, as a way to tie all the human ends 
together into a comprehensive view of moral and political reality, either present or future.  
In other words, the idea of God has a practical use in the discussion of morality and is 
supplemented in Kant with the idea of God that has a logical use in the discussion of the 
overall ends of human history.  As Allen W. Wood puts it, combining the two aspects, 
“The essence of religion for Kant consists in recognizing the duties of rational morality as 
commanded by God, and in joining with others to promote collectively the highest good 
for the world.”6 
For Kant, the “idea of God” is never merely an empty idea, a sort of subjective 
posit that allows one to act “as if” God existed and commanded us to act a certain way.  
In fact, we agree with Peter Byrne who argues that in Kant “the idea of God is necessary 
to sustain belief in human perfectibility, since through the idea of God we maintain the 
                                                
5 A819/B847, CPR, 684. Emphasis added.  
6 Allen W. Wood, Kant (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 20.  
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thought that something others than blind natural causality controls the world and thus our 
destiny.”7  Eckart Förster observes that, for Kant, God’s existence is “the condition of the 
possibility of the obligatory force of the moral law.”8  The idea of the moral law’s 
binding force is explained through a reference to the idea of God, but the rationality of 
the moral law remains the only true motivation: 
Reason sees itself compelled either to assume such a thing [the intelligible world 
under a wise author and regent], together with life in such a world… or else to 
regard the moral laws as empty figments of the brain [leere Hirngespinste], since 
without that presupposition their necessary success, which the same reason 
connects with them, would have to disappear.  Hence everyone also regards the 
moral laws as commands [Gebote], which, however, they could not be if they did 
not connect appropriate consequences with their rule a priori, and thus carry with 
them promises and threats [Verheißungen und Drohungen].9  
 
Does this mean that religious ideas of God and the afterlife act here as supplementary 
promises and threats that only “work” when we represent the law to ourselves as divine 
command?  This connection between the moral law and its enforcement is one of the 
essential aspects of Kant’s discussion of the idea of God and the role of religion vis-à-vis 
morality.  The basic question that Kant feels obligated to address again and again is 
simple: If the genuine affirmation of human freedom requires that the only (moral) law 
one chooses to follow is the (moral) law one sets for oneself, then how does this act of 
self-legislation produce the necessary motivational force to follow one’s own law?  In 
other words, how do my own laws acquire their obligatory force?10  Kant’s answer is 
                                                
7 Peter Byrne, Kant on God (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), 9.  
8 Eckart Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis: An Essay on the Opus Postumum (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2000), 121.  Original emphasis. Cf. A634/B662, CPR, 585: “Since there are practical laws that are 
absolutely necessary (the moral laws), then if these necessarily presuppose any existence as the condition 
of the possibility of their binding force [verbindenden Kraft], this existence [of God] has to be postulated.” 
9 A811/B839, CPR, 680. 
10 Förster argues that only after the initial reception and critical reactions to Critique of Pure Reason did 
Kant realize the need to present his understanding of morality in a more precise way.  It was his task to 
demonstrate that the categorical imperative, the essential rational instrument of self-legislating, was not 
 154 
 
short but complicated: the reason determines the will according to the moral law and thus 
gives it the necessary incentive to act morally, yet at the same time, it also requires a 
vision of reality that reassures it that its laws are not “empty figments.”  It must assure 
itself that it is not dreaming, if we are to reference the famous Cartesian image, and it 
must assure itself that its efforts are not in vain, that there is justice.  The moral law’s 
binding force comes from both “inside” as a self-legislative decision to establish and to 
follow a certain law and from the “outside” as one is guided by a larger vision of 
humanity under the universal law of benevolent and wise God.  Religion, therefore, 
cannot be dismissed as an “afterthought designed to comfort the vulgar,” but an essential 
part of any discussion of morality and, we should add, politics.11  
It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest we need to believe in God in order to 
assure ourselves that our efforts at betterment of humanity are not in vain.  This is 
precisely where Kant’s rational theology gives us a notion of “rational faith” that 
supports our rational morality of self-legislation.  The idea of reason’s self-motivation 
could appear to be a very weak point of Kant’s moral theory: if there is no forceful 
external incentive (in this sense both “promise” and “threat” would qualify as such an 
incentive), then how can I guarantee that once I give the law to myself I will not change 
my mind and decide to go against it?  However, this is where the unique Kantian insight 
of the workings of self-legislation is extremely important to understand.  Henry E. 
Allison puts it this way: “it is precisely because the moral law provides a motivating 
force that the failure of an agent to act according to its dictates cannot be regarded merely 
                                                                                                                                            
producing moral laws that were but “empty figments of the brain.”  Cf. Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis, 
123-25.  
11 Byrne, Kant on God, 9-10.  Cf. John E. Hare, “Kant on Recognizing Our Duties as God’s Commands,” 
Faith and Philosophy 17:4 (October 2000): 236-77. 
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as the result of the law’s failure to motivate (serve as an incentive).”12  In other words, if 
the moral law is established but not followed, then, in Kantian terms, the will is 
determined to adopt a maxim that cannot be universalized, thus producing a 
contradiction.  The distinction between the rational procedure of the categorical 
imperative and the practical application of the law in the willful action is essential for 
Kant’s argument.  It is the same distinction that grounds the difference between morality 
as internal disposition (determination of will) and legality as external conformity (action 
based on determination of will).  It is in the context of this distinction that we are to be 
challenged by the possibility of immoral and illegal actions.  If moral law (regulating 
both internal and external freedoms) is based on our ability to self-legislate, and if the 
rationality of the categorical imperative guarantees that our actions are consistent with 
our dispositions, then how does one explain the possibility of rational and calculated 
violation of the moral law?  Although Kant mostly talks about the violation of moral law 
within the framework of morality and legality, that is to say, within the framework of an 
already-established rightful condition, we might ask ourselves whether Kant’s discussion 
is relevant to our engagement with Derrida and his postulation of an external violence of 
justice aimed at the destruction of law as such.  The question then is not only how 
rational individuals can go against the rationality of law, but also how rational individuals 
can aspire to destroy the order of law, as such, in the name of some higher justice beyond 
law.  In a sense, going against the order of law, as such, is the case that puzzles Kant the 
most since simple criminality can still be understood as acting upon a contradictory 
maxim, while revolutionary activity clearly goes against the rational notion of right. 
                                                
12 Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 148. 
Emphasis added. 
 156 
 
It certainly is not the law’s insufficient motivational force that is to blame, argues 
Kant, but rather the agent’s “evil disposition” [böse Gesinnung] or “evil principle” or 
“evil power of choice” [böse Willkür] that is responsible for immoral action. 13  This, of 
course, leads Kant to his famous discussion of the “radical evil” in human nature.  Again, 
in order to avoid an unnecessarily detailed introduction to the topic that was already 
covered in many excellent studies, our discussion will only touch upon aspects of Kant’s 
presentations that are connected to the theme of this chapter.14  We are interested in 
Kant’s discussion of “radical evil” vis-à-vis the general thread of obligation and its force, 
i.e. how the issue of “radical evil,” as presented by Kant in Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason, helps us understand his view of the binding force of the law 
and its relationship to notions of justice, violence and religion.  
 
2. Radical Evil and the Force of (Moral) Law. 
Kant’s notion of “radical evil,” used to describe and to conceptualize a certain 
human propensity to commit evil acts, has always been and to a certain extend remains a 
rather controversial topic.  One may suggest that there are two general traditions of 
approaching Kant’s discussion of “radical evil.”  On the one hand, there are thinkers who 
suggest that Kant’s “radical evil” is nothing but an attempt to “philosophically 
                                                
13 Ak. 6:23n, Religion, 72n.  
14 Some of the discussions of Kant’s notion of “radical evil” in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason include, but are not limited to, the following works: Chris L. Firestone and Nathan Jacobs, In 
Defense of Kant’s Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), Ronald Green, Religious 
Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of Religious Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 
Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Rational Theology, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), Carl A. Raschke, 
Moral Action, God and History in the Thought of Immanuel Kant (Missoula: American Academy of 
Religion and Scholars Press, 1975), Olivier Reboul, Kant et le problème du mal (Montréal: Presses de 
l’Université de Montréal, 1971), Ann L. Loades, Kant and Job’s Comforters (Newcastle upon Tyne: Avero 
Publications, 1985), Gordon E. Michalson, Jr. Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil and Moral 
Regeneration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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appropriate the old Christian doctrine of original sin.”15  In this case, one is easily 
reminded of Goethe’s reaction to Kant’s idea of “radical evil”: in his letter to Herder he 
interprets Kant’s newly published discussion of evil as an unfortunate attempt to secure 
the respect of the Christians.  According to Goethe, Kant spent so much time and effort 
“purifying his philosophical mantel from various prejudices,” only to “taint it with a stain 
of radical evil [Schandfleck des radikalen Bösen].”16 
On the other hand, Kant’s discussion of evil is interpreted as his attempt to 
develop a sort of “moral anthropology,” a view of human nature in its moral capacity that 
would account for all the evil, a continuation of Leibniz’s tradition of theodicy by other 
means.17  This continuation is, of course, also a closing of that tradition, as Kant is no 
longer interested in discussing the problem of God and the existence of evil.18  That is, 
Kant is no longer interested in a theological solution to the problem of evil, because it is 
essentially a human problem that is to be given only a moral-anthropological solution.19  
Kant’s discussion of evil, and subsequently, radical evil, in Part One of Religion is 
careful to present the issue as a matter of human nature as “the subjective ground of the 
exercise of the human being’s freedom in general,” where this subjective ground must 
“itself be a deed of freedom (for otherwise the use or abuse of the human being’s power 
                                                
15 Joseph P. Lawrence, “Radical Evil and Kant’s Turn to Religion,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 36 
(2002), 320. [319-335] 
16 J. W. Goethe, Goethes Briefe und Briefe an Goethe, Band II: 1786-1805, ed. Karl Robert Mandelkow 
(München: C. H. Beck, 1988), 166 [Letter 536]. My translation. 
17 Cf. Richard J. Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 
19-45. 
18 For Kant’s direct engagement with the topic of theodicy, see his short essay from 1791 “On the 
miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy,” in Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 
trans. and eds. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
24-37 (Ak.8:255-271). 
19 Cf. Kant’s discussion of Job in “Theodicy” essay: Job’s disposition “proved that he did not found his 
morality on faith, but his faith on morality: in such a case, however weak this faith might be, yet it alone is 
of a pure and true kind, i.e. the kind of faith that found not a religion of supplication [Gunstbewerbung], but 
a religion of good life conduct.” (Ak. 8:267) 
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of choice [Willkür] with respect to the moral law could not be imputed to him, nor could 
the good or evil in him be called ‘moral’).”20  In other words, Kant is not dealing with the 
issues of human nature in general, issues that, as he quickly points out, might 
immediately scandalize those who accept his opposition between “nature” and 
“freedom,” but with rules of the power of choice.21  
The matter of Wille and Willkür deserves a short note, although the general 
context of the issue is too complex and too well known to address here in great detail. 
Generally speaking, when Kant begins to distinguish between Wille and Willkür, the 
majority of English translations render these as “will” and “power of choice” – in this 
case, Wille is a term for the will as a whole, and Willkür is the spontaneous aspect of the 
will that generates maxims for the exercise of freedom.  Henry E. Allison describes the 
two aspects of will in terms of Kant’s use of Wille and Willkür in a following way: “Kant 
uses the terms Wille and Willkür to characterize the legislative and executive functions of 
a unified faculty of volition, which he likewise refers to as Wille.”22  
Thus if Kant’s account of evil deals not with human nature as such – “the human 
being is evil by nature,” for Kant, means nothing but that “he is conscious of the moral 
law and yet has incorporated into his maxim the (occasional) deviation from it”23 – then 
what does it tell us about the general theme of the binding force of the (moral) law?  If 
the binding force of law is strong enough because it is based on the idea of self-
                                                
20 Ak. 6:21, Religion, 70.   
21 More on this distinction and its general significance for understanding Kant’s moral theory see John R. 
Silber, “The Ethical Significance of Kant’s Religion,” in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. 
Theodore M. Green and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), xcivff;  Henry E. 
Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 129-135; and Chris L. 
Firestone and Nathan Jacobs, In Defense of Kant’s Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2008), 125-27.  
22 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 129.  
23 Ak. 6:32, Religion, 80.  
 159 
 
legislation, how does one account for such a propensity to break the self-established law, 
since “radical evil” is nothing but the condition of possibility of acting against one’s own 
law?  
It is precisely this dilemma – we need to maintain that we are both free to self-
legislate (unconditioned) and have a “natural propensity to evil”24 (conditioned) – that 
Kant is addressing with his notion of “radical evil” and it is not without controversy 
because it leads Kant to some rather startling conclusions that, as some have argued, Kant 
quietly withdrew in Metaphysics of Morals.25  The main issue with “radical evil,” it 
seems, is the issue of the relationship between nature and freedom, or to use the 
vocabulary that is closer to our discussion, between state of nature and state of law.  The 
idea of “radical evil” refers, first and foremost, to the condition of the possibility of evil, 
not to some special kind of evil.  “Radical evil” is an “innate evil in human nature.”26  In 
this sense it is surprising how quickly the discussion of Kant’s notion of “radical evil” 
usually gets to topics like devastating wars, genocide, torture, and other despicable and 
shameful aspects of human history.  Kant never suggests that “radical evil” is a type of 
evil, but always that it is a notion aimed at explaining the existence of evil as such, i.e. we 
are on the level of transcendental notions, not a historical analysis of the progress (or 
regress) of humankind.  
How does the introduction of “radical evil” help Kant argue the importance of 
affirming human freedom in the discussion of the moral law?  What is the relationship 
                                                
24 Ak. 6:32, Religion, 80. 
25 Henry E. Allison discusses the views of Kant’s earliest defenders, Carl Leonard Reinhold, who argues 
against Kantian view of evil primarily suggesting that it is implausible to think of a concept of freedom that 
allows us to act freely but against the moral law. Allison himself address the problem of the connection 
between freedom and the moral law in terms of what he labels the Reciprocity Thesis. For discussion of 
Reinhold, see Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 133-34; for the Reciprocity Thesis, see, chapter 11.  
26 6:32, Religion, 80. 
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between such freedom/autonomy and the human propensity to go against the self-
legislated moral law?  It is not accidental that the issue of “radical evil” comes up in a 
work dedicated to religion. As Yirmiyahu Yovel argued, Kant’s presentation of will in 
Groundwork “equates the good will with the rational will and construes freedom as 
‘autonomy’,” therefore one gets “the (false) impression that immoral acts are unfree, 
because they produce heteronomy rather than autonomy and, especially, because they 
seem to result from the natural inclinations overpowering reason.”27  To counterbalance 
the description of the will in Groundwork, Kant claims in Religion that evil too originates 
in freedom.  If evil is generated when the will turns against itself, it is a sign of the 
genuine freedom of the will to be able to do so, which means that, even in acts of evil, 
one is free.  Kant’s idea of “radical evil,” we claim, is nothing but this simple point: no 
rational being can completely reject the validity of (moral) reason, even if she has a 
capacity, in her freedom, to act against the duty and therefore against the law she gives 
herself. In this sense, the notion of moral duty is inseparable from the notion of moral 
conflict. 
We must be able to contemplate various sources and courses of actions in order to 
be accountable and completely responsible for our choices as free moral agents.  This 
seems to be quite clear in Kant’s practical philosophy.  However, as some commentators 
pointed out, Kant’s position can also be characterized as “extremely strained and 
awkward,” because it attempts to maintain both that human beings are free and that 
                                                
27 Yirmiyahu Yovel, “Kant’s Practical Reason as Will,” Review of Metaphysics 52:2 (1998), 281. [267-94] 
Yovel adds, “Nature cannot generate evil; only the free human will can.” (281) 
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human beings have an innate propensity to evil.28  This particular tension is essential to 
Kant’s position, because he argues in Religion that this tension is not accidental and 
comes from our inability to explain the “subjective ground of our maxims” or, as Kant 
also calls it, “the depth of one’s own heart.”29  In other words, we cannot know our own 
true motivations, we cannot explain why we make the moral choices we do.  Yet, as Kant 
argues, we must be moral to the best of our rational ability, even if we can never be sure 
that a decision to act in a specific way was ultimately guided by the categorical 
imperative or our inclinations.  This very uncertainty characterizes any ethical decision; 
this particular point is often missed as Kant is described as formalist with his calculation-
oriented moral theory. 
Kant’s discussion of evil then is an attempt to insist that even in acts that we 
designate as “evil” we remain rational and therefore cannot completely reject the 
authority of reason and law that it produces.  “Radical evil,” far from being an attempt to 
appease Christians, is actually introduced to eliminate any real possibility of existence of 
evil as irrational propensity for destruction.  Evil as a rational malfunction is in; evil as an 
irrational demonic destruction is out.  This is why whenever Kant discusses evil, he talks 
about the “evil principle”: 
The battle that every morally well-disposed human being must withstand in this 
life, under the leadership of the good principle, against the attacks of the evil 
principle, can procure him, however hard he tries, no greater advantage than 
                                                
28 Bernstein, Radical Evil, 33.  Cf. Daniel O’Connor, “Good and Evil Dispositions,” Kant-Studien 76 
(1985), 299: “There is something odd about Kant’s whole discussion of evil, for even if we accepted Kant’s 
contradictory notion of evil disposition which is freely chosen outside of time, we would by his own 
admission gain nothing in the way of understanding.”  See also Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of 
Freedom, 136-45 and Gordon E. Michalson, Fallen Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 40-51 and 62-70.  For an excellent discussion of Kant’s view of evil see also John R. Silber, “Kant 
in Auschwitz,” in Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress, ed. Gerhard Funke and Thomas 
Seebohm (Washington: University Press of America, 1991),177-211. 
29 Ak. 6:51, Religion, 95. 
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freedom from the dominion of evil. That he be free, that he “relinquish the 
bondage under the law of sins, to live for righteousness,” [Romans 6:18] this is 
the highest price that he can win. He still remains not any the less exposed to the 
assaults of the evil principle; and, to assert his freedom, which is constantly under 
attack, he must henceforth remain forever armed for battle.30 
 
What does it mean, in terms of our discussion, to suggest that at the heart of the most 
basic human activity of self-legislation – acting only according to the law that one gives 
oneself – there is a fundamental weakness of reason that does not allow us to come up 
with an explanation for the “determining ground” [Bestimmungsgrund] of our actions? 
As Yovel puts it, 
[It] does not mean that the choice between good and evil is arbitrary in the sense 
of picking the random alternative.  There are surely overriding reasons in Kant for 
preferring the good.  These reasons derive from the claim that the moral law 
inheres in the will as the will’s own essential structure, and as end-in-itself.  Yet 
moral reasons, however strong, do not in themselves suffice to produce a concrete 
action, they still must be activated, made effective by a subjective act, in which I 
adopt or endorse those reasons (meaning: decide to bow to their normative 
claim).31   
 
In Kantian terms, one therefore cannot ever call oneself “moral,” but only hope that one 
deduced the maxim correctly and acted upon it with no other motivation but respect for 
the law.  Any person looking for a specific ethical code or a list of instructions on how to 
be moral would be very disappointed.  Still, Kant writes, “he must be able to hope that, 
by the extension of his own power [durch eigene Kraftanwendung], he will attain to the 
road that leads in that direction, as indicated to him by a fundamentally improved 
disposition.”32  All we can hope for is that we become better human beings, and although 
we cannot know what the “determining ground” of our action is, we can act to the best of 
our ability and therefore hope to be moral, while never being able to say “I am moral” or 
                                                
30 Ak. 6:93. 
31 Yovel, “Kant’s Practical Reason as Will,” 284. Emphasis added. 
32 Ak. 6:51, Religion, 95. Original emphasis. 
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“he is moral.”  As Richard J. Bernstein puts it, Kant’s insistence that the subjective first 
ground of our maxims is inscrutable to us is an “indication of Kant’s ultimate intellectual 
integrity and his profound understanding of our radical freedom… it must be inscrutable, 
because this is what it means to be a free and responsible person.”33  However, Kant’s 
discussion of religion and radical evil has a different side to it: although we cannot know 
the determining ground of our action and there is an evil disposition to go against one’s 
own law, there is also a unifying thread of “rational faith” [Vernunftglaube] that can be 
provisionally seen in various religious expressions, but which is also always already 
present in any act of discerning the correct action in moral deliberation.  Religion, for 
Kant, gives us a privileged access to this “rational faith” by allowing us to have a 
different perspective on the workings of practical reason.  What is essential about his 
“rational faith” is that it indicates a possibility of the common ground for all moral 
beings.  There are many religions; there is only one rational faith, and it is by this rational 
faith that we are saved. 
 
3. Kant’s Rational Faith. 
Kant’s references to “rational faith” are found throughout his work, from the first 
Critique to the final essays of The Conflict of the Faculties.34  This “rational faith” is 
characterized as something that “can be convincingly communicated to everyone,” and is 
opposed to a “historical faith” or an “ecclesiastical faith” which is based on specific facts, 
                                                
33 Bernstein, Radical Evil, 44, 45. Emphasis added. 
34 Cf. first Critique: A829/B857 (translated as “rational belief”); second Critique: Ak. 5:126, 144, 146; 
Religion: Ak, 6:102, 104, 129, 164; “Orient Oneself in Thinking”: Ak. 8:141, 141, 143; The Metaphysics of 
Morals: Ak. 18:507, 509, 512, 550; The Conflict of the Faculties: Ak. 7:47, 51 (translated as “rational 
faith”). 
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and often divides itself into sects and therefore cannot be efficiently universalized.35  This 
particular contrast between a “pure religious faith” and an institutionalized faith of a 
particular church has various levels for Kant, but the one that is especially intriguing in 
terms of the themes of this study is the contrast between the voluntary and non-coercive 
manner of rational faith (“inside”) and coercive manner of the ecclesiastical faith 
(“outside”): 
Ecclesiastical authority [Autorität] to pronounce salvation or damnation according 
to this sort of faith would be called priestcraft [Pfaffenthum]…  As soon, then, as 
ecclesiastical faith begins to speak with authority on its own and forgets that it 
must be rectified by pure religious faith [reine Religionsglaube], sectarianism sets 
in.  For, since pure religious faith (as practical rational faith) cannot lose its 
influence on the human soul – an influence that involves consciousness of our 
freedom – while ecclesiastical faith uses force [Gewalt] on our conscience, 
everyone tries to put into or get out of dogma something in keeping with his own 
views.36 
 
Ecclesiastical authority then is a “power (of dogma)” and involves coercion, while pure 
religious faith is connected to our consciousness of freedom, and, most importantly, is a 
universal and necessary rational faith.  Kant’s critique of ecclesiastical faith and his 
promotion of rational faith can be read as primarily a critique of power relations. 37  His 
appeal to the state and his argument that ecclesiastical faith usurps the power of the state 
to demand obedience from its subjects can be read as a direct endorsement of pure 
rational faith that, having found its own “room,” would delegate the matters of legitimate 
enforcement to the state and its apparatus.  In fact, because “there is only one (true) 
religion,”38 and several kinds of ecclesiastical faith, resulting in many religious 
organizations, this true religion of reason does not itself produce the specific statutes and 
                                                
35 Cf. Ak. 6:103 and Ak, 7:48. 
36 Ak. 7:51, CF, 274. Original emphasis. 
37 Ak. 7:61, CF, 282.  
38 Ak. 6:107, Religion, 140. 
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thus does not in itself require any organizational structure as such.  According to Kant, 
only a correct combination of pure rational faith and corresponding ecclesiastical statutes 
that do not violate the spirit of this universal religion can produce a stable religious 
community, yet never the only true religious expression.  If we compare this discussion to 
our themes of law and justice, there is a clear parallel between pure rational faith and 
justice as both, for Kant, do not in themselves have any institutional structure (statutes or 
laws) but require to be represented in specific arrangements, both function as principles 
and, as such, are then inseparable from particular ecclesiastical and legal institutions.  
If this philosophy of religion does not technically constitute a part of ethics based 
on practical reason alone, or as Kant puts it, religion “is not derived from reason alone but 
is also based on the teachings of history and revelation,”39 then religion as a subject 
matter becomes a very potent area of philosophical and historical analysis, an area that 
can potentially give us the solution to the general issues of society’s most essential 
conflicts.40  On the one hand, we have a typical Enlightenment type of discourse: the 
discussion of religion is essentially divided into a presentation of religion’s internal 
truthful core and its external representation in the specific institutional shell.  On the 
other hand, by refusing to reduce religion to its concrete moral content, Kant accepts the 
viability of ecclesiastical faith and its institutions, while providing a sort of critical 
analysis of its limitations. 
The role of philosophy of religion is not to place “restrictions on the excesses of 
speculative reason… [but] to extend the use of practical reason beyond the moral 
                                                
39 Ak. 6:488, MM, 599. Original emphasis.  
40 We are, of course, very much aware here of Marx’s famous pronouncement that “the critique of religion 
is the prerequisite of every critique” in Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, ed. Joseph J. 
O’Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 131.  
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legislation of a strict ethics of duties to the presumptively rational postulates of God and 
immortality.”41  This supplementary role, it seems, is theorized not in terms of religion’s 
contribution to ethics or politics, i.e. not as a specific religious content (as in 
ecclesiastical statutes or biblical revelations), but as a way of approaching certain aspects 
of human reality.  Namely, Kant argues, “faith (as a habitus, not as actus [as a habit or 
disposition, not as an individual act]) is reason’s moral way of thinking in the affirmation 
of that which is inaccessible for theoretical cognition… Faith (simply so called) is trust in 
the attainment of an aim the promotion of which it is not possible for us to have insight 
into.”42  This statement from Kant’s third Critique could serve as an indication of rational 
faith’s importance in Kant’s philosophy of religion. If it is up to any rational being to 
embrace faith as a part of her overall existence, it can only be in this new form of rational 
faith.  
However, the same tension we have discovered in Kant’s moral theory seems to 
exist at the heart of the new rational faith.  On the one hand, this faith is rational and 
therefore universal, yet on the other hand, it cannot be reduced to any set of practical 
postulates because then it would cease to be a disposition and become a particular set of 
prescribed actions.  Like Kant’s moral theory, his understanding of religion aims to be 
formal, yet it also requires that the form of faith be represented in specific religious forms 
(“ecclesiastical faiths”).  This tension can be best presented in terms of a more traditional 
                                                
41 Habermas, “Between Faith and Knowledge,” 216.  
42 Ak. 5:471, 472, Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 336. Emphasis added.  
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philosophical issue of “faith” versus “knowledge.”43  In this sense, Kant does not 
distinguish between “faith” and “knowledge,” but rather between “dogmatic faith” and 
“reflecting faith.”  Kant argues that dogmatic faith claims knowledge of supernatural 
things, and reflecting faith does not “contest the possibility or actuality of the 
[supernatural] objects,” but simply refuses to “incorporate them into its maxims of 
thought and action.”44  In other words, the distinction is not between knowing and 
believing, but between claiming to know what is outside of the limits of possible 
experience (“transcendental illusion”) and willing to hope that, despite reason’s 
limitations, it is still possible to act morally and therefore work for the improvement of 
the general human condition.  To put it yet differently, Kant proposes to distinguish 
between those who claim to know the difference between faith and knowledge and those 
who posit such difference and are acting upon this posited distinction, thus distinguishing 
between faith as a matter of knowledge or lack of knowledge and faith as a matter of will 
and action. 
The difference between “claiming to know” and “willing to hope” is certainly 
crucial if we think of it in terms of the difference between law and justice that we have 
been considering in this essay.  In this sense, claiming to know the difference between 
law and justice, between legal actions that are also just and legal actions that are unjust, is 
the defining characteristic of an attitude we have learned to designate as 
“fundamentalist.”  Although most often associated with religious organizations and faith 
traditions, fundamentalism is a position of absolute certainty rather than faith.  As Roger 
                                                
43 For the general overview of the issue, see John Hick, Faith and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1957);  Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason: The Christian Doctrine of Faith and Knowledge, 
trans. Olive Wyon (Louisville: The Westminster Press, 1946) 
44 Ak. 6:52, Religion, 96. 
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Stump writes in his study of fundamentalism, “the absolute certainty of fundamentalism 
has important consequences because it precludes the possibility of compromise with 
others with whom they disagree.”45  Certainty is that which gives a particular motivation 
and not just a description of one’s knowledge: because a fundamentalist is certain that 
what is being done is unjust, he or she acts against the injustice.  It is in this sense of 
challenging the arrogance of such ultimately rationalist certainty that Kant (and Derrida) 
formulate their accounts of faith and knowledge.     
Faith considered as an attitude toward the task of moving humanity along toward 
a better future, and not as a type of knowledge, is found, for example, in Terry Eagleton’s 
recent critique of the “new atheism” of figures like Christopher Hitchens and Richard 
Dawkins.46  With characteristic bluntness and plenty of sarcasm, Eagleton ridicules the 
“new atheists” who “claims with grandiloquent folly that religious faith dispenses with 
reason altogether, which wasn’t true even of the dimwitted authoritarian clerics who 
knocked [Eagleton] around at grammar school.”47  Eagleton’s formulation of the Kantian 
insight is that “faith is for the most part performative rather than propositional.”48  Slavoj 
Žižek, another contemporary cultural critic, echoes Eagleton’s assertion that faith does 
not belong to “the same modality of positive knowledge” as science.49  We must 
remember, Žižek continues, that “the opposition of knowledge and faith echoes the one 
between the constative and the performative: faith (or, rather, trust) is the basic ingredient 
of speech as the medium of social bond, of the subject’s engaged participation in this 
                                                
45 Roger W. Stump, Boundaries of Faith: Geographical Perspective on Religious Fundamentalism 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 216.  
46 Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009), esp. chapter 3 “Faith and Reason.” 
47 Eagleton, Reason, Faith and Revolution, 109.  
48 Eagleton, Reason, Faith and Revolution, 111. 
49 Slavoj Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2008), 31. 
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bond, while science – exemplarily in its formalization – reduces language to neutral 
registration.”50  This idea of faith as trust has been given a great amount of attention in 
the works of late Derrida, specifically in his essay “Faith and Knowledge.” 
 
4. Derrida’s “Faith and Knowledge.” 
Derrida’s address “Faith and Knowledge,” delivered as a part of an 
interdisciplinary conference in 1994, can be considered his first comprehensive and 
public discussion of the issues related to the problem of “religion” in general (as opposed 
to Derrida’s early interest in the issues of onto-theology and the name of God).  Derrida’s 
framing of this discussion of “religion” in terms similar to Kantian “reflecting faith” is 
indicative of his peculiarly Kantian interpretation of the role of faith.  This framing is 
Kantian, we argue, not because Derrida basically agrees with Kant’s declaration about 
“making room for faith,” but because both Derrida and Kant are in search of a kind of 
“rational theology” that would allow for religion to play a larger legitimate public role 
and that is conspicuously lacking in the contemporary public debate today.  This public 
role for religion is a midpoint between an extreme secularist rejection of religion as 
“superstitious” knowledge and an extreme religionist calls for reversal of secularization 
and a return to the “golden age” of piety and decency (“golden age” that, however, never 
existed and is, paradoxically, to be achieved in the coming eschaton of the end of times).  
Derrida’s talk opens with a question of the singularity of the noun “religion”: 
there is no “religion,” but always “religions.”  We know that this is the case yet we do not 
change our conversational pattern and stubbornly continue with “religion,” abstracting 
                                                
50 Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes, 32. 
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from all the different religions and their peculiarities and insisting on forcing a number of 
unrelated (or barely related) phenomena under the roof of one singular noun.  For 
Derrida, this is achieved through a work of abstraction that is the cause of the purported 
dichotomy between “faith” and “knowledge.”51  Connecting the problem of religion and 
the problem of violence in the name of religion, Derrida proposes to find the solution in 
the very paradoxical interplay of conceptual apparatuses of “faith” (sacred/holy, 
salvation, immunity/purity, particularity, and justice) and “knowledge” (machine, 
science, tele-technology, regularity, lawfulness).52  When it comes to the “sites of 
abstraction” such as technology or science or knowledge, Derrida argues, religion is “at 
the same time involved in reacting antagonistically and reaffirmatively outbidding 
itself.”53  Derrida’s hypothesis is then a rather simple one: religion, if one were to use this 
term in an attempt to designate something, refers to a peculiar co-implication of what we 
traditionally label “faith” and “knowledge.”  In their various incarnations, “faith” and 
“knowledge” are “bound to one another by the band of their opposition.”54  However, and 
Derrida will continue to argue this point throughout his presentation, the very co-
implication of “faith” and “knowledge,” the very non-oppositional nature of their 
                                                
51 FK, 43. 
52 Although Derrida does not claim to have originally discovered this peculiar co-implication of religion 
and modern technology, he is often treated as having done so by interpreters.  In fact, the relationship 
between various forms of contemporary fundamentalisms and modernity has been described as that of 
“symbiosis” by various scholars of religion.  Martin Marty, discussing the history of contemporary 
Evangelicalism, asserted, “Evangelicalism is the characteristic Protestant way of relating to modernity.”  
Cited in Joel A. Carpenter, Revive Us Again: A Reawakening of American Fundamentalism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 235.  For an intriguing discussion of modern evangelical fascination with 
technology and simultaneous rejection of modernity, see Glenn W. Shuck’s analysis of Left Behind novels 
in Marks of the Beast: The Left Behind Novels and the Struggle for Evangelical Identity (New York: New 
York University Press, 2005), 2: “Contemporary evangelicalism is… a highly adaptive religious impulse 
that feeds upon modernity, even while railing against it, using, ironically, its own tools to transmit the 
evangelical message.” 
53 FK, 43. 
54 FK, 43.  
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opposition, so to speak, forbids one from clearly identifying which contemporary 
struggles would neatly fit into which part of the juxtaposition.55  All initial assignments 
will only be provisional and pragmatic.  The themes of “faith” and “knowledge” are 
bound by their opposition in the similar manner as the themes of law and justice: one is 
not possible without the other, yet the movement between the two constitutes the space of 
difference that is continuously renegotiated in and through this very movement.  
Religion, therefore, allows us to take a closer look at this oppositional bind and approach 
its complexity from a new perspective, especially once we attempt to apply our newly 
acquired insights to the notion of religious violence.  
If the distinction between “faith” and “knowledge” were to be approached with a 
number of contemporary test cases, Derrida writes, then the very first and the most urgent 
would be that of language and of nation.  What is at stake in any talk of “unprecedented 
resurgence” of religion, if such resurgence in fact is taking place at all, is “language, 
certainly – and more precisely the idiom, literality, writing, that forms the element of all 
revelation of all belief… but an idiom that above all is inseparable from the social nexus, 
from the political, familial, ethnic, communitarian nexus, from the nation and from the 
people…  In these times, language and nation form the historical body of all religious 
passion.”56  Nation and language are closely related in popular imagination and populist 
discourse.  Both, as Derrida argues elsewhere, are linked to the “question of 
                                                
55 Two temptations vis-à-vis this juxtaposition will receive the names of their philosophical proponents, 
according to Derrida, as a “Hegelian” temptation to remove the opposition through sublation and a 
“Heideggerian” temptation to move beyond this ontotheological setup. Cf. FK, 53-54.  
56 FK, 44. Emphasis added. 
 172 
 
interpretation, reading and teaching as well as to the political problems of discrimination, 
of frontiers, of belonging to a nation or a language group…”57 
Language, argues Derrida, indicates uncertainty in the midst of communication 
that disrupts the very fabric of sociability.  Nation, accordingly, attempts to reaffirm the 
possibility of gathering together of the various types of human connections.  Language, 
as Derrida states throughout his vast corpus, articulates itself as a system of sense-making 
that contains at its very heart a nonsensical chaotic moment of arbitrariness.  Nation, on 
the other hand, is judged to be the most appropriate (if not perfect in its ideality) 
incarnation of the human co-existence, yet it is based on a decision, an act of will, not a 
supposedly rational deliberation or some version of “social contract.” 
When Derrida claims that language and nation form the historical body of all 
religious passion, he aims to point out, it seems, that both “language” and “nation” only 
acquire their significant roles in the vocabulary of present political debates when their 
abstract and timeless conceptual status is threatened by the specific historical 
circumstances of the everyday reality of human coexistence.  As language is potentially 
unstable and destructive, although this potential negativity is not as threatening as some 
opponents of deconstruction are eager to argue, the idea that a nation could be purged of 
all the otherness and thus allegedly all the conflicts is equally aimed at a politics of 
neutralization and pacification.  Derrida’s discussion of language, nation and “religious 
passion” gives us a glimpse of the rhetoric of religious violence that, while insisting on 
the necessary change for the better, more than just political arrangement, implicitly seeks 
                                                
57 Jacques Derrida, Paper Machine, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 156.  
Cf. Derrida’s 1986 short essay on Paul Celan “Shibboleth – for Paul Celan,” trans. Joshua Wilner in Word 
Traces, ed. Aris Fioretis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 3-72. 
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to stop all change and all polysemy in order to fulfill a dream of otherworldly reign based 
on a number of religious doctrines.  In other words, what distinguishes genuine religious 
passion, as Derrida labels it, from reactionary religious passion is the assumption of 
fundamental instability of human institutions, including institutions of language and 
nation.  
Language does not describe “religion” but gives us a set of historical marks, 
observations, and conceptualizations that aim at capturing the development of the idea of 
religion, yet claim no final authoritative ability to define what it is.  The history of a 
concept produces not knowledge, but only a contingent constellation of always 
approximating descriptions united into a definite concept only by the founding decision 
of the (nation-building) human association.  Such founding act, of course, is never 
innocent and presuppositionless, yet it is precisely this act of will, argues Derrida, that 
establishes that which is able to sustain itself regardless of instability that grounds its 
possibility.  Simply put, Derrida is not irresponsibly arguing that any cultural or political 
institution that claims authority and power somehow lacks any legitimacy in its claims.  
He points out that a visible constancy and consistency of any societal arrangement has 
come into existence through a series of decisions that do not obey any historical logic or 
play out any teleological scenario.  
How does the discussion of “faith “ and “knowledge” help Derrida make his point 
not only about the auto-immune characteristics of the present-day religious 
fundamentalisms but also about today’s societal arrangement?  For Derrida, there are two 
sources of religion, sources that give it all the necessary power to continue its influence 
in the contemporary society: the experience of belief [croyance] (“believing or credit, the 
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fiduciary or the trustworthy in the act of faith, fidelity, the appeal to blind confidence, the 
testimonial that is always beyond proof, demonstrative reason, intuition”) and the 
experience of the unscathed, of sacredness, or of holiness [indemne, sacralité, saintete].58  
In this distinction Derrida attempts to theorize two moments of religion that should not be 
confused, even if they cannot be strictly separated.  The strata of belief correspond to 
Derrida’s discussion of “fiduciary” as a necessary element in any ethical and political 
decision that, based on a calculable nature of rules, regulations and laws, always contains 
an element of incalculable and indeterminable.  The strata of sacredness correspond to 
Derrida’s critique of the “metaphysics of presence,” of that utterly human desire to reach 
the ultimate source of everything, the ultimate explanation and origin of reality.  Thus we 
see that we can roughly describe these two sources of religion as “faith” and 
“knowledge,” yet only in their combination do they produce any sort of religious effects, 
positive and negative.   
The interaction between “faith” and “knowledge” is far from smooth, of course, 
precisely because their co-implication is hidden.  In fact, one might see some of the 
examples of radical secularization (from early modern atheism to Soviet era “militant 
atheism” to contemporary figures of “new atheism”) as a continual effort to cleanse the 
secular, the scientific, and the ultimately explanatory and progressive “knowledge” from 
all the so-called superstitious and primitive elements of “faith.”  At the same time, major 
religious movements often labeled “fundamentalist” are attempting to resist what they 
perceive to be a radical emptying of contemporary societies of all things religious 
                                                
58 FK, 70. 
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through a discourse of what can only be labeled alternative modernity where religious 
ideas are as accepted and respected as secular ideas.  
Religion in the singular, Derrida claims, comes to designate “always a response 
and responsibility” that is prescribed, not freely chosen, because “the other makes the 
law.”59  We can recall here our discussion of Derrida’s analysis of the need to speak the 
language of the other, of being forced to speak the language of the majority.  This 
understanding of religion seems to be opposed to Kantian position that law necessarily 
comes from oneself, that law is produced by the subject and therefore it acquires its force 
from this act of self-legislation.  However, as we pointed out, it is not entirely clear, 
based on our reading of Kant, whether law is produced absolutely autonomously, i.e. 
without any reliance on nature.60  What does unite Kant and Derrida at this point of our 
study is that both affirm the necessity to differentiate between the dogmatic position of 
claiming to know that we are free and autonomous and the critical position of positing 
that we are free and autonomous.  If Kant denies us the knowledge of our freedom, he 
provides us with a philosophical justification for positing such freedom and hoping that 
our efforts are not in vain.  If Derrida undermines any attempt to ground knowledge in a 
crypto-metaphysical assurance of scientific certainty, he insists that such impossibility of 
pure presence, pure origin and epistemic closure is in fact good news because it allows us 
to think and to change the present in the name of a better future.  
                                                
59 FK, 71. 
60 See, for example, a recent study by Patrick Kain, “Self-Legislation in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” Archiv 
für Geschichte der Philosophie 86:3 (September 2004), 257-306.  Kain argues, based on his study of Kant’s 
lectures, that there is indeed no author of moral law in Kant as we have to distinguish between the “author 
of moral law” and the “legislator of moral law.”  Allen W. Wood agrees with Kain’s reading and is willing 
to correct his earlier “half-correct” view of the same issue: see Allen W. Wood, Kantian Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 294note7.   
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As Derrida continues his discussion of “faith” and “knowledge” it appears in yet 
another version as that between “believing one knows and knowing one believes.”61  
Formulated this way, “faith” and “knowledge, do not serve as two poles alongside which 
we can comfortably align various religious and secular phenomena.  In fact, this 
particular formulation contains a rather startling thesis that Derrida attempts to flesh out 
in the remainder of “Faith and Knowledge”: the co-implication of “faith” and 
“knowledge” that constitutes religion allows us to claims that, in principle, “there is no 
incompatibility… between the ‘fundamentalisms’, the ‘integrisms’ or their ‘politics’ and, 
on the other hand, rationality, which is to say, the tele-techno-capitalistico-scientific 
fiduciarity, in all of its mediatic and globalizing dimensions.”62  In other words, to put it 
bluntly, there is a strange correlation between so-called fundamentalisms and the most 
progressive discourses of techno-science and liberal capitalist ideologies.  Derrida labels 
this peculiar correlation, playing on the familiar term “globalization,” globalatinization.63  
This term, which is no longer surprising, enters Derrida’s vocabulary first in his 
engagement with Kant’s notion of “reflecting faith,” faith that “favors good will beyond 
all knowledge.”64  However, we quickly learn that “globalatinization (this strange 
alliance of Christianity, as the experience of the death of God, and tele-technoscientific 
capitalism) is at the same time hegemonic and finite, ultra-powerful and in the process of 
exhausting itself.”65 
 
                                                
61 FK, 76. 
62 FK, 81. 
63 Cf. FK, 50. Translator’s note indicates that, like English term “globalatinization,” French term 
“mondialatinisation” is a neologism created by Derrida.  
64 FK, 49. 
65 FK, 51-52. 
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5. Religion and Violence. 
This strange alliance between the most archaic forms of religion (cult, sacrifice, 
revelation, texts and so on) and the new media (capitalism, mechanical reproduction, 
information technology and so on) is a direct result of “globalatinization,” of religion 
becoming more and more worldly.66  The task of “thinking religion” then for Derrida is 
the task of thinking it in terms of both Kant’s discussion of “radical evil” in Religion and 
Bergson’s discussion of the “machine for making gods” in The Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion.67  Kant’s idea of “radical evil,” as we saw earlier, is not concerned with 
horrific acts of immorality but with the question of the possibility of evil, as such.  Kant’s 
radical evil, however, proposes to rationalize evil, to make it into an “evil principle” as 
opposed to some demonic “evil madness.”  Derrida’s peculiar twist here consists in 
asking a series of questions concerning the “return of the religious” as raising a question 
of possibility of evil committed in the name of religion, evil that is more potent and 
destructive due to religion’s revealed structure of auto-immunity:  
Religion today allies itself with tele-technoscience, to which it reacts with all its 
forces.  It is, on the one hand, globalization; it produces, weds, exploits the capital 
and knowledge of tele-mediatization; neither the trips and global spectacularizing 
of the Pope, not the interstate dimensions of the ‘Rushdie affair’, nor planetary 
terrorism would otherwise be possible…  But, on the other hand, it reacts 
immediately, simultaneously, declaring war against that which gives it this new 
power only at the cost of dislodging it from all its proper places, in truth from 
place itself, from the taking-place of truth.  It conducts a terrible war against that 
which protects it only by threatening it, according to this double and contradictory 
structure: immunitary and auto-immunitary.68 
 
                                                
66 Cf. Hent de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1999), 15. 
67 FK, 77. Cf. Herni Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and 
Cloudesley Brereton (Norte Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1977). 
68 FK, 82. Original emphasis.  
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Derrida’s analysis of auto-immunity seems to proceed along the lines of comparing the 
idea of “radical evil” that he finds in Kant with what he labels “evil of abstraction.”  The 
peculiarity of such formulation is not found in Derrida’s critique of abstraction, but in his 
willingness to describe it in such moralistic terms, even if borrowed from Kant, as “good” 
and “evil.”  Early in his philosophical career, in an essay called “White Mythology,” 
Derrida first touched on the subject that turned out to be predicated on the general 
philosophical trust in the power of abstraction.69  Although on the first reading, the essay 
can be understood as dealing primarily with the question of metaphoricity and its relation 
to the nature of philosophical language, one quickly discovers that there is much more to 
it.  If we follow Derrida’s discussion of the metaphor, we notice that there is a privileged 
philosophical move with which a philosophical usage claims to have manufactured a 
metaphorical connection based on some “original figures” of natural language, a move of 
abstraction. 
The primitive meaning, the original, and always sensory and material, figure is 
not exactly a metaphor.  It is a kind of transparent figure, equivalent to a literal 
meaning [sens propre].  It becomes a metaphor when philosophical discourse puts 
it into circulation.  Simultaneously the first meaning and the first displacement are 
then forgotten.  The metaphor is no longer noticed, and it is taken for the proper 
meaning.  A double effacement.  Philosophy would be this process of 
metaphorization which gets carried away in and of itself.  Constitutionally, 
philosophical culture will always have been an obliterating one [fruste].70 
 
The history of a metaphor thus appears as a history of abstraction: the very constitution of 
philosophical language demands that all the particular and defining characteristics of a 
                                                
69 Jacques Derrida, “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” in Margins of Philosophy, 
trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 207-71.  
70 “White Mythology,” 211. It is precisely this obliteration of the scene that produces philosophy that 
Derrida terms “white mythology”: “White mythology – metaphysics has erased within itself the fabulous 
scene that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an 
invisible design covered over in the palimpsest.” (213). 
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thing or a relation be stripped away in order to produce a concept, a usable coin capable 
of being exchanged and therefore circulated.  The reference to the “evil of abstraction,” 
therefore, is not at all accidental, as the stripping away of the particular in any act of 
abstraction is the very essence of the salvific function of religion for Derrida.  The 
discourse on religion cannot be separated from a discourse on the holy and sacred which 
is, for Derrida, a discourse on salvation as indemnification.  In other words, on the one 
hand, because the privileged sites of abstraction are “the machine, technics, 
technoscience and above all the transcendence of tele-technology,”71 religion as a 
discourse of salvation and transcendence finds itself in agreement with tele-technology 
and law.  On the other hand, because religion also contains an experience of the most 
elementary act of faith, its universalizing movement of aligning itself with “new media” 
is countered by its very own movement toward particularity that is violated in the original 
gesture of any abstraction.  
This auto-immune reaction of religion against itself, this “auto-immune 
indemnification,” shows itself, for Derrida, in a form of what in “Violence and 
Metaphysics” he called “the worst violence” [la pire violence].  In a rather interesting 
passage in that essay, interesting precisely in light of his later discussion of religion and 
violence, Derrida describes “the worst violence” as a type of violence in which “the 
horizon of peace would disappear into the night (worst violence as previolence).”72  This 
worst violence is such because it is “the violence of primitive and prelogical silence, of 
an unimaginable night which would not even be the opposite of day, an absolute violence 
                                                
71 FK, 43. 
72 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 
130. 
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which would not even be the opposite of nonviolence: nothingness and pure non-
sense.”73  If this worst violence, as Hent de Vries argues, is “abstraction ad absurdum” 
and a “looking away from every singularity,” then it is a violence that can be identified 
with injustice, i.e. with a disregard for what we called “the imperative of justice” to 
always attend to singular while also applying the laws that are to guarantee rights and 
freedoms of others.74  
Derrida’s discussion of the worst violence and his general critique of religion and 
its auto-immune violence is effective precisely because it is directed at both “knowledge” 
and “faith,” i.e. both rationalist pretension of objectivity and fiduciary reliance on 
dogmatic assertions about supersensible reality.  However, it is his insistence that we 
rethink, in light of his observations, that the major premises of the modern attitude toward 
religion and modernity is what makes the essay so potent.  The fact that religion aligns 
itself with technology and capitalism is not just a critique of religion but also a critique of 
modernity, a vision of modernity that relies on technological advancement and capitalist 
economy to solve all the societal problems.  “What in the world is suddenly emerging or 
re-emerging under this appellation [of religion]?” asks Derrida.75  The answer of “Faith 
and Knowledge” is simple: what suddenly emerges in our discussion of “religion” today 
is not a need to rid the world of religion but a vision of the future in which we must find a 
way to renegotiate the relationship between the calculable machine-like predictability of 
“knowledge” and the incalculable to-come of “faith.”  
                                                
73 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 130. 
74 Hent de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, 20. 
75 FK, 75. 
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What Derrida labels the “Kantian gesture” of thinking religion “within the limits 
of reason alone” is a preference for “republican democracy as a universalizable model, 
bringing philosophy to the public ‘cause’, to the res publica, to ‘public-ness’… to the 
enlightened virtue of public space, emancipating it from all external power (non-lay, non-
secular), for example from religious dogmatism, orthodoxy or authority (that is, from a 
certain rule of doxa or of belief, which, however, does not mean all faith).”76  This 
gesture of public critique of religion, of attempting to think it within the limits of reason 
is, however, problematic.  Kant appears throughout “Faith and Knowledge” and 
exemplifies an attitude of reason/knowledge that purports to know the difference between 
“faith” and “knowledge” (or reason and religion), to think religion “within limits of 
reason,” while Derrida suggests that we need to constantly try “to think the 
interconnectedness… of knowledge and faith, technoscience and religious belief, 
calculation and the sacrosanct.”77  However, the main problem is not with 
conceptualizations of the need for such reevaluation of the role of religion in the public 
sphere, but with a seeming lack of motivation to do so on the part of the secular 
modernity.   
 Both Kant and Derrida conceptualize religion not as a set of special obligations or 
as a set of special issues.  For Kant, religion is always a combination for pure rational 
(formal) faith and some institutionalization; although it is not absolutely clear how a 
specific religion negotiates this relationship between universal rational faith and 
particular dogmatic content.  For Derrida, religion is a peculiar combination of an attitude 
of faith and believing (messianicity as a structure of experience) and an opening of the 
                                                
76 FK, 47. 
77 FK, 90. 
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inaccessible and the holy (unscathed) space that articulates that ever-present incalculable 
in any calculation and undecideable in any decision, an ultimate blind spot that does not 
allow us to comprehend reality as a whole.  Religion, for both Kant and Derrida, signifies 
the presence of some excess in the very midst of reason, excess that we need to come to 
grips with, not through additional theorization, but in an act of faith.  
 If genuine religious passion, despite both Kant’s and Derrida’s attempts to make it 
more or less reasonable and therefore manageable, still remains rooted in prelogical, 
unarticulated, illegitimate and silent violence that exposes any and all human institutions 
as ultimately finite, then we return to the problem of religious violence now from a 
slightly different perspective.  If religion is about our attitude toward our duties and our 
motivation to strive for a better more just society, then its violent expressions are not to 
be conceptualized as simple challenges to this or that law, but as attempts to suspend all 
laws in order to ask questions about legitimacy of societal arrangements, as such.  Kant’s 
introduction of “radical evil” allows us to raise questions about human nature and its evil 
disposition to excuse itself from obeying its own laws in the name of something else (be 
it self-interest or justice, it still remains something other than law).  Although Kant risks 
philosophical scandal by incorporating this “radical evil” into his discussion of human 
freedom and reason (rationalization of evil, as we called it), it is clear why he needs to do 
so.  Without a reasonable discourse on human evil, there opens up, for Kant, a monstrous 
gap of hidden silent and irrational lawlessness of the state of nature.  Although Derrida 
risks philosophical embarrassment by “returning to religion” in his insistence on placing 
both faith and knowledge on the same side of the scales of modernity, while leaving open 
the possibility for radical uncertainty in his notion of justice beyond law, it is not entirely 
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clear exactly how this is suppose to help us better understand the relationship between 
law and justice. 
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VI 
Conclusion: Law, Justice and Religious Violence. 
 
Among many characteristics of acts of violence in the name of religion, either 
explicitly stated by the perpetrators themselves or discerned by witnesses of such acts, 
there is a strong determination to violate the present law in the name of some future (but 
always necessary) change of human condition.  This passion for change turns destructive 
not by accident or due to some misuse by those who pursue their own hidden agendas in 
these acts of religious violence.  In this essay, we have attempted to think of the 
possibility that the tension created in the interaction between the discourses of law and 
justice, and the conflict that is inevitably produced whenever the ideas of what is lawful 
clash with the ideas of what is just, are to be explored by providing a possible new 
approach to the problem of religious violence.  Our primary goal was to take the 
discussion of religious violence out of the familiar contexts of scriptural 
misinterpretation, psychological deficiency, sociological dysfunction, or geopolitical 
conflict, and put it in the context of the issues of law and justice.  Our reference to what 
some have labeled apocalyptic violence as violence in the name of some future human 
condition of justice helped us to initially locate a possible fruitful angle of approach to 
the problem of religious violence. 
 We began our investigation with a look at Kant’s practical philosophy and its 
attempts to present the matter in terms of the distinction between the moral law in its 
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internal and external expressions: morality and legality.  Although both morality and 
legality, strictly speaking, deal with the moral laws of freedom, Kant’s distinction 
between the “inside” of the moral disposition (the determining ground of action) and the 
“outside” of the lawful action (the external conformity of action to law) resulted in an 
eventual divorce between morality as a matter of private motivation and legality as a 
matter of public behavior.  The possibility of conflict between one’s internal disposition 
and one’s external conformity, that is to say, the possibility of conflict between the moral 
duty and the legal duty, occasionally entered Kant’s discussion of the subject matter, yet 
the probable solution was not sufficiently articulated.  A simple hypothetical situation in 
which a group of individuals, in the rightful condition, objects to some laws and finds 
them unjust forced Kant to further separate the interiority of moral freedom and the 
exteriority of legal coercion: called upon to obey unjust laws, argued Kant, we are 
obligated to obey, while maintaining our freedom to disagree with the enforcing 
authority, even if never came to the point of violent resistance to the unjust regime.  
 Kant’s practical philosophy, based on the tradition of social contract and 
complicated by its own critical distinction between noumena and phenomena, was not 
unique in its efforts to construct a rationalist theory of right and virtue. But it was, and 
still remains, one of the most consistent attempts to think through some of the thorny 
issues, the problem of law and justice being the most important.  In the case of any 
conflict between the rationality of the categorical imperative and the irrationality of the 
unjust abuses of power by those in charge, Kant is on the side of rationality.  Yet when 
this logic presses him against the wall and raises the question of the possibility of 
violence in the name of justice (revolution being one example), Kant refuses to allow for 
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any active resistance, relying completely on the idea of “top-to-bottom” reforms.  In this 
sense, Kant pushes the contrarian discourse to its very limit where it ultimately breaks: 
emphasis on the externality of law, on its necessarily formal structures, threatens to 
minimize the importance of the interiority of the moral disposition that ultimately 
undermines the very idea of justice in the name of which the law is first established and 
later enforced.   
The paradox of Kant’s position then can be identified as the following: on the one 
hand, Kant attempts to protect the moral freedom and self-determination of the individual 
agents by distinguishing between the rational ideal of the rightful condition in which 
internal disposition and external conformity are perfectly aligned and the imperfect 
rightful condition that contains the possibility of unjust laws. Yet, on the other hand, Kant 
protects the individual agents perhaps too strongly, thus creating a clear discrepancy 
between one’s moral dispositions and one’s external behavior that threaten to strip 
legality of all interiority (and the accompanying motivating framework) and turn laws 
into commands.  To put it differently, for Kant the legitimacy (and the validity) of the 
legal system is independent of its efficacy, therefore creating a larger gap between the 
formal and the material aspects of justice.  It is in this sense that we have pointed out that 
Kant can be considered an intermediary between the earlier traditions of natural law and 
the later traditions of legal positivism.1  The clear distinction between law and justice 
articulated in Kant, we argued, becomes more visible in the discourse on justification of 
the use of coercion.  The problem of coercion, as the problem of the legitimacy of 
violence, makes the gap between the “inside” of the moral sense of justice and the 
                                                
1 Cf. Sven Arntzen, “Kant on the Moral Condition of Law: Between Natural Law and Legal Positivism,” in 
Law and Peace in Kant’s Philosophy / Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants: Akten des X. 
Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, eds. Valerio Rohden et al., (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008): 195–206. 
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“outside” of the legal arrangements wider and more problematic.  We have concluded 
that the problem of violence, then, is calling our attention to the need for a better 
articulation of the problem of the relationship between law and justice before we can 
productively think about religious violence in terms of this relationship.  
In order to better articulate the (conceptual) space of the difference between law 
and justice, we turned to Derrida.  We chose Derrida not because he was explicitly 
engaging Kant’s concepts or trying to solve Kant’s problem, but because, in a sense, he 
was approaching the same issue of the difference between law and justice in a way that 
was illuminating vis-à-vis Kantian and contemporary traditions and our general attempt 
to find a more productive conceptual framework for dealing with the problem of religious 
violence.  If we were again to reference Marx, who famously insisted that the critique of 
religion was to be transformed into the critique of law [Recht] and the critique of 
theology in the critique of politics, Derrida, having arrived at some initial results of such 
critique, aimed to turn the critique of law back into the critique of religion and the 
critique of politics into the critique of theology.2  The issues of law and politics are not 
separable from the issues of religion and theology, argues Derrida; long rejected and 
suppressed by secular modernity, they are making a “comeback” by revealing themselves 
as never having left in the first place.  
Derrida’s articulation of the space of difference between law and justice in terms 
of a movement between the two leads him to identify the positive and the negative 
aspects of this distinction: no distinction between law and justice disavows any genuine 
exteriority to the order of law and disarms any attempt to evaluate laws as either just or 
                                                
2 Cf. Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, ed. Joseph J. O’Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), 132.  
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unjust; yet too strong of an emphasis on the distinction between law and justice threatens 
to destabilize the order of law and destroy any attempt to establish some, even if 
imperfect, rightful condition.  The balance between these two approaches is presented in 
Derrida in terms of the balance between the particularity of justice and the universality of 
law.  Although we tend to think of particular laws and universal justice, Derrida argues, 
based on Kantian understanding of law as originating in the self-legislating activity of the 
universal reason, law is universal in its determination to include everyone and justice is 
particular in its attention to the individual case in question.  Derrida’s analysis reveals 
that the gap between law and justice is not accidental but appears, necessarily, precisely 
because it can be traced back to Kantian emphasis on the distinction between the 
interiority of the moral disposition and the exteriority of the conformity to law.  If the gap 
between law and justice is not accidental but structurally necessary, then Derrida’s 
insistence on messianicity as a structure of experience that is based on our awareness of 
the imperfections of the present age and our hope that these imperfections will be 
overcome in some future (even if always to-come) condition helps us resituate the 
problem of religion and violence in this new context in the following way: since the 
discrepancy between law and justice is necessary as a part of the initial conceptual 
articulation of the very notions of law and justice, the question of what holds them 
together (bound by their opposition) comes to the forefront as the question of force 
(violence, coercion, power) and the question of the fiduciary (faith, trust, religion).   
Our look at Derrida’s discussion of force, considered in the light of our 
engagement with Kant’s analysis of the necessary coercion of law and the non-violent 
attitude toward unjust laws and regulations of the legitimate sovereign authority, lead us 
 189 
 
to a closer analysis of the peculiar contamination of both law and justice by the idea of 
legitimate and illegitimate violence.  Derrida’s reading of Benjamin showed us the very 
real problem of violence present in any legal system that cannot properly legitimize its 
own origin and its own “force of law,” despite Kant’s previous attempts to ground 
legality in the universal structures of reason.  Justice, Derrida told us, is never fully 
incarnated in any legal system precisely because it is to be thought as never really 
belonging to the legal discourse and Benjamin’s insightful analysis of violence (Gewalt) 
illustrated this point more poignantly: if law is created out of nothing and from that very 
moment is haunted by radical destruction, then only by tying itself to the notion of justice  
(either explicitly as the justice of God in the pre-modern legal discourses or implicitly as 
the justice of the best legal arrangement in contemporary legal discourses) can it suppress 
its finitude and vulnerability by forbidding any serious challenge to its legitimacy as an 
institution.  We are “allowed” to challenge this or that law in the name of justice, yet this 
justice is always perceived as intimately connected to the very idea of legality, and Kant 
is a great example of this very attitude.  Any attempt to think of justice beyond the order 
of law is to be condemned and immediately suppressed unless we risk the destruction of 
the very fabric of human society.  However, as Derrida’s analysis revealed, it is very 
likely that the order of law intentionally articulates itself as connected, but not identical, 
with justice simply in order to ground itself in a religious idea, now stripped of its 
religiosity and its explicit references to the transcendent order of infinite truths.  If law is 
indeed the necessary condition of justice and therefore there is no “justice beyond law,” 
then, Derrida informed us, we are unable to explain why more laws do not result in more 
justice, but, in fact, in more soulless legalism and therefore injustice.  The relationship 
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between law and justice is therefore problematized by violence that establishes and 
maintains the order of law while also working against it (and itself) in positing the 
transcendent criterion of justice.  The issue of religion, however, is never far away from 
this issue of auto-immune violence (although Derrida arrives at this conclusion in the 
reverse order), because it reveals the fiduciary structure of any trust in legality and its 
ultimate justice.  The idea of justice, having replaced the more explicit references to God, 
cannot completely repress all mentions of religion, primarily because it is postulated as a 
truly exterior point of reference vis-à-vis any societal constitution.  Derrida’s discussion 
of violence shows us, perhaps against his own philosophical wishes, that the movement 
that constitutes the space of difference between law and justice is also the movement 
between the calculability of (human) reason and the incalculability of  (divine) violence.  
This “divine violence,” as Slavoj Žižek puts it in his peculiar reading of Benjamin’s 
essay, “purifies the guilty not of guilt but of law, because law is limited to the living: it 
cannot reach beyond life to touch what is in excess of life, what is more than mere life.”3  
If justice is to show itself as truly beyond law, Derrida seems to suggest, it can only do so 
in the acts of violence in the name of its higher (transcendent) order, although, as we 
pointed out, Derrida stops short of any specific prescriptions when it comes to this 
strange “divine violence” and does not explicitly suggest, as we do, that this is precisely 
where any analysis of “religious violence” should inevitably go.  In fact, neither Kant nor 
Derrida explicitly show us how to talk about the problematic instances of religious 
violence and while formulating a theory of religious violence based on our insights is 
beyond the scope of this work, we would like to provide a number of preliminary 
                                                
3 Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (New York: Picador, 2008), 198. 
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observations necessary, as we argue, for any future theoretical attempts to understand the 
issue of religious violence.  
Our initial hypothesis was that the problem of religious violence is best 
approached and addressed in a new context of the difference between law and justice.  
Having considered Kant’s and Derrida’s contributions to the articulation of this 
difference, it seems appropriate at this point to describe religious violence in the 
following manner: the difference between law and justice, having been established and 
initially articulated, reveals itself as containing a fundamental tension that cannot be 
resolved either in unity or in strict distinction between the two concepts; this tension 
reveals itself in a crisis of religious violence.  If the movement toward the unity (if not 
identity) of law and justice results in the condition of extreme formalization of law, 
religious violence shows itself in acts that are designed to highlight the difference 
through acts of violation of law in the name of justice (acts that do not have to involve 
loss of life or destruction of property, but that are indeed symbolic acts of defiance of 
legality as such that can include, for example, various forms of civil disobedience).  If the 
movement toward the separation (or even complete divorce) of law and justice results in 
complete lack of any reference to universality of lawfulness, religious violence shows 
itself in acts of establishing new law or new legality based on the renewed sense of 
transcendent justice.4  Both tendencies, paradoxically, produce what we might label the 
deficit of justice: in the first scenario, the unity between law and justice eventually 
eliminates the need for any external criterion for evaluating legality (if it is legal, it is 
                                                
4 Although most cases of religious violence are, in fact, thought to be of the first destructive kind, one may 
very well consider such significant Western developments as Gregorian Revolution (papal reform and 
codification of church canon law in eleventh century) or Lutheran Reformation as instances of religiously 
motivated creative acts of intentional realignments of the contemporary legal systems resulting in a new 
societal situation.  
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just) and produces a kind of tyranny of law; in the second scenario, the sharp distinction 
between law and justice raises the question of the very utility of the notion of “justice” in 
our attempts at designing a better society.  If Kant can be read as emphasizing the need 
for the unity of law and justice, and therefore as promoting universal legalization of all 
the social relationships (in some future cosmopolitan condition), then Derrida, especially 
in his endorsement of Benjamin’s call for “justice beyond law” can be read as potentially 
threatening the universality of reason and its grounding of morality and legality.   
If religious violence is to be thought as indicating a crisis in the relationship 
between law and justice, let us attempt to preliminarily describe the conditions of 
emergence of such a crisis and show how all of the issues raised in this study – law, 
justice, violence, and religion – help us in our efforts to do so.  The notion of crisis, we 
hope, captures the complexity of the problem of religious violence.  What follows, 
however, is not a theory of religious violence as such, but only a series of propositions 
that are to serve as a preparatory work for any future attempt to provide such a theory.  
These preliminary remarks are based on our discussions in this study and therefore could 
not have been deduced without a careful study of the issues.  However, it is important to 
reemphasize that both Kant and Derrida, considered together and often forced to interact 
(philosophically), are but entry points into the general theme of placing the problem of 
religious violence alongside the problem of law and justice.   
In order to assess the general problem of this essay and, at the same time, to 
present our hypothesis vis-à-vis religious violence in a new (even if provocative) light, let 
us ask ourselves a difficult question that undoubtedly often haunted the major movements 
of our argument: Is there a redemptive dimension to religious violence? Is it possible to 
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imagine a scenario in which one may not only approve of certain violent acts, but also 
endorse them as necessary?  It is precisely here that the issue of proper contextualization 
affectively draws our attention.  If, by acts of religious violence, we understand acts 
similar to the attacks of 9/11 or the suicide bombings in Palestine or Iraq, it is almost 
impossible to fully understand the motivation behind such acts, let alone to approve of 
them.  The problem, however, is that we somehow already know what is “religious 
violence” when we identify these examples as examples of this type of violence.  Our 
theoretical task here was to step outside of the popular contextualization of religious 
violence as violence committed by religious people in the name of their perverse versions 
of generally peaceful and harmless religious beliefs.  Violence as a deviation from the 
norm, as a violation of the rules of the “proper” conflict resolution, and religion as a set 
of irrational and therefore uncontestable beliefs, combined in a volatile mixture with 
equal portions of anti-modern conservative backwardness, non-Western cultural, social 
and political otherness, and threatening insubordination, usually dominate all more or less 
sophisticated discussions of religious violence.  However, if we take the notion of 
religious violence out of this common context and attempt to resituate it among the 
“respected” concepts of socio-political analysis (law and justice), our theory of religious 
violence, we contend, will serve a proper philosophical function aimed at understanding, 
rather than a simple hysterical denunciation.  
If there is any redemptive dimension to religious violence, we argue, then it is 
found in its very raising of the question of justice: justice is a volatile and active force 
that gathers our thought around the notions of law and order (Kant) and yet that also 
disperses our thought by preventing any closure, any finality in the interaction between 
 194 
 
itself and our moral and legal ideals (Derrida).  Although we causally measure our own 
obedience to the law (our “law-abiding-ness”) over against the criminality of those who 
choose to break the law (while still remaining within the law as criminals), we find the 
intrusion from the “outside,” the possibility of the destruction of the law itself to be most 
frightening because, regardless of our awareness of the finitude and constructability of 
the law, we identify, following Kant and other theorists of right, our very humanity with 
the emergence of the rightful condition.5  The fear of lawlessness, of the relapse into the 
state of nature that is, as Kant insisted, devoid of justice, also indicates that we have, in 
fact, learned to closely identify the condition of law with the condition of justice.  In this 
flat (“immanent”) relationship between law and justice, there is no possibility of a 
legitimate challenge to the order of law that is not already contained within the law itself: 
law improves itself, it corrects itself, and it develops itself according to a set of values 
that somehow also come from within itself.6  The tension between law and justice 
therefore is not a tension between reality and ideality, but a tension between the false 
exteriority of the intra-legal criterion of justice and the true exteriority of justice itself 
that, if we are to follow Derrida, always arrives with a bang (revolution, general strike, 
war, terrorism, coup d’etat and so on) and always challenges the condition of legality as 
                                                
5 In his “Critique of Violence,” Benjamin talks about the strange “secret admiration of the public” for the 
figure of the “great criminal” that does not result from the crime itself but from the “violence to which it 
bears witness.” Cf. Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 281.  It would be an interesting undertaking to 
compare the still existing admiration for “great crime” in the West (daily crime reporting, crime TV shows, 
etc) and the complete lack of any (even perverse) interest in the figure of the “great terrorist” when even a 
slight suggestion that, for example, 9/11 terrorists were to be commended for their determination (consider, 
for example, Bill Maher’s remark along these lines and the reaction it solicited) is dismissed as itself 
terrorist and dangerous: any attempt to understand why 9/11 took place are also condemned as heretical and 
inherently sympathetic to the terrorist agenda.  
6 Harold J. Berman, however, points out in his analysis of the contemporary attitude toward law that the 
“belief in the growth of law, its ongoing character over generations and centuries, has been substantially 
weakened.  The notion is widely held that the apparent development of law – its apparent growth through 
reinterpretation of the past, whether the past is represented by precedent or by codification – is only 
ideological.” Cf. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 38.   
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such.  If law is the moment of stability (Kant) and justice is the moment of change 
(Derrida), then violence in the name of justice both does and does not belong to this 
relationship between law and justice (“contaminates” it, as Derrida puts it).  Both religion 
and law-destroying violence are points of entry into this problematic relationship, as we 
tried to show in this essay.  However, if we take a clue from Derrida, we are to 
distinguish between a genuine religious passion (“messianicity”) that arises from our 
awareness of the fundamental instability of human institutions (and therefore brings the 
problem of law and justice out into the open) and a false manipulative violence against 
certain laws and regulations that presents itself as a violence driven by religious 
principles (unarticulated, hidden, pre-logical, “worst violence” of Derrida’s analysis).       
If human existence is primarily determined by its lack of determinacy and 
certainty, if religion is not a set of special duties, but a set of attitudes toward our duties, 
then both Kant and Derrida conceptualize violence of such religion as a disruptive and 
disconcerting reminder of this human condition of finitude.  All of this, of course, would 
sound very sophisticated and philosophical, if, in fact, we were not dealing with such an 
impactful issue as violence against our fellow human beings, even if in the name of 
justice and some future peace and harmony.  The very fact that it is extremely difficult to 
stay on the level of high abstraction indicates to us that any theorization of religious 
violence will have to deal with this very tension between, on the one hand, attempting to 
formulate a theory and therefore bracket all the premature evaluations of certain events, 
despite their horrific and shocking nature, and, on the other hand, dealing with what is 
already prejudged as the examples of religious violence.  To put it differently, the 
paradox of any theorization – how do we recognize an example of that which we are 
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undertaking to study and therefore the definitive description of which we are yet to 
produce? – is complicated here by the very visceral reaction we have to the subject matter 
under investigation.  Therefore, before we end this essay, we insert this disclaimer: there 
is a risk that in our investigation of the proper contextualization of religious violence we 
may come across as endorsing or insufficiently condemning certain aspects of it, despite 
the obvious fallacy of expecting one to evaluate something before it is properly 
conceptualized; however, we are willing to run such a risk, not to justify religious 
violence but to show how it can be understood as revealing a possible way of looking at 
any action toward justice, because only then can we really attempt to provide a way of 
reaching the same just condition non-violently.   
If any discussion of law is immediately complicated by the idea of justice, and 
any discussion of law and justice is immediately complicated by the problem of violence, 
then any discussion of religion today is to be conceived as necessary for any serious 
discussion of justice.  As some contemporary theorists are pointing out, the “institutions 
of secular liberal democracy simply do not sufficiently motivate their citizenry.”7  If 
secular liberal politics fail to motivate us in our pursuit of a more just and peaceful 
society, then religion as an affective symbolic system with a powerful motivational 
tradition can be seen as stepping right in and compensating for the lack of properly 
political imagination and motivation.  If the norms of contemporary legal and political 
discourses are externally binding but not internally compelling, then the secular liberal 
democratic citizenry will either fall back into dogmatic slumber of mindless capitalist 
consumption or be rudely awakened to the realities of powerful and pervasive religious 
                                                
7 Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (New York: Verso, 
2007), 7. 
 197 
 
motivations aiming at changing the world (for better or for worse).  If, as Michal J. 
Sandel insightfully observes, “fundamentalists rush in where liberals fear to tread,” then 
reassessing the role of religion is not really a matter of choice, but a matter of necessity.8  
The subject matter of religious violence, then, is a better entry point into the discussion of 
the public role of religion because, unlike other aspects of the ever-present conflict 
between religious motivations and secular commitments, it cannot be easily ignored or 
theorized away as non-representative of the general peaceful nature of religious beliefs.   
This is the paradoxical nature of any act of violence directed at a larger societal 
arrangement: it aims to attract attention to something that is beyond itself and, despite our 
general attempts to deal with such acts in a way that does not promote their future use, it 
is by and large successful in that it does draw attention to the issues in question.  In this 
sense, acts of religious violence present themselves as means to an end and a primary task 
for any future theory of religious violence then should be to investigate the complex set 
of issues related to this end.  In this essay we have tried to show that this end is justice 
and that any serious approach to religious violence must take into consideration the 
complex relationship between law and justice.  
                                                
8 Michael J. Sanders, “Political Liberalism,” in Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 246. 
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Appendix: Abbreviations. 
 
All citations from Kant’s writings are from the so-called Akademie edition, 
abbreviated as “Ak.” (Kants Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königlich preussischen [later, 
Deutschen] Akademie der Wissenschaften [Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1900 
– ).  The following abbreviations refer to the English translations that will be used in this 
essay more than once:  
 
CF “The Conflict of Faculties.” In Religion and Rational Theology. 
Translated and Edited by Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 239-309.  
 
CPR Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and Edited by Paul Guyer and Allen 
W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
CPrR Critique of Practical Reason. In Practical Philosophy. Translated and 
Edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
137-276. 
 
Groundwork Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In Practical Philosophy. 
Translated and Edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, 41-108. 
 
MM Metaphysics of Morals in Practical Philosophy. Translated and Edited by 
Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 361-603.   
 
PP Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. Translated by Ted Humphrey. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983. 
 
Religion Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. In Religion and Rational 
Theology. Translated and Edited by Allen W. Wood and George di 
Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 55-215. 
 
Derrida’s writing will be cited from the following English translations, using the 
following abbreviations:  
 
FK “Faith and Knowledge.” In Acts of Religion. Translated and Edited by Gil 
Anijar. New York: Routledge, 2002, 42-101. 
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FL “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’.” In Acts of 
Religion. Translated and Edited by Gil Anijar. New York: Routledge, 
2002, 230-298. 
 
Limited Limited Inc. Translated by Samuel Weber. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1988. 
 
